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Abstract 
 Since the 1990s, Taiwan’s capital market has been tarnished by several corporate 
scandals, many involving managerial embezzlements and false/misleading financial 
reports. One of the main reasons why these scandals frequently occurred is the lack of an 
effective system of checks-and-balances or good corporate governance mechanisms 
within Taiwan’s companies. To deal with this deficiency for corporate governance, there 
have been many discussions in Taiwan’s academia of corporate laws about how to reform 
the provisions of Taiwan Company Act, especially for a better internal monitoring 
mechanism.   
 In fact, in last two decades, Taiwan has taken a series of legal reforms as an 
attempt to build a system for better corporate governance. For instance, in 2002 Taiwan 
for the first time introduced independent directors in hopes that U.S. experience in this 
regard can be a good model for Taiwan, and in 2006 Taiwan Securities and Exchange Act 
added new amendments making independent directors statutory and legally different 
from non-independent directors. 
 However, there are still many issues or topics that need reform, but they draw 
little attention from Taiwan policymakers. The institution of shareholder derivative 
  viii 
litigation, which was introduced into the Taiwan Company Act in 1966, is one such 
example. Due to strict pre-suit requirements, very few cases brought in practice, so two 
amendments were enacted to lower the requirements in hopes of activating it. However, 
the amendments have made no real difference: fewer than ten cases have been brought 
since the latest amendment in 2001. Thus, this institution has almost been extinct under 
the Taiwan Company Act.  
 This dissertation argues that Taiwan’s current provisions regarding the 
shareholder derivative litigation are ill-designed and need reform soon for better 
corporate governance. The dissertation offers a feasible proposal for future reform, along 
with comparative analyses of derivative suits in the U.S., other East Asian countries and 
Taiwan. An important goal of my research will be how to make this institution 
practicable in a more effective manner in Taiwan. 
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Chapter One: An Introduction 
I. Background and Motivation 
Since the 1990s, Taiwan’s capital market has been tarnished by several corporate 
scandals; and many involved managerial embezzlements and false/misleading financial 
reports. One theory for why these scandals frequently occurred is the lack of effective 
system of checks-and-balances existed within most Taiwanese companies.1 Without 
adequate monitoring against directors and officers (the management), it is possible that 
they have had significant opportunities may exist to exploit the interests of the companies 
that company directors and others are supposed to serve. To deal with the deficiencies for 
corporate governance, there have been many discussions in Taiwan’s academia of 
corporate laws about how to reform the provisions of Taiwan Company Act (TCA).2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Securities and Futures Institute (“SFI”), Corporate Governance in Taiwan 1 (Nov., 2013), available at 
2 An English version of GONGSI FA [Company Act] (Taiwan), available at 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawContent.aspx?PCODE=J0080001 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
Please note the official version of the Act is written in Chinese and is available at 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Law/LawSearchResult.aspx?p=A&t=A1A2E1F1&k1=%E5%85%AC%E5%8F%B8
%E6%B3%95 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). The Text of the English version is only for English speakers’ 
references. 
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Building better internal monitoring mechanisms should be a key component of such 
reforms.3   
During the past two decades, Taiwan has made a series of legal reforms with an 
attempt to build a system of effective corporate governance. For example, in order to 
provide a more efficient and robust system of checks-and-balances, Taiwan introduced 
some entirely new concepts such as independent directors, an audit committee, and a 
compensation committee, which were not provided in the original version of the Taiwan 
Company Act.4 The institution of independent directors is derived from the United States, 
which is a leader in corporate law, and this corporate governance mechanism can solve or 
alleviate the agency problem that has occurred in modern companies. In 2002, Taiwan for 
the first time introduced independent directors with the hope that the American 
experience would be a good model for Taiwan.5  
By amending the listing rules, the Taiwan Stock Exchange, with support from 
Taiwan’s competent authority, required newly-listed companies to appoint at least two 
independent directors and one supervisor. Their listing applications would be denied if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See SFI, supra note 1, at 9.  
4 See SFI, supra note 1, at 9-22. 
5 See SFI, supra note 1, at 10; see also Taiwan Stock Exchange, Corporate Governance Center, available at 
http://cgc.twse.com.tw/frontEN/aboutCorpgov (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).  
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they failed to comply with such a requirement.6 However, at that time, the concept of 
“independent directors” had no special legal meaning distinguished from non-
independent directors.7 A director could be an independent director if he or she met 
independence qualifications set by Taiwan Stock Exchange, but, legally, he or she was 
also a regular director under Taiwan Company Act.  
In 2006, Taiwan went further. The Taiwan Securities and Exchange Act was 
amended to make independent directors statutory and legally different from non-
independent directors. 8  Basically, unless required by the competent authority (i.e., 
Financial Supervisory Commission), the appointment of independent directors was made 
optional. 9  Anyone can be an independent director only if he or she meets the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Lawrence S. Liu, Corporate Governance Development in the Greater China: A Taiwan Perspective 4 
(November 2-3, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=293081 [hereinafter Liu, Corporate 
Governance Development in the Greater China]. Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Rules Governing 
Review of Securities Listings art. 9. An English version of Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Rules 
Governing Review of Securities Listings, available at http://eng.selaw.com.tw/FLAWDAT0201.asp (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2014). Please note the official version of the Act is written in Chinese and is available at 
http://www.selaw.com.tw/Scripts/Query4B.asp?FullDoc=%A9%D2%A6%B3%B1%F8%A4%E5&Lcode=
G0100561 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
7 See Liu, Corporate Governance Development in the Greater China, supra note 6, at 4-5. 
8 ZHENGQUAN JIAOYI FA [Securities and Exchange Act] art. 14-2 (Taiwan). Taiwan Securities and 
Exchange Act has many provisions of corporate governance. These provisions are specially enacted for 
public companies and can preempt some provisions in Taiwan Company Act. An English version of the 
ZHENGQUAN JIAOYI FA [Securities and Exchange Act] (Taiwan), available at 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=G0400001 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). Please 
note the official version of the Act is written in Chinese and is available at 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=G0400001 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). The Text of 
the English version is only for English speakers’ references. 
9 According to latest order issued by Taiwan Financial Supervisory Commission in December 2013, all 
listed companies shall appoint independent directors by end of 2017. See The press release of Taiwan 
Financial Supervisory Commission in Dec. 16, 2013, 
  4 
qualifications and the companies comply with procedural requirements (i.e., amending 
the articles of association contending the appointment of independent directors, adopting 
nominating rules, and separating election of independent from non-independent 
directors).10 From then on, the concept of independent directors became a statutory 
monitoring device.  
Once a company appoints independent directors, some items should be discussed 
and resolved in the boardroom. These items in nature are fundamental or have potential 
conflict-of-interest concerns, including the issuance of equity securities, the appointment 
and removal of accountants, and self-dealings.11 Thus, independent directors are expected 
to join the discussions and detect suspicious transactions before they are executed. 
However, at present, few companies in Taiwan have boards in which a majority of their 
members consists of independent directors.  
As the minority in the boardroom, independent directors cannot prevent 
transactions that they believe are improper or otherwise not in the best interests of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.fsc.gov.tw/en/home.jsp?id=54&parentpath=0,2&mcustomize=multimessage_view.jsp&dataser
no=201401020002&aplistdn=ou=news,ou=multisite,ou=english,ou=ap_root,o=fsc,c=tw&toolsflag=Y (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
10 ZHENGQUAN JIAOYI FA [Securities and Exchange Act] art. 14-2 (Taiwan). 
11 ZHENGQUAN JIAOYI FA [Securities and Exchange Act] art. 14-3 (Taiwan). 
  5 
company. Board minutes provide the only mechanism for them to express and record 
dissenting opinions12 meaning that they can signal “red flags” to investors and the public 
by expressing such opinions. Of course, they can also resign from the board, which 
would send a stronger signal. Yet, notwithstanding the reform of independent directors, 
we may have a long way to go if the U.S.-typed corporate governance is to be adopted in 
Taiwan. These reforms can show Taiwan is in need of effective corporate governance 
mechanisms to solve its governance problems.13  
Another example is the introduction of fiduciary duty which was established by 
court cases in common law jurisdictions. Taiwan, as a civil law jurisdiction, regulates the 
agency relationship through statutes.14 In the original version of the Taiwan Company 
Act, directors and officers are mandated to observe the duty of care owed to the 
companies in which they serve. Similar to the duty of care in American law, directors and 
officers should act with prudent care. However, there are no similar concepts like duty of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Id. 
13 LAWRENCE S. LIU, Global Markets and Parochial Institutions: The Transformation of Taiwan’s 
Corporate Law System, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 419 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003) [hereinafter LIU, 
The Transformation of Taiwan’s Corporate Law System].  
14 About regulations governing agency relationships, see MIN FA [Civil Code] arts. 103-118 (Taiwan). An 
English version of MIN FA [Civil Code] (Taiwan), available at 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=B0000001 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
  6 
loyalty.15 The TCA uses only two provisions to deal with the conflicts of interest. Article 
209 of the TCA requires directors to secure approval from the shareholder’s meeting with 
all relevant information before they actually engage in any competition behaviors. 
According to Article 223 of the TCA, in cases involving self-dealing, a supervisor (but 
not the president of the company) should be the representative of the company.  
These two provisions, however, apply in such limited circumstances that many 
types of breach of duty of loyalty remain unregulated. For instance, a director might not 
be liable for usurping corporate opportunities when such usurpation is not deemed 
competitive behavior under Article 209 of the TCA. That appears unreasonable and could 
give directors so many opportunities to exploit interests at the expenses of shareholders. 
Therefore, in 2001, Taiwan introduced the duty of loyalty to try to limit such unregulated 
and unfiduciary behavior.16  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Liu, Corporate Governance Development in the Greater China, supra note 6, at 10; see also LIU, 
The Transformation of Taiwan’s Corporate Law System, supra note 13, at 420. 
16 See id. at 420. “Duty of loyalty” was added into Paragraph 1, Article 23 of Taiwan Company Act in a 
2001 amendment. See GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 23 § 1 (Taiwan). Paragraph 1, Article 23 of 
Taiwan Company Act provides “[t]he responsible person of a company shall have the loyalty and shall 
exercise the due care of a good administrator in conducting the business operation of the company…” See 
LAWRENCE S. LIU, The Politics of Corporate Governance in Taiwan, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 263 (Hideki Kanda et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter LIU, The Politics of 
Corporate Governance in Taiwan].     
  7 
The introduction of the duty of loyalty raises questions about its application (e.g., 
what is its judicial review standard?). Unlike other common law jurisdictions, Taiwan has 
no prior cases substantiating this duty.17 In addition, Taiwan lacks a concept like stare 
decisis so that judicial cases (i.e., precedents) do not have binding authority for future 
cases. That raises concerns for establishing a uniform judicial review standard. Still, the, 
introduction of the duty of loyalty implies that Taiwan policymakers prefer to deal with 
agency problems by expanding the scope of duty that directors and officers bear as agents 
of the companies.  
However, there are still many matters that need reform, but that have not yet 
sufficiently drawn Taiwan policymakers’ attention. The institution of shareholder 
derivative litigation, which was introduced into TCA in 1966 is one example.18 However, 
due to strict pre-suit requirements (e.g., plaintiff[s] should hold 10% or more of the 
company’s outstanding shares), very few suits were filed in this matter, so that two 
amendments were enacted to lower the requirements (down to 3%) in hopes of activating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See LIU, The Transformation of Taiwan’s Corporate Law System, supra note 13, at 420. Professor Liu 
also indicates that “with the underdevelopment of fiduciary duty in Taiwan is uncertainty as to whom the 
duty is owed.” 
18 WANG RUU TSENG & WALLACE WEN YEU WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan: Legal and Cultural 
Hurdles with A Glimmer of Hope for the Future, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 215 (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter TSENG & WANG, 
Derivative Actions in Taiwan]. 
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it. However, the amendments actually make no real difference and only eight cases have 
been brought since the latest amendment, which was enacted in 2001.19 It is possible that 
current pre-suit requirements remain too strict and thus provide no incentives for 
shareholders to bring suits.20 
Admittedly, compared with a robust internal monitoring system through the 
introduction of independent directors and audit committees, and the expansion of 
fiduciary duty (the introduction of duty of loyalty), the institution of shareholder 
derivative litigation is more controversial, which is probably why there is no consensus 
about its reforms. The controversial natures of institution of shareholder derivative 
litigation will be briefly illustrated below.  
Directors and officers owe fiduciary duty to the company in which they serve, and 
the company has a cause of action against those who breach their fiduciary duty. 
Directors and officers, however, are the persons in charge of all the matters in connection 
with the company’s business operations, including whether litigations against themselves 
should be brought. Of course, there is no reason to believe that the wrongdoing directors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See id. at 215, 223.  
20 See id. at 221. 
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or officers will impartially institute an action against themselves on behalf of the 
company.21 Because of directors’ inability to objectively exercise their authority in such 
situations, the institution of shareholder derivative litigation is expected to serve as a 
substitute.22  
Furthermore, the institution of shareholder derivative litigation in theory has a 
deterrent effect against directors. Without such an institution, which effectively enforces 
the regulations of fiduciary duty, it is unlikely that directors will faithfully discharge their 
fiduciary duties to the company. Therefore, whether regulations of fiduciary duty can 
effectively be enforced becomes essential in constraining agent’s behavior. 23  The 
institution of shareholder derivative litigation can serve as a deterrent against potential 
wrongdoers, especially company directors and officers. Hence, this institution can 
become an important corporate governance mechanism because it can lower fiduciaries’ 
incentives to breach their corporate duties.24  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See id. at 216. 
22 Id.  
23 JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., Agency Problems, Legal Strategies and Enforcement, in THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 21(Reinier R. Kraakman et al. eds., 2d 
ed., 2009). 
24 Professor Romano refers to “shareholder litigation is accorded an important stopgap role in corporate 
law.” See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 
55, 55 (1991) [hereinafter Romano, The Shareholder Suit]. The litigation is thought as a tool to align 
managers’ incentives and shareholders’ interests that corporate directors and officers would not breach of 
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However, such an institution can also be burdensome for directors and officers, 
because they are usually targets as defendants in these types of suits. Afraid of being sued, 
they might make decisions in a risk-averse manner to protect themselves from easily 
being sued. A value-maximizing manner with high legal risk will be intentionally ignored. 
Such risk-averse behavior might in turn have an adverse effect on shareholder wealth 
maximization. Another disadvantage is that shareholder derivative litigation may be 
abused by shareholders who intend to strike at current management regardless of how 
bad an effect their litigation will produce. Once a suit is brought, defendant directors will 
need to spend a lot of time and money on their defense and thus will not be able to pay 
full attention to running the company, which may result in it suffering huge losses.  
Taking all the advantages and disadvantages of shareholder derivation litigation 
into consideration, corporate scholars believe that it should be allowed only in some 
exceptional situations. But how to design this institution may depend on a variety of 
factors, and there may be no an absolutely right approach to this issue. The bottom line is 
that such a derivative suit should play a role in some “exceptional situations” if it has 
positive functions in the context of corporate governance.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
their duty of care and loyalty. Moreover, shareholder derivative litigation is considered as “the chief 
regulator of corporate management.” See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).  
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However, as mentioned above, such an institution has almost become been extinct; 
there have been very few cases in Taiwan because of the ill-designed derivative suit 
system provided in the TCA. Undoubtedly, the institution’s current status is far from why 
this institution was introduced into that Act. Thus, this dissertation argues that Taiwan’s 
current provisions regarding shareholder derivative litigation are ill-designed and need a 
reform soon for better corporate governance. In fact, the enforcement should be as 
important as other corporate governance mechanisms. If there are any expectations from 
shareholder derivative litigation, Taiwan should seriously consider how to make this 
institution more effective.  
In conclusion, this dissertation will offer feasible proposals for future reform, 
along with comparative analyses of U.S., Taiwanese, and other East Asian countries’ 
derivative suits. An important aspect will be how to make this institution practicable in a 
more effective manner.  
II. Questions to Be Explored  
The specific questions to be explored in this dissertation will include (but not 
limited to):  
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(1) What advantages and disadvantages does the institution of shareholder 
derivative litigations have in terms of corporate governance? 
(2) How has such litigation been utilized by Taiwanese, U.S., and other East 
Asian countries’ shareholders?  
(3) Why does the institution of shareholder derivative litigation fail to function in 
Taiwan, the U.S. and other East Asian countries?   
(4) What problems do Taiwanese shareholders face when they bring a derivative 
suit?  
(5) How could this measure function as a good governance mechanism that also 
can effectively police strike suits?       
This dissertation will analyze the practicality of the institution of shareholder 
derivative litigation by exploring these questions, especially through comparative studies 
involving Taiwan, the U.S. and other East Asian countries.  
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III. Methodology Used in this Dissertation  
Three primary research methods which will be used in this dissertation: citation 
analysis, data collection and analysis, and case studies. 
First, citation analysis will focus on a theoretical foundation, consisting of 
research literature in the U.S., other East Asian countries and Taiwan, that involves 
shareholder derivative litigation.  
The data collection and analysis requires surveys on data relating to shareholder 
derivative litigation. For example, a survey on how many shareholder derivative suits 
have been brought to date in Taiwan can support the argument that the institution of 
shareholder derivative litigation rarely has been used by Taiwanese shareholders. Surveys 
will be conducted to explore other mechanisms similar or relating to derivative litigation 
in Taiwan, e.g., class-action suits recently played an important role as a legal remedy for 
securities fraud victims. Class-action litigation, if properly being utilized, also can have a 
deterrent effect similar to that of shareholder derivative litigation. While shareholder 
derivative litigation remains a focus in this dissertation, the interrelationship between 
class action and shareholder derivative litigation may provide some useful implications 
for reforms on shareholder derivative litigation.  
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Case study will help readers understand what problems a plaintiff might face 
when proceeding with a shareholder derivative litigation. Although very few cases were 
brought, studying cases also may provide useful lessons. Finally, a government-
sanctioned non-profit organization, the Investors Protection Center, which was formed in 
2003, is exclusively authorized by law to commence class-action litigations, representing 
securities fraud victims and to bring derivative litigations with lifted pre-suit 
requirements in the TCA. Thus, the Investors Protection Center has become the most 
important locus for the private enforcement of securities regulations and corporate law. 
Any research is incomplete that does not study cases by the Investors Protection Center.  
IV. Structure of this Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is divided into several chapters as below: 
Chapter two is Corporate Governance in Taiwan, will introduce the background, 
framework and features of Taiwan’s system of corporate governance, including problems 
that Taiwan is facing. Case studies of recent scandals will provide a perspective on 
deficiencies for Taiwan corporate governance. Finally, this chapter will illustrate legal 
remedies for Taiwanese shareholders available, and analyze why legal remedies are 
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largely useless for shareholders. Thus, the institution of derivative suits can be a method 
that improves corporate governance in Taiwan. 
Chapter Three, Derivative Litigations System in Taiwan, offers a comprehensive 
analysis of the current derivative suit system in Taiwan, and discusses the impracticable 
hurdles for shareholders. 
Chapter Four, Securities Investors and Futures Trader Protection Act and the 
Investors Protection Center, provides a comprehensive introduction to the Protection 
Center, including its structure, functions, and performances since its establishment. 
Recognizing derivative suit as a good corporate governance mechanism, Taiwanese 
policymakers have established a government-sanctioned non-profit organization to 
commence derivative suits by lifting some unreasonably strict pre-suit requirements 
provided in the TCA. The data show that there is a rapid increase on the number of 
derivative suits, which might imply that existing requirements are indeed too strict and 
need to be amended. 
Chapter Five, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in the United States, will provide 
a comprehensive study on issues related to the institution of derivative suits in the U.S. 
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Because American derivative suits can be a model for Taiwan, the comparison would be 
inform my suggestions for future reform of Taiwan’s corporate governance. 
Chapter Six is Shareholder Derivative Litigation in East Asia This chapter will 
introduce the institution of derivative litigations in Japan, China, and South Korea. 
Taiwan has a similar culture background and legal systems as those of these East Asian 
countries. The comparisons will offer insights into what kind of reforms are needed for 
Taiwan’s system of derivative suits.  
Chapter Seven, Suggestions and Conclusion, offers concrete proposals for the 
future reform of shareholder derivative litigation in Taiwan. The Conclusion will 
integrate all the important findings in previous chapters into a conclusion as a whole.  
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Chapter Two: Corporate Governance in Taiwan 
This chapter offers a fundamental understanding of corporate governance in Taiwan. 
It begins with a brief introduction to the subject of corporate governance and then 
illustrates how Taiwan’s legal framework develops laws and regulations for corporate 
governance. This chapter will also describe some governance concerns and problems that 
Taiwan currently faces and explains why these problems arise. A corporate scandal 
(involving the Rebar Group) is discussed to illustrate corporate governance problems. 
Finally, this chapter will introduce the types of legal remedy available for shareholders of 
Taiwan’s companies when directors breach their fiduciary duties or defraud shareholders. 
I. Introduction 
What does corporate governance mean? While each scholar may have his or her 
own definition, according to the principles of corporate governance issued by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “[c]orporate 
governance is one key element in improving economic efficiency and growth as well as 
enhancing investor confidence.”25 To achieve these goals, corporate governance should 
involve “a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders,”26 while a “good corporate governance should 
provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in 
the interests of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 11, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
26 See id.  
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monitoring.”27 From the above quotes, the concept of corporate governance now seems 
clear and important, but that was not the case two decades ago in East Asia (including 
Taiwan).  
In 1997, there were an explosion of corporate scandals in East Asia that involved 
certain types of cheating behaviors, such as false financial reports and embezzlements. It 
was believed that the corporate governance in Asia was so weak that some powerful 
persons in a given company (e.g., directors or controlling shareholders) could easily 
exploit improper or derive illegitimate gains from the company’s assets. Such 
wrongdoings tended to be processed secretly, and would not be broken out until the 
wrongdoers fled away or intentionally went bankrupt. Thus, shareholders of the company, 
as residual claimants, usually were the persons who bore all the losses after such scandals 
exploded. Concerned with these types of issues, investors would be more cautious while 
making investments and the credibility of all companies would be severely undermined in 
the capital markets. In other words, investors began to care about not only a company’s 
ability in making profits, but also its governance risks when they made their investment 
decisions because an investment in a company with poor governance might well be 
riskier than one in a company with better governance. With better corporate governance, 
a company’s sustainability and profitability is more likely to be expected. Good 
governance can provide restraints on improper managerial exploitations or other 
exploitative behaviors.28 As such, investors (especially Western institutional investors) 
will take corporate governance issues into serious account when choosing investment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See id. 
28 Securities and Futures Institute, Corporate Governance in Taiwan 2-3 (Nov., 2013), available at 
http://www.sfi.org.tw/E/Plate.aspx?ID=332 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
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targets. In a globalized society, good corporate governance as a whole in a given country 
will help improve its competiveness in the capital markets. Thus, when a country builds a 
sound and good corporate governance system, it helps its companies raise capital in an 
efficient manner.  
With an understanding that corporate governance plays an important role in the 
capital market, corporate governance has become one of the most popular topics one 
hotly discussed in academia and in law practices around the world. For example, the 
OECD issues the principles of corporate governance that emphasize its importance of 
corporate governance, and its promulgated principles have become important sources for 
investors, companies, and policymakers in the world for their references. Also, after 2001 
when some serious scandals like Enron and WorldCom exploded in the U.S., and the U.S. 
government took some correlative acts in order to deal with governance issues. The most 
famous one should be the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.29 The Act was 
designed to protect investors by requiring corporations to provide reliable and accurate 
disclosures to the public in accordance with federal securities regulations. 
Taiwan is part of this trend of adopting measures for better corporate governance. 
Although the 1997 Asian financial crisis harmed Taiwan less than other countries, many 
corporate scandals have still occurred since the 1990s and have deeply tarnished 
Taiwan’s capital markets. Many involved embezzlement and false financial reports. 
Taiwan’s commentators believe that a main reason for so many scandals is that no 
effective checks-and-balances system exists to provide adequate monitoring and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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deterrence of directors and officers who run a company. Hence, debates have occurred in 
Taiwan’s academia about how to improve corporate governance. To deal with this issue, 
Taiwan has under taken a series of reforms to build a better governance system. The most 
important reforms include the introduction of independent directors, audit committees, 
and remuneration committees. 
However, the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) deemed these 
reforms are important, but not enough for good corporate governance.30 As observed in 
the “ACGA White Paper on Corporate Governance in Taiwan” issued in February 2011, 
“if Taiwan brings its corporate governance regime more closely into line with global best 
practices, this would help to attract more investment and make its capital markets more 
internationally competitive.”31 In this paper, the ACGA made recommendations in three 
key areas to improve Taiwanese corporate governance practices: shareholder meetings 
and voting, board effectiveness, and shareholder rights.32 
II. The Basic Framework and Internal Governance System in the Taiwan 
Company Act 
The Taiwan Company Act (TCA) and the Taiwan Securities and Exchange Act 
(TSEA) are the primary legal sources for corporate governance in Taiwan. The TCA is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA), an independent and non-profit membership 
organization was established in 1999. The goal of ACGA is dedicated to encourage effective corporate 
governance practices throughout Asian countries. See ACGA, http://www.acga-asia.org/ (last visited Oct. 
25, 2014). 
31 ACGA White Paper on Corporate Governance in Taiwan 5 (February 2011), available at 
http://www.acga-
asia.org/public/files/ACGA%20Taiwan%20White%20Paper%20(February%202011)%20(FINAL)%20Feb
%2021.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).  
32 See id.  
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the basic governing law for Taiwanese companies,33 includes some fundamental matters 
related to the establishment of a company, the authority and procedural rules of 
shareholder’s meeting and the board of directors, the authority of supervisors, merger, 
and dissolution and liquidation. In addition, the TSEA has provisions concerning 
corporate governance that can preempt provisions in the TCA. Basically, provisions in 
the TSEA are only applicable to public companies but not to closed companies. As 
Taiwan is a civil law jurisdiction, provision and statutes (but judicial cases) consist of 
primary legal sources.  
Under the TCA, a company’s internal governance system should include three 
basic components: the board of directors, supervisors and shareholders’ meetings. 
A. The Board of Directors 
According to the TCA, the board of directors should consist of at least three 
directors, who are elected at a shareholder’s meeting.34 In a public company, the TSEA 
provides that the number of directors should be at least five.35 In general, the board of 
directors should have a very wide range of authority over the operations of the company, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 There are four types of companies that are allowed to be incorporated. They include Unlimited Company, 
Limited Company, Unlimited Company with Limited Liability Shareholders and Company Limited by 
Shares. Company Limited by Shares is the only type, which can issue shares to the public. Such type of 
companies is similar to corporations in the U.S., which is the most important in practice. Please note in this 
dissertation a Taiwanese company refers only to Company Limited by Shares.  
34 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 192 (Taiwan). 
35 ZHENGQUAN JIAOYI FA [Securities and Exchange Act] art. 26-3 (Taiwan). The board of directors of 
a company that has issued stock in accordance with the Act may not number less than five persons. 
  22 
unless certain matters are specifically reserved for shareholder’s meeting in accordance 
with the provisions of laws and articles of incorporation.36  
Unlike the board of directors of a U.S. corporation, the board of directors in Taiwan 
is not regarded as a pure monitoring device. Specifically, although the statute of U.S. 
corporation law usually provides that the board of directors is a statutory device invested 
with the power to manage a corporation’s affairs, the board rarely does so. As a matter of 
fact, a U.S. board tends to manage the corporation through appointing senior officers (e.g., 
the chief executive officer and chief financial officer) and supervises their performances. 
Thus, the board’s role in a U.S. corporation usually is not managing but monitoring. On 
the contrary, the board of directors in a Taiwanese company is usually deeply involved in 
executing the company’s business. Although the board of directors may appoint senior 
officers and managers to run the business in a daily basis, directors usually serve as 
officers and managers.  
The chairman of the board of directors who usually serves as the company’s a 
president, usually has a great deal of influence on board’s decision and even on the 
company’s operations. In the U.S., the positions of chairman and president usually are 
separate in a larger corporation. In Taiwan, however, the president must be a director 
(called as “chief director” or “lead director”) with the power to chair the board’s meetings. 
In the meantime, the president also serves as a statutory representative. As a 
representative, the president has the necessary authority to perform his or her duty, 
though some important items (such as fundamental transactions) need to secure approval 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 As provided by the Company Act, the matters include transfer of corporate fundamental asset, merger, 
such as appointment and removal of directors and so on.  
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from the shareholder’s meeting or board of directors before he/she acts. As a Taiwanese 
commentator contends, a chairman who is also a statutory representative of the company 
becomes “king of the corporate empire” in the term of Taiwanese Confucianism.37 Thus, 
the board of directors in Taiwan has two primary functions: executive and the monitoring 
of officers.  
B. Supervisors  
A company should appoint at least one supervisor, for a public company, two or 
more are required.38 The supervisor’s function is to monitor the board of directors and 
officers.39 Unlike the so-called one-tier board system adopted in the U.S., Taiwan has 
two-tier board system in which the board of directors is responsible for executing 
decisions while the supervisors are for monitoring. Hence, although the board of directors 
has the authority to monitor officers, when directors and officers are same persons, it is 
unrealistic to expect directors to be good monitors of officers. Thus, the supervisor plays 
an important internal control role in monitoring directors and officers. The major task of 
supervisors is to monitor directors and management, to investigate the company’s 
corporate business and financial condition, to ask the board to stop improper behavior, 
and to audit the company’s property. More importantly, supervisors can verify the 
accuracy of financial reports prepared by the board of directors.40  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See LIU, The Transformation of Taiwan’s Corporate Law System, supra note 13, at 418. 
38 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 216 (Taiwan). 
39 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 218 (Taiwan). 
40 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 218 (Taiwan). 
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Unlike Germany’s traditional two-tier board system in Taiwan, the board of 
directors and supervisors are not in a hierarchical relationship but, a parallel one. Both 
directors and supervisors are elected at shareholders’ meetings, and supervisors have no 
power to remove directors.  
C. Shareholders’ Meeting 
Under the TCA, shareholders can exercise certain rights to monitor company’s 
management as following: (1) to submit a proposal; 41 (2) to elect and remove directors 
and supervisors;42 (3) to approve fundamental transactions to transfer the whole or a 
substantial part of the company’s assets;43 (4) to determine the compensation of directors 
and supervisors;44 (5) to institute a lawsuit against directors or supervisors on behalf of 
the company.45 
III. Corporate Governance Problems in Taiwan 
A. Failure of the Supervisors System 
As a monitoring device, supervisors are expected to provide robust and effective 
checks on the board of directors and officers. However, the monitoring functions are in 
reality limited. Supervisors usually fail to function in a way they are expected to do. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 172-1 (Taiwan). 
42 GONGSI FA [Company Act] arts. 192, 216 (Taiwan). 
43 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 185 (Taiwan). 
44 GONGSI FA [Company Act] arts. 196, 227 (Taiwan). 
45 GONGSI FA [Company Act] arts. 214, 227 (Taiwan).  
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Sometimes they even become the accomplices in a corporate scandal. The main reason 
why supervisors fail to do their jobs can is that Taiwan Company Act builds a powerless 
and non-independent supervisors system.46  
First, as a monitoring device, supervisors should be objective and independent, so 
the TCA requires that a supervisor should not concurrently be a director, officer or 
employee of the company. 47  However, such a requirement cannot guarantee  
independence. Directors and supervisors are elected by shareholders, and elections for 
each must be held separately. Thus, large shareholders can cast their votes in both 
elections and acquire as many seats of directors and supervisors as possible, so that the 
majority of the board of directors and the majority of supervisors might be supported by 
the same shareholder(s). 48  In the situation in which directors and supervisors are 
“captured” by the same shareholder(s), it is difficult to expect supervisors to effectively 
monitor directors. In a given company, in which a controlling shareholder is actively 
involved in the company’s operations, he or she might secure a majority of board 
members and supervisors, which would make the supervisor system fail to function as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See LIU, The Transformation of Taiwan’s Corporate Law System, supra note 13, at 418 (indicated that 
“candidates for directors and supervisors are often supports of the same group of insiders (or more 
specifically, the chairman of the board), and they rarely perform an independent role”).  
47 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 222 (Taiwan). 
48 See Liu, Corporate Governance Development in the Greater China, supra note 6, at 5, 10. 
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expected. 49  And in practice, supervisors usually have close family or social ties with 
directors or large shareholders. Thus, when directors, officers, or big shareholders 
commit wrongdoing, supervisors cannot serve as effective monitors for the shareholders’ 
interests (especially minority shareholders). 
In addition to non-independence, the weak supervisory power provided in the TCA 
is another main reason why supervisors fail to function independently and otherwise 
effectively. For example, supervisors can request that the board or individual director 
stop behaviors that violate laws and articles of association.50 However, the board of 
directors could ignore supervisors’ request. Although directors will be liable for their 
misconduct, which could result in damages, it is usually too late for the company to make 
a claim against wrongdoers. In other words, there is no effective preventive mechanism 
to constrain wrongful behavior available for supervisors to use.  
In summary, although supervisors have certain monitoring powers to offer 
constraints on directors and the management, lack of independence and effective power 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See id.; see also LIU, The Transformation of Taiwan’s Corporate Law System, supra note 13, at 418. 
50 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 218-2 (Taiwan). 
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makes them unable to be an effective and objective monitor. In many corporate scandals 
in Taiwan, supervisors have been found to have no constraints on wrongdoers. 
B.  Family-Controlled Company 
Few decades ago, Taiwan’s civil war against the Chinese Communist Party was 
over in late 1940s. At that time, many social orders needed to be rebuilt soon and the 
government did not pay much attention to economic developments. The Vietnam War 
gave Taiwan’s economy a chance to grow. However, the small scale of the Taiwanese 
economy did not allow companies to compete in the global market, in which larger 
participants have best chances to win. To make profits, many Taiwanese businessmen 
started doing the OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) business for foreign 
companies. Such businesses were usually small in scale and were founded by an 
individual. When the founder prospered and his or her business kept growing, he or she 
would invite family members to manage the business. The family not only owned the 
company but also ran it.51 Even after the company goes public, the founder and his or her 
family usually keep their dominance over how the company operates. This is the historic 
reason why most companies in Taiwan are family-controlled. In contrast to the U.S., 
most Taiwanese companies are featured with the combination of ownership and 
management.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Yin-Hua Yeh et al., Family Control and Corporate Governance: Evidence From Taiwan, 2 INT’L REV. 
FIN. 21, 25 (2001). 
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But, recently Taiwan’s listed companies are becoming larger. With the growth of 
these companies, the number of shareholders increases, which may lead towards the 
gradual separation of ownership and management. Still, the presence of a controlling 
shareholder can be pervasive among Taiwan’s companies. A controlling shareholder is 
powerful and can actually influence the company’s business decisions, although he or she 
may not formally serve any position in the company. Through selecting his or her 
preferred persons as directors and supervisors, a controlling shareholder can do whatever 
he or she likes, even something illegal. Especially when such a person encounters 
financial problems, he or she may have more incentive to embezzle the company’s asset.  
Most of Taiwan’s listed companies are family-controlled companies. It is a 
significant variable in performance of corporate governance when family control is 
predominant in the management. One researcher found that approximately 76% of 
publicly traded companies in Taiwan are family-controlled,52 and suggested “the conflict 
of interest between majority and minority shareholders being the greatest when the 
majority shareholder’s level of control is high enough that the benefits of expropriate 
outweigh the costs.”53 
C.  Majority of Securities Investors Are Individuals 
There are two major types of stock market in Taiwan, centralized market trading of 
the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE), and the Over-the-Counter (OTC) market trading on 
the GreTai Securities Market (GTSM).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See id. at 30-31. 
53 See id. at 46. 
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At the end of July 2013, 812 firms were listed on the TWSE, with a total 
capitalization of NT$ 6,434.1 billion. Meanwhile, the number of GTSM-listed companies 
was 645, with a capitalization of NT$ 648.92 billion. In 2011, the ratio of market value of 
listed shares to GDP is about 152%.54 Generally, among Taiwan’s listed companies, the 
majority of investors are individual investors, rather than institutional investors. Due to 
limited funds, individual investors usually own relatively few outstanding shares of the 
company. They usually in effect waive their shareholders’ rights because it is difficult to 
combine small shareholders’ shares to exercise shareholders’ power (i.e., rational apathy). 
Contrast this with the U.S. stock market, where major investors tend to be 
institutional investors. 55  Recently, institutional investors, as large shareholders, 
sometimes actively become involved in matters related to corporate governance, in order 
to guide companies to better governance practices. According to Çelik and Isaksson’s 
research, the institutional investor “serves an important economic function in society for 
the efficient allocation of capital and the monitoring of corporate performance.”56 Thus, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Securities and Futures Institute, Corporate Governance in Taiwan 5 (Nov., 2013), available at 
http://www.sfi.org.tw/E/Plate.aspx?ID=332 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
55 The proportion of equities managed by institutional investors in the U.S. was around 5 percent between 
1900 and 1945, but the proportion increased to about 67 percent by the end of 2010. See Marshall E. Blume 
and Donald B. Keim, Institutional Investors and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends and Relationships, 4 (Aug. 
21, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2147757. Institutional investors play a significant role in 
U.S. capital market and its impact is growing year by year. For example, the institutional ownership 
concentration was 46.6% of the outstanding equity in the 1,000 largest U.S. corporations, and the number is 
rapidly increasing to 73% in 2009. See Matteo Tonello & Stephan Rahim Rabimov, The 2010 Institutional 
Investment Report: Trends in Asset Allocation and Portfolio Composition, 27 (Nov. 11, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1707512.  
56 Serdar Çelik and Mats Isaksson, Institutional investors and ownership engagement 110, OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trends, Vol. 2013/2 (2014), available at DOI: 10.1787/fmt-2013-5jz734pwtrkc (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2014).  
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one of their important functions is to actively monitor the management of the companies 
on behalf of their own and other shareholders’ interests. 57  
However, in Taiwan, institutional investors are not active as they are in the U.S. The 
extent of ownership may be a key here. As shown in Table 1, the trading value on the 
TWSE market between January and February 2014 for domestic individual investors 
(60.8%) is much higher than that number for domestic institutional investors (16.6%). 
Further, the percentage of foreign institutional investors is increasing gradually. When 
Taiwan provides better corporate governance for shareholders’ protection that would 
encourage more investments from foreign investors.  
Table 1: Investors Structure in Terms of Trading Value on TWSE Market                                                                                                                              
Year  Domestic 
Institutional 
Investors  
Foreign 
Institutional 
Investors  
Domestic 
Individual 
Investors 
Foreign 
Individual 
Investors 
2003  11.5  9.4  77.8  1.3  
2004  11.6  10.9  75.9  1.6  
2005  13.3 15.5  68.8  2.4 
2006  11.0  16.2  70.6  2.2  
2007  13.0  17.6  67.3  2.1  
2008 14.0 22.1 61.7 2.3 
2009  11.6  16.3  72  0  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 ADEBISi ADEYEMI, The Role of the Institutional Investor in Corporate Governance, BUSINESSDAY 
(Jun. 9, 2014), available at http://businessdayonline.com/2014/06/the-role-of-the-institutional-investor-in-
corporate-governance/#.VELBBIvF-E8 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
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2010  13.6  18.4  68  0  
2011  15.4  21.8  62.7  0  
2012  15.4 22.6  62  0 
2013 16.2 24.6 59.2 0 
2014/01-2014/02 16.6 22.6 60.8 0 
    Unit: % 
Source: Financial Supervisory Commission (Taiwan).58 
D.  Conclusion 
One of the most notorious corporate scandals was the case of the Rebar Group 
(consisting of Rebar Co. and its subsidiaries) and the Wang’s families. The Wang’s 
families were controlling shareholders and could secure total power of management in 
the Rebar Group. On December 29, 2006, two subsidiary companies of Rebar Co. (Chia 
Hsin Food and Synthetic Fiber) applied to a Taiwan court for bankruptcy protection, for 
which Rebar Co. also filed soon after.59 Then the Rebar Group founder and chairman, 
Wang You-Theng, absconded with illegal benefits to Shanghai, China.60 Mr. Wang and 
his families were found to have committed many violations of criminal law, as well as of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Financial Supervisory Commission (Taiwan), Investors Structure in terms of Trading Value on TWSE 
Market (Mar. 15, 2013), available at 
http://www.sfb.gov.tw/en/home.jsp?id=86&parentpath=0,7&mcustomize=important_view.jsp&serno=2013
03150002 (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
59 The China Post news staff, Mogul and Family Found Guilty of Embezzlement, THE CHINA POST (Jan. 
1, 2009), available at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/t-business/2009/01/01/190063/Mogul-and.htm 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
60 Kevin Chen, FSC Denies Insider Leak Helped Rebar Chairman Escape, TAIPEI TIMES (Jan. 15, 2007), 
available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2007/01/15/2003344936 (last visited Oct. 25, 
2014). 
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company acts, and securities regulations. They engaged in fraud, insider trading, and 
embezzlement to usurp illegal benefits from the subsidiary companies.61 The Wang’s 
families could totally control the Rebar Group and its subsidiary companies through 
cross-holdings, which enabled them to elect majority directors (management) and 
supervisors (monitoring).62 In these subsidiary companies, no real checks-and-balances 
system existed and corporate governance was only a kind of decoration. According to the 
indictment by prosecutors, the Wang’s families were suspected of gaining illegal benefits 
amassing 2.2 billion U.S. dollars between 1998 and 2006,63 which resulted in huge 
monetary losses for Taiwanese investors. At the same time, this case also revealed that 
corporate governance system was weak and the public had deep doubts about its real 
functions. The Rebar Group scandal is only one example, as a matter of fact, many 
similar cases broke out during the 1990s and early 2000s, of which indicated the lack of a 
vigorous checks-and-balances system.  
Some characteristics that existed in Taiwan have raised potential issues of 
corporate governance. The most serious might that many public companies are under the 
control of a particular family or investing group (i.e., controlling shareholders) and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The China Post news staff, Mogul and Family Found Guilty of Embezzlement, THE CHINA POST (Jan. 
1, 2009), available at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/t-business/2009/01/01/190063/Mogul-and.htm 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
62 Under Article 27 of Taiwan Company Act, a government or a juristic person as a shareholder of a given 
company can be elected as a director or supervisor of the company. GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 218-2 
(Taiwan). Additionally, they also can appoint several representatives elected as directors or supervisors. 
The Wang’s families used this Article to control major of directors and supervisors in all the affiliated 
companies. Thus, the Wang’s families could easily interfere with any business decision of the companies. 
See Liu, The Politics of Corporate Governance in Taiwan, supra note 16, at 258.   
63 Annie Huang, Rebar Scandal Sets Record Fines, Prison Terms For Embezzlement, TAIWAN TODAY 
(Mar. 16, 2007), available at http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=23976&CtNode=429 (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2014). 
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combination of ownership and management is normal. In this type of situation, the 
interests of minority shareholders may be easily exploited by the controlling shareholders, 
who are usually not subject to robust monitoring from other corporate constituencies. 
Minority shareholders may have no strong incentives to become involved in 
monitoring affairs in the interests of the company and its shareholders; it might be a 
better strategy for them to walk away by selling stock. For those who are interested in 
monitoring the company, they may find that the powers with which they are invested tend 
to be useless for preventing wrongdoings (this will be discussed in Chapter Three).  
To sum up, if directors or of the officers want to commit wrongdoings to take 
advantage of the company or of the relative powerlessness of minority shareholders, in 
some cases, there is no effective checks-and-balances mechanism within the company to 
prevent such wrongdoings. Thus, some such mechanisms have been introduced into the 
TCA, including the institutions of independent directors and an audit committee. 
Unfortunately, Taiwan’s policymakers have ignored that the legal remedy can serve for 
the same purpose. For example, shareholder derivative litigation (also called a 
shareholder suit), if functioning properly, can make a company’s claim real and can gain 
recovery out of the wrongdoers’ pockets. Doing this will deter directors, and others who 
plan to exploit the company’s interests, from committing wrongdoings. Good corporate 
governance can provide directors with incentives to maximize the company’s interests 
and can provide such persons with disincentives not to do things detrimental to their 
companies. Thus, further reform of this matter may be necessary for improvement of 
corporate governance in Taiwan.  
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Again, this dissertation will focus on the relevant issues of the institution of 
shareholder derivative litigation in Taiwan. But this institution of reforms fails to be 
effective due to several reasons. The same or similar institutions used in other countries 
may be a good model for Taiwan. This dissertation is expected to provide a comparative 
analysis for Taiwan’s future reform. As to legal transplantation, it should be noted that 
the experience that certain corporate governance practices that work in other countries are 
not guaranteed success in Taiwan. Legal transplantation is not easy because some 
principles of corporate governance currently used in the West are rooted in different 
developments of history, regulations of law, and activities of financial markets than those 
in Taiwan. How to feasibly adopt these measures will be the primary issue on which this 
dissertation will focus.  
IV. Legal Remedies for Shareholders of Taiwan’s Companies  
This section will introduce types of legal remedies available to Taiwanese 
shareholders of companies whose directors breach their fiduciary duties or defraud 
shareholders. Here, some questions are going to be raised and analyzed: (1) who has a 
cause of action against wrongdoing directors? (2) when a company has a cause of action 
against wrongdoing directors, how does it effectively claim damages through legal 
actions? (3) if a shareholder has a cause of action against the company’s director, how 
does he or she effectively claim damages through legal action?  
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A. Who Has Cause of Action Against Wrongdoing Directors? 
Under the TAC, when a directorial candidate is elected, he or she should enter into 
a service contract with the company in which the person is going to serve, before he or 
she can officially take the directorship. In Taiwan’s legal system, a contracting party is 
responsible for his or her incomplete performance only to the counterparty, rather than to 
a third party. Because the company (but its shareholders) is the only counterparty entering 
into a contract with its directors, it should be the one to have a cause of action against 
wrongdoing directors who fail to discharge their fiduciary duty owed to the company. 
Thus, under the relationship between the company and the directors, shareholders (as 
third parties) usually have no direct cause of action against wrongdoing directors, unless 
laws particularly establish a statutory cause of action for them in some special 
circumstances.  
However, many provisions in the TCA focus on the rights of shareholders (e.g., 
the right to vote, the right to submit proposal for the annual meeting, and the right to 
exit), but no provision grants shareholders a direct cause of action against wrongdoing 
directors. Although shareholders also have a right to sue, substantially speaking, this right 
is based on the company’s cause of action, which will be discussed later.  
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As a result, the company is the only claimant that has a cause of action against 
wrongdoing directors because it owes fiduciary duty only to the company, as a party of 
service contract. Directors are not directly responsible to shareholders. Unless otherwise 
provided by laws, shareholders, as residual claimants (sometimes also referred to as 
owners of the company), may have statutory rights on the company, but they have no 
direct cause of action against directors. It should be noted that shareholders, also as 
security holders, might have a cause of action against directors who are in violation of 
securities regulations. However, such a cause of action, in nature, is not based on the 
fiduciary relationship between directors and shareholders, but is created by statutory. 
Please refer to Chart I for reference. 
Chart I: Contractual Relationship & Statutory Relationship 
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B.  Monitoring Tools of Shareholders 
Based on the above chart, shareholders in Taiwan are not claimants against 
wrongdoing directors. Yet the TCA provides shareholders with some protective 
mechanisms to secure their rights (or the value of their ownership in the company). For 
example, when the board of directors is engaged in wrongdoings in violation of laws and 
the company’s articles of incorporation, any single shareholder (who continuously holds 
one share of the company for not less than one year) can ask the board to stop such 
behaviors.64  
Because this monitoring right invested in every single shareholder, ideally the 
board of directors is subject to scrutiny from shareholders as policemen for the 
company’s interests. However, in realty, such a right does not work well and does not 
have a deterrent effect on directors because shareholders are usually reluctant to get 
deeply involved in the with company’s operation. It is costly for them to collect sufficient 
information to initiate any legal action for the company’s interests. For example, the 
board’s wrongdoings might take place secretly, and a shareholder who wants to detect 
such wrongdoing needs to spend time reading corporate documents and doing necessary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 194 (Taiwan). 
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investigations. As a homo economicus, a concerned shareholder would sell shares instead 
of trying to stop board’s wrongdoing if he or she knows that such wrongdoing will 
definitely or likely result in significant unbearable loss of his or her investment. If the 
loss is bearable, a shareholder usually prefers doing nothing rather than spending time 
and money on detecting and stopping wrongdoings. That is because, if a wrongdoing is 
successfully prevented the cost is normally much higher than what he or she is likely to 
gain in the value of shares.  
Second, free-riding could be a problem that could happen among shareholders 
with different kinds of interests. As every shareholder is eligible to exert his or her 
monitoring right, each shareholder may have incentives to do nothing and wait for other 
shareholders to assume the jobs for all.  
Third, even if shareholders would like to exert a monitoring right in the 
company’s interests, he or she may face difficulties in collecting necessary information 
from the board of directors. In the TCA, there is no provision like Section 220(b) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, which provides an inspection right for shareholders 
that enables them to access company’s books and records in some circumstances.65 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Section 220(b) of Delaware General Corporation Law, “[a]ny stockholder, in person or by attorney or 
other agent, shall, upon written demand under oath stating the purpose thereof, have the right during the 
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According to Article 210 of the TCA, the board of directors must make specified kinds of 
documents accessible for its shareholders and creditors. These documents include articles 
of incorporation, minutes of every shareholder’s meeting, financial records, and a list of 
shareholders. A shareholder’s request for company’s books and records can be denied 
when the requested documents do not full within the specified types of documents, even 
if the shareholder is exercising his on her rights and such documents are required for him 
or her to exercise a monitoring right. Thus, without having the necessary information, 
exercising their monitoring right will be costly for shareholders, who may easily give up.  
Of course, requesting the board of directors to stop illegal or inappropriate 
behavior should not be the only monitoring tool for shareholders. Traditionally, they can 
use the right to vote to prevent distrustful directors from being re-elected. Also, 
shareholders can remove incumbent directors, with or without cause, whom they do not 
trust anymore.66 Such rights, however, do not function as well as expected. In Taiwan, 
controlling shareholders are pervasive in many companies and they usually have 
dominance in boardroom and shareholders’ meetings. 67  Both director election and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
usual hours for business to inspect for any proper purpose, and to make copies and extracts from: (1) The 
corporation’s stock ledger, a list of its stockholders, and its other books and records…” 
66 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 199 (Taiwan). 
67 Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & Carol Yuan-Chi Pang, An Analytical Framework for Controlling Minority 
Shareholders and Its Application to Taiwan, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 
  40 
removal should need a resolution by a shareholders’ meeting, but these process can be 
manipulated in a way that entrenches directors.68 For example, the board of directors has 
the authority to determine where and when to hold a shareholders’ meeting and to decide 
which items will be discussed and resolved in the meeting. According to the TCA, the 
removal of directors should be listed in the agenda of a shareholder’s meeting; laws 
prohibit such an item to be proposed and resolved with an extempore motion during the 
meeting.69 Thus, when the board of directors refuses to put the item of director removal 
in the agenda, shareholders present during the meeting lack a way to remove directors. 
The shareholder proposal can alleviate this problem of director entrenchment when which 
eligible shareholders can submit a proposal for consideration in the regular shareholder’s 
meeting, even without the board’s approval.70 However, only a shareholder holding 1% or 
more of shares issued by the company (or multiple shareholders aggregately holding 1% 
or more of shares) would be eligible to submit a proposal, while any proposal submission 
made by unqualified shareholders would be rejected. Unfortunately, the minimum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281-82 (Hideki Kanda et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Wang & Pang, An Analytical Framework for 
Controlling Minority Shareholders and Its Application to Taiwan].   
68 GONGSI FA [Company Act] arts. 171, 172(5) (Taiwan). 
69 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 172(5) (Taiwan). 
70 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 172-1 (Taiwan). 
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ownership requirement seems too high for shareholders, especially for those of publicly-
traded companies. In fact, the right to submit a proposal has rarely been used.  
In two types of circumstances when the board of directors fails to call regular 
shareholder’s meeting before the deadline, as provided by the corporation’s laws and 
when the board can’t carry out duty for some reasons (for example, all directors resign or 
have been removed), a shareholder(s) continuously holding 3% or more of shares issued 
by the company for at least one year can call a shareholders’ meeting after he or she 
obtains a permission from the competent authority. In this situation, in which a meeting is 
held by shareholder(s), shareholders may be able to prepare a meeting agenda that does 
not favor existing directors. However, either submitting a proposal or calling a 
shareholders’ meeting must meet minimum ownership requirement as required by laws 
(1% and 3% respectively),71 which is not easy for shareholders to achieve.  
According to above, although the TCA offers shareholders some tools or rights to 
prevent possible wrongdoings by the board of directors, it is also concerned about abuse 
by shareholders. Hence, ownership thresholds appear to be a necessary mechanism for 
resolving the possible abuse problem. Without such thresholds, there will be a huge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 GONGSI FA [Company Act] arts. 172-1, 173 (Taiwan). 
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number of shareholders who can exercise the statutory rights, such as submitting a 
proposal or calling for a special shareholders’ meeting; consequently, the company might 
have to face too many challenges from bad-faith shareholders. In these circumstances, the 
management would have to take time dealing with the challenges and could not 
sufficiently concentrate on the company’s business affairs. However, such rights also 
could be exercised in good faith and for the company’s interests. Thus, there might be no 
strong evidence to support all ownership thresholds in the Act, but Taiwan seems to 
prefer a conservative policy to a laissez-faire one.  
Similarly, corporate governance tools were originally created to enable 
shareholders to monitor the board of directors when it violates the laws. However, such 
tools become weapons that interfere with the company’s operation, for those who want to 
extract illegitimate advantages from it.  
To prevent shareholders’ possible abuse, the TCA determines thresholds for 
different kinds of rights. There are two primary thresholds to prevent shareholders from 
abusing their rights are a minimum ownership requirement (1% or 3% of shares issued by 
the company) and a minimum holding period (continuous holding of required minimum 
of shares for at least 6 months or at least 12 months). Although such thresholds prevent 
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possible abuse, they also can become huge hurdles for those who want to act in the 
company’s interests. No matter what kinds of corporate governance policies (director 
primacy or shareholder primacy) should be adopted by the TCA, it makes sense to set 
high thresholds for certain rights which are just preventive. After all, at the time during 
which that right is to be instituted, no duty is really breached and no harms actually 
occurred.  
When the probability of directors’ breach of fiduciary duty is quite high or it is 
clear that harm has actually occurred, is it appropriate to adopt the same philosophy in 
regulating a possible abuse of rights? Specifically, high thresholds can help in situations 
in which bad-faith shareholders initiate frivolous attacks that go against a company’s 
interests. By the same token, the high thresholds also make it difficult for good-faith 
shareholders difficult to exert their rights and/or use monitoring tools. To balance these 
two dilemmas, the TCA appears to have adopted the philosophy that abuse control has 
priority over monitoring function. However, every type of rights has its characteristics, 
functions and possible outcomes. One should consider whether a threshold is suitable to a 
particular tool or right. Theoretically, setting high thresholds for preventive tools may be 
justified, because no harm actually occurs. However, it would be problematic if 
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shareholders could institute preventive tools too easily. Even if we can assume all 
shareholders act in good-faith, their frequently using preventive tools would inevitably 
have adverse effect on a company’s operation.  
Once a tool is created to make sure whether a wrongdoer should be liable for 
damages resulting from his breach of duty, a different philosophy may pertain than has 
applied for regulating preventive tools. The laws should treat shareholder derivative 
litigation differently than other preventive tools, because in some situations in which 
directors’ breach of duty is evident. If the laws require high thresholds for every 
derivative suit and disregard the probability that a suit should benefit the company, such a 
policy appears inappropriate. In Taiwan, to be plaintiffs of a shareholder derivative 
action, shareholders have to meet a minimum ownership requirement (3%) and minimum 
holding period (6 months). These two requirements apply to every shareholder who 
wants to institute a shareholder derivative action, no matter how strong his or her 
arguments will be or how evident the facts concerning directors’ breach of duty are.  
C. Shareholder’s Causes of Action Against Wrongdoing Directors 
Shareholders, who are holders of shares issued by a company that issues securities 
under the TSEA. As security holders, shareholders may have a cause of action against an 
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issuer (i.e., the company) and its directors for violating anti-fraud provisions under the 
TSEA. Such provisions usually provide shareholders with direct claims. As provided in 
Article 20-1 of the TSEA, when the material content of the financial reports or other 
financial and business documents contains misrepresentations or nondisclosures, bona 
fide shareholders have a cause of action against the issuer and responsible persons, 
including directors.72 In addition, if directors are involved in insider trading, bona fide 
security purchasers, including shareholders may claim damages against these insiders by 
using nonpublic material information of the company. In summary, if directors violate 
anti-fraud provisions, they can be directly liable to the company’s shareholders who 
suffer from their fraudulent behaviors.  
Although shareholders may have certain causes of action against directors, they 
may face difficulties in exerting their right if they want to bring an action for recovery of 
their damages. The amount of damages that individual shareholder suffer tend to be so 
small that there is no economic incentive for any one of them to bring a legal action. In 
most cases, the civil claimants, i.e. the prospective plaintiffs, would bring an action 
against wrongdoers only if they assume that the expected cost that they expend on an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 ZHENGQUAN JIAOYI FA [Securities and Exchange Act] art. 20-1 (Taiwan). 
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action would be no higher than the expected benefit of such action. Compared with costly 
litigations, for most shareholders, their damages tend to be relatively small.  
However, fraudulent behaviors in violation of securities regulations usually make 
a great number of security holders suffer. Aggregate amount of damages incurred 
sometimes is huge. It is unfair if those committing fraud could get rid of legal liabilities 
because of victims’ disincentives to bring an action. If that is the case, the securities 
regulations would not function effectively and the deterrent effect would not exist. To 
deal with this issue, class-action litigation would be a feasible framework that would 
enable an individual investor to make his or her small claims possible. However, a class-
action suit is a special institution specially created by laws to allow many potential 
plaintiffs to claim their recovery when their claims result from a common single cause or 
behavior. Without special permission by laws, class-action suits should not be allowed 
(this dissertation will have further discussions in Chapter Four). 
In Taiwan, the Code of Civil Procedure establishes an institution called 
Appointment of Litigation Representatives. Multiple parties, who have common interests, 
may appoint one or more persons from among themselves to sue on behalf of all the 
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appointing parties.73 In litigation related to a claim arising from securities regulations, 
securities holders who are victims in the same fraudulent scandal can appoint one or more 
representatives for the interest of all plaintiffs. For example, shareholders of a company 
whose disclosure of material information was false and misleading can use this type of 
institution to claim damages. In this situation, representatives can execute all necessary 
measures that benefit all appointing parties during the whole procedure. After appointing 
representatives, the appointing parties are still parties in the lawsuit and should be bound 
by the result of whichever they like or dislike.74 Under this institution, shareholders who 
are not interested in litigations can be encouraged to recover their damages by appointing 
other plaintiffs as their representatives, and do not have to personally get involved with 
litigation matters, which sometimes are complicated and time-consuming. However, 
some problems still confront the victims of a securities scandal. Victims usually do not 
know each other, so if they want to use this means, they have to find each other before 
the lawsuit. Searching for other victims or potential plaintiffs sometimes can be very 
costly even in a situation where the company is willing to disclose shareholder lists. The 
task would be impossible when a company refutes to provide a shareholder list. Although 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 MINSHI SUSONG FA [Code of Civil Procedure] art. 41 (Taiwan). 
74 MINSHI SUSONG FA [Code of Civil Procedure] art. 401 (Taiwan). 
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are other ways for shareholders to communicate with each other, such as via 
advertisements or broadcastings, they all involve some cost. After a person locates 
potential plaintiffs, an issue for him or her is how to persuade them to join in the suit. In 
fact, no one would like to undertake this because the initiator would probably not get any 
benefit from doing so. To put it simply, this institution is designed for the convenience of 
those who intend to bring an action together, and plaintiffs can authorize their 
representatives to do necessary legal affairs on the behalf of all plaintiffs as a whole.  
Appointing others as representatives does not change their positions as plaintiffs 
in the lawsuit, they still need to take on all costs and risks. For example, a pre-paid court 
fee is required when plaintiffs file an action with a court, a based on the amount that 
plaintiffs claim (in most cases, about 1% of plaintiff’s claim).75 If plaintiffs lose, they 
may have to bear the pre-paid fee, as well as other expenses associated with the lawsuit 
(but attorney fee is paid by the defendant are not included). Such costs and risks usually 
discourage victims from filing any actions. As analyzed above, for most victims, a 
regular lawsuit system could offer a useless remedy for them so that they may prefer 
doing nothing rather than sue those engaging in fraud.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 MINSHI SUSONG FA [Code of Civil Procedure] art. 77-13 (Taiwan). 
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V. Conclusion 
From the above analysis, it is clear that Taiwan’s corporate governance system 
has its own problems and one main factor causing them is ineffective corporate law 
enforcement. Shareholders, as residual claimants of the company or equity holders of the 
securities issuer, who suffer from directors’ bad-faith or illegal behaviors have no 
effective enforcement mechanisms that makes wrongdoers liable. Without effective 
enforcement, any laws and regulations could be practically useless. For many investors, 
they might be worried if there are no legal constraints or effective internal checks on 
directors of the company. Overall speaking, their worries would possibly become so 
serious to harm the competiveness of Taiwan in the capital markets. Thus, how to make 
current enforcement mechanism more effective is a key for better corporate governance 
in Taiwan. As mentioned, Taiwan has instituted several reforms to provide a more 
vigorous checks and balances system by adopting some U.S.-typed corporate governance 
practices, such as introductions of independent directors, audit committees, compensation 
committees, and the concept of fiduciary duty. However, enforcement has long been 
ignored by Taiwan’s policymakers when considering reforms of corporate governance. 
This dissertation argues that this makes corporate governance incomplete. In the next 
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chapter, this dissertation will discuss existing enforcement mechanisms in Taiwan, 
including derivative suits, traditional civil actions and special statutory class-action 
litigations.  
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Chapter Three: Derivative Litigation System in Taiwan 
Below, I will introduce the Taiwan derivative litigation system, as specified in the 
Taiwan Company Act, (TCA), which mainly focusing on pre-suit requirements. These 
requirements are set for controlling abuses by shareholders; however, they cannot avoid 
frivolous or striking suits. Actually, even suits with merit can be prevented because of 
these strict requirements. Thus, very few derivative suits have been brought.76   
Recognizing the derivative suit as a good corporate governance mechanism, Taiwan 
policymakers have sought to revive this institution by establishing a government-
sanctioned non-profit organization to initiate derivative suits by lifting some 
unreasonably strict pre-suit requirements provided in the TCA.77 The data (which will be 
discussed in Chapter Four) show there has been a rapid increase on the number of 
government-sponsored derivative suits. That may imply that existing requirements for 
actions brought by private shareholders are indeed too strict and need to be modified. 
I. Introduction: Collection Methods against Directors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Taiwan has four types of companies in Taiwan Company Act, but the derivative actions are only 
available in companies limited by shares (i.e., joint stock companies). 
77 See LIU, The Transformation of Taiwan’s Corporate Law System, supra note 13, at 425. 
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Under the TCA, if a director is liable to the company in which she serves (for example, if 
she has engaged in a breach of fiduciary duty resulting in a loss for the company), there 
are two available methods for the company to launch a lawsuit against its director for 
recovery.  
The first is that a shareholder meeting makes a resolution to sue.78 In the meantime, 
a supervisor should be the lawsuit representative on behalf of the company, unless others 
are appointed at the shareholder’s meeting that initiates the lawsuit.79 This method 
provides shareholders with an opportunity to determine whether a lawsuit against 
directors is in the best interest of the company.  
It is not appropriate for the board of directors to make decisions on whether to sue 
one of its members. Even though a majority of directors are disinterested, they are likely 
influenced by interested directors, or have sympathy or another kind of favorable bias for 
their colleague. With these concerns, the board of directors has no authority in deciding 
whether to bring lawsuits against a director; rather, shareholders may be in the best 
position to do so (See Chart II.)  
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79 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 213 (Taiwan). 
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Chart II: Litigations against Directors Based on Shareholder Meeting’s Resolution    
 
However, the shareholder’s meeting may be subject to a board’s determination or 
manipulation.80 For instance, the board of directors still has the power to decide whether, 
when, and where to convene a shareholder’s meeting, as well as to determine the agenda 
to be discussed. While a majority of directors become colluders or conspirators regarding 
the alleged wrongdoing, wrongdoing directors probably will try to prevent a 
shareholder’s meeting from taking negative measures against them. Even when 
wrongdoing directors only constitute a minority, it is possible that other directors will be 
reluctant to take actions against them due to their collegial, social or even familial 
relationships.  
If filing a suit is not on the agenda of a shareholder’s meeting, disgruntled 
shareholders still have some tools, including a new shareholder proposal, an extempore 
motion, or a special shareholder’s meeting, one not convened by the board of directors. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 171 (Taiwan). 
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However, these tools may impractical or even impossible in many situations. As for 
shareholder proposals, only large shareholders (those holding more than 1% of the 
company’s shares) are eligible to submit a proposal.81 Also, a shareholder proposal can 
only be made at the annual shareholder’s meeting. Proposing an extempore motion may 
work but no relevant information can first be disseminated to shareholders through proxy 
statements.  
Although the board of directors has the authority to convene a special shareholder’s 
meeting anytime when emergencies occur, the TCA authorizes shareholders and 
supervisors to hold a special shareholder’s meeting, but only in very exceptional 
situations.  
The conveners of such meetings can decide their agenda and disregard the influence 
of the board of directors. However, large shareholders (those holding 3% or more of the 
company’s shares) can convene a special shareholder’s meeting only when some 
requirements are met (e.g., the board’s inaction or inability to convene the meeting, 
permission from the competent authority).82 In contrast, supervisors are eligible to 
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82 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 173 (Taiwan). 
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convene a shareholder’s meeting if they think that is in the company’s best interests.83 
Unfortunately, supervisors in Taiwan tend to have good relationships with directors, and 
it is doubtful that supervisors are willing to jeopardize such relationships. To summarize, 
facing possible tricky interferences from the board of directors, shareholders still have 
some tools to sue directors via a shareholder’s meeting resolution but they will face many 
difficulties.  
Shareholders’ difficulty in engaging in collective action may make a 
shareholder’s meeting resolution practically impossible. Most shareholders may be 
apathetic on governance issues. The costs of making them informed usually are 
overwhelming to those who hold only a fraction of the company’s shares. As an 
economically rational person, a shareholder tends to sell her shares in most cases 
involving corporate governance issues, instead of actively participating in acting against 
those engaging in corporate misconduct (i.e., the Wall Street Rule). In summary, because 
of the barriers discussed above, filing a shareholder suit rarely is an exercised option. 
In terms of the practical difficulties for the first method, the TCA offers another 
method: the derivative suit system, in which minority shareholders can sue directors on 
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behalf of the company.84 It should be noted that under the TCA, a derivative suit only 
refers to an action brought by shareholders on behalf of the company against “directors” 
or “supervisors” as defendants.85 I will mainly focus on actions against directors, which 
have been an emphasis in the literature about derivative suits, because they are 
responsible for running the business and making important decisions for the company. 
Directors are likely to breach their fiduciary duty by pursuing their interests at the 
expenses of the company and shareholders. Supervisors, however, only play a monitoring 
role without authority of decision-making.86  
As the derivative suit is defined in Taiwan, it does not include suits brought 
against officers or other persons. Thus, the board of directors has the power to decide 
whether to bring such a suit. However, shareholder’s meetings, supervisors, or minority 
shareholders should not have power to bring such a suit on behalf of the company.  
II. Pre-suit Requirements of Derivative Litigation  
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85 See TSENG & WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 216. 
86 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 218 (Taiwan). 
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Under Taiwan’s derivative suit system as specified in the TCA, for the purpose of 
avoiding possible abuses by shareholders, there are very strict pre-suit requirements.87 
Specifically, a plaintiff needs to meet these requirements before a suit can be legally 
brought: (1) minimum ownership requirement (holding at least 3% of outstanding shares 
of the company) and minimum shareholding period (for at least 12 months), (2) prior 
written demand to supervisors and a 30-day waiting period after the demand, (3) 
litigation security, if requested by the court. 88  This dissertation will discuss these 
requirements and analyze them below. 
A. Minimum Ownership Percentage and Share Holding Period 
According to Article 214 of the TCA, only shareholders who hold at least 3% of a 
company’s outstanding shares continuously for at least one year can be plaintiffs in 
derivative suits. Several shareholders are allowed to initiate the suit by aggregating their 
holdings to satisfy this legal threshold.89 
The rationale for this requirement is quite straightforward: to prevent abuse. With 
this requirement, very few shareholders qualify as plaintiffs. Because qualified 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 See TSENG & WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 217. 
88 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 214 (Taiwan). 
89 See TSENG & WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 219; see also Len-Yu Liu, The 
Derivative Action, TAIWAN LAW JOURNAL 64, 156-161, 157-58 (2004).  
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shareholder plaintiffs must have an economic stake in the company (holding 3% of 
company’s shares and more), the motive that she brings a suit is less likely striking or 
meritless and harmful to the company. For this purpose, the requirement of a 
shareholding period also can avoid shareholders intended to bring suits by purchasing 
shares. This requirement also disqualifies many shareholders as plaintiffs in the 
lawsuits.90 
B. The Demand and Wait Requirement  
 Shareholder plaintiffs need to make a written demand upon to supervisors to 
bring suits against directors on the behalf of the company before they are instituted. Also, 
plaintiffs can bring suits on behalf of the company only when supervisors fail to do so 
within 30 days after the demand is made.  
One rationale for this demand and wait requirement is to prevent a strike or trivial 
suit by shareholders, who intend to interfere with the operations of the company. In this 
regard, a supervisor plays a critical internal role in determining whether such a demand 
has merit and is in the company’s best interest. Once a supervisor decides to sue directors 
in response to the demand, there are no grounds for shareholders to participate in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 See TSENG & WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 219; see also Len-Yu Liu, The 
Derivative Action, Taiwan Law Journal 64, 156-161, 157-58 (2004).  
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proceeding and no derivative suit can be brought. It should be noted the demand is a 
prerequisite that supervisors can institute lawsuits against directors. Supervisors 
apparently have no discretion to decide whether file such a suit if there is no 
shareholder’s meeting resolution or shareholder’s demand.  
The demand and wait requirement can provide an internal organ (supervisors) 
within the company with an opportunity to the exercise company’s claim. However, if 
supervisors fail to bring an action within 30 days of receipt of the demand, they give up 
the authority to do so, and the shareholders who have made the demand can sue the 
allegedly wrongdoing directors. However, it is the supervisors’ failure to sue within the 
waiting period, rather than their rejection of a suit, that matters in determining whether 
shareholders are eligible to bring an action. In other words, even if supervisors reject the 
demand during the waiting period, shareholders still need to wait and cannot bring the 
action until this period ends. See Chart III.     
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Chart III: Internal Procedure before Shareholder Derivative Litigation  
 
C. Litigation Security  
According to Article 214 of the TCA, upon the defendant’s petition, the court 
may order the plaintiff to deposit an appropriate security to ensure that the plaintiff takes 
the suit seriously and does not have a bad-faith purpose (frivolous or striking). If the 
plaintiff loses, the security automatically becomes a “deposit” for the future claims of 
sued directors and companies when they suffer damages resulting from a plaintiff’s suit. 
The company and sued directors can bring a follow-up suit against the losing plaintiff 
when they suffer damages as a result of the suit.91   
III. Problems in Taiwan Derivative Suit System  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 215 (Taiwan). 
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 This section will demonstrate problems in Taiwan derivative litigation system, 
and introduce some ideas from U.S. corporate laws for comparative purposes. Chapter 
Five will offer a more comprehensive study of U.S. derivative suits.  
A. High Ownership Percentage Requirement  
The ownership percentage requirement is strict for a plaintiff in a derivative suit.92 
Especially for shareholders of a publicly-held company, this type of requirement usually 
makes derivative suits practically impossible.93 Although shareholders are allowed to 
aggregate their holdings to meet the requirement, coordination among them may well be 
a problem as costs may be high. This requirement can be an unreasonable provision 
because shareholders in a larger company (in terms of the amount of paid-in capital) are 
less likely eligible to be derivative plaintiffs than those in a small company.  
As mentioned, the main purpose behind this requirement is to prevent bad-faith 
shareholders from bringing strike suits. To avoid the excessive usage of lawsuits, Taiwan 
has created a high threshold for shareholders who intend to use litigation as a dispute-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 See TSENG & WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 219. 
93 A Taiwanese commentator contends that “the shareholder derivative suit mechanism authorized under 
the Company Act does not work very well.” Due to the dispersed ownership usually seen in public 
companies, the minimum ownership requirement (3% of all outstanding shares) almost makes derivative 
suits extinct in practice. See Liu, Corporate Governance Development in the Greater China, supra note 6, 
at 11.  
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resolution mechanism. Apparently, Taiwanese policymakers prefer other mechanisms 
than lawsuits to deal with corporate internal affairs.94   
Undoubtedly, the ownership requirement prevents a large number of strikes or 
trivial suits. However, this kind of pre-suit requirement also precludes other meritorious 
suits. In other words, this requirement in fact prevents all potential litigation that is not 
striking. 95  From the perspective of abuse control, this ownership percentage requirement 
fails to function as an effective filter as to whether lawsuits have merits; in fact, the 
requirement rules out all lawsuits in advance on an indiscriminate basis.  
Under American law, “the plaintiff must be a shareholder at the time of the 
lawsuit” and “remain a shareholder throughout the life of the action.”96 Thus, any 
shareholder is eligible to sue if other litigation requirements are satisfied. In the U.S., a 
certain percentage of ownership in a company seems not the right tool to encourage good 
suits and deter bad ones. Compared with U.S. laws, in terms of the standing requirement 
in a derivative lawsuit, the ownership percentage requirement in Taiwan appears too high 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Likewise, securities law enforcement in Taiwan largely relies on the public sector (such as regulators and 
prosecutors) rather than the private sector. See id. at 9.  
95 See TSENG & WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 219. The legal commentators 
indicated that “[t]he current shareholding requirements have, in fact, worsened this situation,” and “a 
minimum period of shareholding is necessary to avoid excessive use of litigation which has a detrimental 
effect on a company’s normal operations.” 
96 FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 395 (2000) [hereinafter GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW]. 
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and fails to function as a mechanism to control abuse. As a result, this requirement should 
be eliminated.  
B. Unreasonable Shareholding Period Requirement    
Another unreasonable hurdle is that the plaintiffs must continuously have been 
shareholders for at least one year. The demand should be made only by eligible 
shareholders and other ineligible shareholders cannot make it. Thus, a new shareholder 
who has purchased company’s shares within the past year is not qualified to make this 
demand. Also, her holding cannot be combined with those of other shareholders to meet 
the ownership percentage requirement. This shareholder holding period requirement also 
makes it more difficult for shareholders to meet the ownership percentage requirement. 
In fact, the shareholding period requirement results in a kind of discrimination 
between old and new shareholders (those holding shares for less than one year). New 
shareholders cannot make demands and bring suits on behalf of companies, even though 
they detect wrongdoing committed by directors. Yet no reasonable grounds exist to 
discriminate against new shareholders. If the main purpose behind the shareholding 
period requirement is to prevent shareholders’ abuse, this requirement inadvertently 
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produces discrimination between shareholders. Yet there is no reason to believe that new 
shareholders tend to bring strike or trivial suits more frequently than other shareholders.         
In the U.S., a derivative suit requirement exists called the “contemporaneous 
shareholder rule,” which means that the plaintiff must also have been a shareholder at the 
time that the alleged wrongdoing was committed.  A main justification for this rule is that 
the plaintiff who knew of the wrongdoing would purchase company shares only for the 
purpose of bringing a shareholder derivative suit. Also, this might result in a windfall for 
him or her. Specifically, the rule assumes that new shareholders purchase shares at a 
discount, reflecting a decrease in the company’s value as a result of the alleged 
wrongdoing. When new shareholders are allowed to file a suit for recovery, if successful, 
this recovery will go to the company and the shares’ value will increase, creating a 
windfall.  
Unfortunately, this rule is not strong enough to go unchallenged, and there are in 
fact some theoretical flaws contained in it. For example, the assumption that new 
shareholders buy shares at a discounted rate could be wrong when neither party knows 
about the alleged wrongdoing when it engages in the transaction. In fact, wrongdoing is 
usually committed secretly and the information normally is not available to the public. 
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Thus, the assumption on which the contemporaneous shareholder rule is based may be 
inapplicable in cases where information related to wrongdoing is unknown to the public.   
Basically, Taiwan has less strict disclosure regulations than does the U.S. Under 
Taiwan’s laws, shareholders have no right of access to the “books and records” of the 
company, like U.S. shareholders do under DGCL§220.97 Therefore, might not conform 
with other major Taiwanese legal assumptions and norms.  
In summary, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that new shareholders will 
be more likely to bring frivolous or striking suits than longstanding shareholders. Like the 
ownership percentage requirement, the shareholding period requirement cannot be a good 
filter to distinguish good-faith from bad-faith shareholders. Therefore, this dissertation 
contends that this requirement should be eliminated. 
C. Un-Excusable Demand  
Under the Taiwan Company Act (TCA), both demands submitted to supervisors 
and a waiting period are pre-suit requirements in any situation. As the cause of action in a 
derivative suit belongs to the company, whether to exercise this cause of action should 
not be determined by an individual shareholder. For an American company, the board of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2005). 
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directors is the body that has authority over the company’s operations,98 including 
whether to file an action against company directors.99  
Such a board decision will be protected by the business judgment rule, which 
assumes that business decisions by the board are made on an informed, good-faith basis 
and are in the company’s best interests.100 The court only second-guesses the legality of 
the board’s decision in some exceptional situations (e.g., a majority of directors are 
interested in doing so).  
Basically, the board of directors in a Taiwanese company is vested with the same 
scope of authority as a U.S. board. Major differences include that Taiwan has supervisors 
against directors, who in effect are legally authorized corporate monitors with the 
authority to decide whether to sue directors. Thus, a shareholder should make a demand 
to supervisors before she sues directors. Similarly, a plaintiff needs to file a prior written 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Bradley T. Ferrell, A Hybrid Approach: Integrating the Delaware and the ALI Approaches to 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 244-245 (1999). 
99 See id.  
100 See id. The business judgment rule is “a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of 
a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action was in the 
best interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Auerbach v. 
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630-32, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926-28 (1979). 
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demand with supervisors before she brings a derivative suit. More important, there is no 
exception for a plaintiff to get around this requirement, i.e., the demand cannot be 
excused in all circumstances. 
However, there are some loopholes in a few circumstances. For example, if all 
supervisors are dismissed or retire, this vacancy creates a significant problem for the 
plaintiff because there is now no supervisor to whom he or she can make a demand. The 
unexcused demand and wait rule also creates problems in an emergency. For instance, if 
wrongdoing directors attempt to hide their assets to avoid recourse, the plaintiff has no 
way to take any action on behalf of the company.  
In some cases in which all supervisors are interested (e.g., involved with the 
alleged wrongdoing or have close relationship with wrongdoing directors), making a 
demand to supervisors could be useless, even harmful. The directors could hide assets or 
even flee before a lawsuit is brought against them. This example illustrates that the 
current demand and wait rule has some crucial flaws that need to be amended.             
In the Delaware laws, a demand to the board of directors is a pre-suit requirement, 
but one that can be excused in some certain situations, when such a demand is futile. 
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Upon having demands made of it, the board of directors can decide whether a 
shareholder’s demand has merit and is in the best interest of the company.  
Generally, the board has full discretion to make a decision as to whether to bring a 
suit or reject the demand. If the board brings an action based on the demand, the 
shareholders do not have right to participate in the ensuing suit. A board of directors, 
however, tends to reject a shareholder’s demand. When this occurs, the shareholder still 
can bring a derivative suit if she can show that her demand was wrongfully rejected. 
Unfortunately, the board’s rejection is a type of business decision that is protected by the 
business judgment rule, which assumes that every board’s act is a valid business 
judgment made on an informed, good-faith basis. Thus, unless the plaintiff can rebut the 
business judgment rule, his or her action probably will not survive at the pretrial 
proceedings.                   
Realizing the difficulty of rebutting the business judgment rule in a lawsuit, a 
plaintiff usually will bring a derivative suit without making a pre-suit demand. In 
Delaware, a plaintiff can claim the demand should be excused when it is futile. In 
Aronson, the court elaborates on how a derivative plaintiff can argue that an alleged 
demand is futile, i.e., the demand is futile if under the particularized facts alleged by the 
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plaintiff, a reasonable doubt is created that (1) the directors are disinterested and 
independent; or (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid 
exercise of a business judgment.101  
Unlike Delaware law, the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) §7.42 
provides for a universal demand policy, which specifies that a shareholder should initiate 
a derivative proceeding after a written demand has been made upon the corporation to 
take suitable action; and 90 days have expired from the delivery date of when the demand 
was made, unless the shareholder had earlier been notified that the demand has been 
rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable injury to the corporation would result by 
waiting for the expiration of the 90-day period.102 According to the MBCA, such a 
demand is un-excusable, as in Taiwan. However, a plaintiff in a MBCA jurisdiction is 
eligible to sue after a board of directors rejects his or her demand or in an emergency 
situation. In Taiwan, the demand and wait rule must be complied with without exception.       
To deal with the above loopholes, a plaintiff should be able to sue in certain 
situations in which compliance with the demand and wait rule is unreasonable. At least in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. 
102 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.42 (2008) [hereinafter MBCA].  
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an emergency situation, in which waiting will make a company suffer irreparable injury, 
a suit should be allowed. The plaintiff should have an obligation to present in court 
persuasive evidence, including the existence of an emergency and the high likelihood of 
irreparable injury to the company.  
This dissertation argues the concept of demand futility should be introduced into 
Taiwan. A demand to supervisors should be considered futile when all supervisors are 
vacant or there is a reasonable doubt that all supervisors are disinterested and 
independent. The plaintiff needs to provide evidence to prove his or her doubt at the pre-
trial proceeding. 
The problem is how to treat supervisor’s rejection. No Taiwanese statute or 
authoritative judicial opinion articulates how the business judgment rule is applicable to 
business decisions made by a board of directors and supervisors. Therefore, without the 
protection of the business judgment rule, a supervisor’s rejection cannot become a basis 
of defense for a defendant.103 However, since supervisors are invested with discretion in 
evaluating the shareholder’s demand before the suit, their decision deserves a certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 “A supervisor’s decision not to act has no impact on the shareholders’ rights, nor is it taken into 
consideration by the court.” Thus, the demand requirement is merely a procedural requirement before the 
shareholders files a derivative suit. The court will not be affected by the supervisor’s decision while 
determining if the suit could be legally maintained. See TSENG & WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, 
supra note 18, at 218.  
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degree of deference from courts, even though no U.S.-styled business judgment rule is 
applied.  
Litigation is not the only way to collect claims of the company. In fact, although a 
company might have a valid cause of action against its directors, derivative suits 
sometimes are not in line with its best interests. For example, the amount of the possible 
recovery may be so little that it is does make economic sense for a company to institute a 
lawsuit.           
In situations in which supervisors decline to sue, the court should take their 
opinion into consideration, unless there is reasonable doubt that supervisors are 
disinterested or independent. Even without an articulated business judgment rule, there 
are reasons to believe that a court is not in a better position to make business decisions 
than supervisors, unless supervisors are overly influenced captured by the defendants or 
get involved with the alleged wrongdoing.  
In this regard, the Aronson test may be a good source here. Under the TCA, each 
supervisor can exercise power individually without interference by the others.104 Thus, if 
there is at least one supervisor who is disinterested and independent in the company, his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 221 (Taiwan). 
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or her demand should not be futile, and shareholders should make their demand, while 
the supervisor’s judgment should deserve deference from the court.            
D. Unreasonable Litigation Security  
There are no statutory conditions limiting a court’s ability to issue a security order. 
Thus, if a defendant makes a petition requesting a litigation security, a court is vested 
with a great deal of discretion in determining whether such a security is appropriate.105  
As explained, the security is supposed to become a deposit that ensures the 
smooth uninterrupted process of lawsuits against those who intentionally bring strike 
suits.106 If the possibility that plaintiff will be liable for a groundless suit becomes 
relatively low by first viewing her complaints, this implies that potential liability arising 
from her suit is unlikely. In this circumstance, requesting a security becomes 
unreasonable. But because of the court’s unlimited authority to order a security, a 
plaintiff may be discouraged from bringing a suit because of this financial burden.107  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 See TSENG & WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 221.  
106 See id.  
107 See id.  
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The litigation security perhaps can help the court determine how serious the 
plaintiff who brings the suit is, especially if the amount of the security has a potentially 
deterring effect. Yet like other requirements of derivative suits, the security seems not a 
good way to assess whether a derivative suit has merit because the plaintiff’s willingness 
and ability to deposit the required security does not necessarily reflect the merit of her 
suit.  
Even if a security is necessary, the court should order the plaintiffs to deposit it 
only when it finds the lawsuit frivolous or striking.108 If there are no facts indicating that 
the plaintiff has acted in bad faith, the court should not order the depositing of a security. 
In the U.S., while some states having requesting security in derivative suits, most states 
have eliminated such a requirement.  
E. Lack of Incentives for Shareholders 
Since the cause of action belongs to the company, if the plaintiff wins the 
derivative suit, recovery should go to the company. Even though recovery to the 
company will lead to an increase in the value of shareholders’ holdings, shareholders in a 
publicly-held company are likelier to sell their holdings than to bring a suit on behalf of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 See id. The authors suggest that “[a] court should be able to order security only when a defendant can 
reasonably prove that a plaintiff brought a derivative suit with malicious intent.”  
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the company. If the derivative suit is thought as a good corporate governance mechanism 
that can maintain accountability to some degree, there should be an appropriate incentive 
mechanism to encourage shareholders to bring derivative suits. Under the incentive 
mechanism, the plaintiff who brings a beneficial suit can be reimbursed for reasonable 
litigation fees and costs.      
In the U.S. according to MBCA §7.46, the court may order the company to pay 
the plaintiff’s expenses incurred in the proceeding if it finds that the proceeding has 
resulted in a substantial benefit to the corporation.109 In Taiwan, however, there is no 
reimbursement provision with respect to a shareholder derivative litigation.110 Under a 
system without reimbursement, it is highly unlikely that any shareholder would bring a 
derivative suit for the interests of all shareholders. In fact, the lack of incentives for 
shareholders is one reason why so few derivative suits are brought in Taiwan.  
Thus, Taiwan needs an incentive mechanism that can properly encourage 
beneficial litigation to be brought. Specifically speaking, the court could review whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 MBCA, supra note 102, § 7.46. 
110 Commentators indicated that “even assuming that the plaintiff shareholders succeed in a derivative 
action, if they fail to convince the court that they meet the criteria in both articles 172 and 176 [of the 
Taiwan Civil Code], they will personally bear all the legal costs and fees associated with the action.” See 
TSENG & WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 222-23; see also MIN FA [Civil Code] 
arts. 172, 176 (Taiwan). 
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the proceeding has resulted in a substantial benefit to the corporation and determine the 
reasonable amount of reimbursement that the plaintiff should be awarded. A well-
established reimbursement regimen could not only encourage potential plaintiffs to bring 
beneficial litigation, but also could avoid strike or trivial suits that seek lucrative awards. 
In this sense, the court will play a very critical role in “filtering” what suits are brought.       
F. Other Limitations of Shareholder Derivative Litigation 
 In addition to many legal barriers in Taiwan’s derivative suit system, there are 
inherent unfavorable factors in Taiwan’s society and legal system for developing and 
implementing derivative suits. First, the controlling shareholder system in Taiwan 
provides poor protection of shareholders and ways to limit derivative litigations.   
 In many Taiwanese corporations, there is a large discrepancy between the control 
right and the cash flow right.111 Although the controlling shareholder system has its own 
advantages to management, common concerns are how to regulate controlling 
shareholders involved in self-dealing and self-enrichment. These shareholders may 
control the board of directors and shareholder’s meetings to manipulate important 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 See WANG & PANG, An Analytical Framework for Controlling Minority Shareholders and Its 
Application to Taiwan, supra note 67, at 278.  
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business decisions of the company. Thus, some provisions of the TCA may not be truly 
enforced, including those concerning derivative litigations.112 
 Second, the deficiencies of the TCA cannot provide an appropriate mechanism for 
shareholders who intend to bring derivative litigations. The TCA has many vague 
definitions of the duty of care, duty of loyalty, self-dealing, and self-enrichment.113 A 
shareholder may be sure if a defendant’s behavior has breached the duty of loyalty 
because there is no clear definition articulated in either the TCA or judicial opinions.114 
Thus, the litigation will become unpredictable and a shareholder would rather bring an 
action through criminal procedure than a derivative suit because there are fewer 
requirements and more benefits in criminal law prosecutions than via the TCA.  
 As mentioned, recovery through a criminal procedure involves no securities or 
fees; it is essentially free. Other rules and regulations could offer more elaborate 
protections to individual investors, such as the Securities and Exchange Act, banking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 See id. at 281-82. 
113 See LIU, The Transformation of Taiwan’s Corporate Law System, supra note 13, at 420. (“Although 
Taiwan’s civil code jurisprudence is vague on the duty of loyalty, breach of trust and embezzlement are 
crimes under Criminal Code......Another problem with the underdevelopment of the concept of fiduciary 
duty in Taiwan is uncertainly as to whom the duty is owed.” The concept of fiduciary of duty in the 
amendment of 2001 Taiwan Company Act is followed on U.S.-typed, and focused on directors, supervisors, 
and other executive officers. However, the cause of action will be different when the fiduciary duty is owed 
to whom without explicit definition); see also LIU, The Politics of Corporate Governance in Taiwan, supra 
note 16, at 263.   
114 See LIU, The Transformation of Taiwan’s Corporate Law System, supra note 13, at 420-21. 
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laws and other financial rules and regulations.115 Therefore, protection provided by the 
Company seems useless in practice. 
 Third, the unfriendly civil justice system has weakened the enforcement of the 
TCA. The history of how the political culture has affected the civil justice system reveals 
a bias against causing private disputes such as suits.116 In addition, Taiwan judges could 
be very intelligent young people but without sufficient social experience, given that the 
system that selects them is limited to the National Judicial Examination. Thus, these 
intelligent young judges possibly might have no professional ability to implement 
business practices.117  
 Scholars also point out Taiwan has far fewer licensed attorneys to practice law 
than other countries; there are only about 5,000 attorneys serving a population of 23 
million.118 This low legal service rate probably decreases the possibility of derivative 
litigation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 See LIU, The Politics of Corporate Governance in Taiwan, supra note 16, at 270-71.   
116 See id. at 271. 
117 See Liu, Corporate Governance Development in the Greater China, supra note 6, at 12.  
118 See id. at 12; see also TSENG & WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 233. . That 
would be approximately one registered attorney for every 4,600 people in 2012. 
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 Fourth, the risk-averse and “Asian Values” nature of Taiwanese society can limit 
derivative litigations.119 Taiwanese people prefer dealing with a dispute through a private 
settlement or negotiation, and often turn to litigation as a last resort.  
 In summary, there are many limitations of derivative litigations, such as high 
procedural barriers, the controlling shareholder system, the deficiencies of the TCA, an 
unfriendly civil justice system, a low legal service rate, and the reluctance of litigation.  
IV. History and Development of Taiwan Derivative Suit System 
 The Derivative Suit System was introduced into TCA in 1966, along with two 
subsequent amendments. Largely similar to current provisions, the original one requires 
the shareholder plaintiff to hold at least 10% of the company’s shares. Probably because 
very few cases were brought, in 1983, the ownership percentage requirement was reduced 
to 5%. However, such a requirement remained too high, so that only one case was 
brought before 2001.120 Given this unsatisfactory state, the ownership requirement was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 See Liu, Corporate Governance Development in the Greater China, supra note 6, at 12; see also TSENG 
& WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 234. Chinese tradition culture distaste for 
litigations and its culture will result in a non-litigious society to limit the application of the derivative 
actions in China. Taiwan has similar tradition and culture like China. For discussions of “Asian Value,” see 
also XIAONING LI, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SHAREHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE ACTIONS 276-78 (2007).  
120 After researching in electronic database established and maintained by Taiwan Judicial Yuan (i.e., the 
highest judicial branch), this dissertation finds only one case between 1983 and 2001. Only one judgment 
has been delivered: Taipei District Court decision, case no. 88 Su Tzu 2714 (1999). Although the 
shareholder plaintiff met the strict standing requirement, the plaintiff lost the case. The database can be 
reached at http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/eng/ (last visited on Oct. 25, 2014). 
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lowered again, to 3% in 2001. Since then, fewer than ten cases have been brought.121 See 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2: The Derivative Action Judgments Have Been Delivered to Taiwan Courts   
Year Courts Case No. Result 
1999 Taipei District Court 88 Su Tzu 2714 Defeated 
2004 Pingtung District Court 93 Chung-Su Tzu 59 Succeeded 
2004 Changhua District Court 93 Zhi Tzu 3 Succeeded 
2005 Taipei District Court 94 Su Tzu 2223 Defeated 
2007 Shihlin District Court 96 Su Tzu 1320 Defeated 
2008 High Court 97 Shang-Yi Tzu 914 Partly succeeded 
Source: The database can be reached at Taiwan Judicial Yuan and collected by author.122 
 
 Admittedly, such data might be imperfect and does not show all the cases, 
because some may have been withdrew by the plaintiff and settled out of court. However, 
such data still could at the least implicate the fact that very few cases have been brought 
in Taiwan since the derivative suit system was introduced. One may argue the fact that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 See TSENG & WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 215, 223.  
122 Taiwan Judicial Yuan, Law and Regulations Retrieving System, available at 
http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/eng/(last visited Oct. 25, 2014). However, there were other cases related to the 
derivative actions in past years. Four cases were concerned with the provisional attachment, and three cases 
were involved in whether the plaintiffs should deposit the security for expenses in the actions. The database 
cannot find cases of the derivative suit that were brought by individual shareholders after 2008.  
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few cases are litigated does not necessarily indicate strict pre-suit requirements. However, 
as agreed by many Taiwan’s scholar, the strict requirements have been one of the main 
reasons why few cases are brought in practice. 
V. Procedural Issues 
 Under the U.S. derivative suits system, the shareholder is a nominal plaintiff and 
the company is a nominal defendant. The company’s position involves two roles 
simultaneously: a nominal defendant and a real plaintiff in interest. In essence, the 
derivative suit in U.S. consists of three parties:  the plaintiff, the company, and the 
defendants.123 However, the TCA and Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure (“Taiwan Civil 
Procedure”) do not include statutes for use in the proceedings of the derivative action. 
Without statutes governing this, the issues discussed below may emerge. 
A. The Role of The Company in the Action 
 In a Taiwanese derivative suit, a qualified shareholder is the plaintiff suing in the 
name of the company. The plaintiff should be nominal and serve as a legal representative 
acting on behalf of the company. According to the TCA, wrongdoing directors or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD D. FREER, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 356 (6th ed. 
2011) [hereinafter HAMILTON & FREER, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL]; WILLIAM A. KLEIN 
ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 207 (11th ed. 2010) 
[hereinafter KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES].  
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supervisors should be defendants in this action.124  However, the TCA does not have 
provisions concerning the company’s role in the action. Taiwan Civil Procedure, as the 
primary legal source for civil actions, also has provisions about the procedure of the 
derivative action. As derivative suits have some characteristics that are different from 
those in the normal civil actions, some provisions should be specially enacted to deal 
with the distinctive issues arising from such distinctive characteristics. For example, in a 
normal civil action, the plaintiff can withdraw his or her suit or reach a settlement with 
the defendant. However, does the plaintiff in a derivative suit, as a nominal plaintiff, have 
the right to withdraw the suit or settle? Given that the plaintiff is not the real party with 
the cause of action, it is not appropriate that he or she has the authority to do what he or 
she wants to during the action.  
 Due to serious deficiencies of the legal suit process, some legal commentators 
agree that the company could intervene in the action.125 A rational explanation is that the 
cause of action originally belongs to the company, and it is the real party in interest. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Ching-Ping Shao, Representative Litigations in Corporate and Securities Laws by Government-
Sanctioned Nonprofit Organizations: Lessons from Taiwan, 15 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL'Y J. 58, 66 (2013).  
125 The perspective of intervention rooted in Japan. Under Article 849 of Japan Companies Act, the 
company may intervene in a derivative action, either as a coparty or for assisting either of the parties. The 
Act of KAISHA-HO [Companies Act] (Japan) in English is available at 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2052&vm=04&re=01&new=1 (last visited Oct. 25, 
2014). 
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result would have a direct association with the company (either in value of assets or in the 
firm’s reputation). Furthermore, the company which may not be a party, should be bound 
by the result (i.e., res judicata).126 
 However, after the company intervenes in the action, some questions may 
remain.127 First, there is the issue of the notice of intervention. According to Article 65 of 
Taiwan Civil Procedure, a party may notify a third party whose legal interests will be 
adversely affected when the party loses the action.128  
 It is unclear who should make the notice. In 1993, a new article was enacted that 
provided that the court may, at its discretion, send a written notice of the action to the 
company at an appropriate time before ending oral arguments in the trial and appellate 
courts.129 This may deal with the legal loopholes that protect the rights of the company to 
join in the action. Compared to the legal systems in Japan and South Korea which have 
special provisions for derivative suits, when a shareholder files a derivative action, he or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 MINSHI SUSONG FA [Code of Civil Procedure] art. 401 (Taiwan). Under the Article 401 of Taiwan 
Civil Procedure, the shareholder has acted as the plaintiff for the company, thus the company is also 
binding on the final and binding judgment. 
127 Shareholders of the company have interest in the outcome of the action, so they may apply for 
intervention too. Of course the court would have full discretion to make the decision.  
128 MINSHI SUSONG FA [Code of Civil Procedure] art. 65 (Taiwan). 
129 MINSHI SUSONG FA [Code of Civil Procedure] art. 67-1 (Taiwan). 
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she must give notice of the action to the company.130 This dissertation argues that Taiwan 
should immediately establish similar provisions.  
Second, after the company has been notified by the court or shareholders and 
intervened in the action, an issue is whether a dissenting plaintiff or defendant can make a 
motion to deny the company’s intervention.131 Of course, the court would have full 
discretion in making a decision, and it is likely that it would not deny the company’s 
intervention. Taiwanese commentators have suggested that the company be a “potential 
intervener” in the suit.132 Thus, the court should deny the parties’ motions.  
Third, can the company intervene in the action by siding with the defendant? The 
answer is yes.133 The intervening company may take the position against the plaintiff if it 
believes that such intervention would be in the company’s best interests.134 In Japan and 
South Korea, if a derivative action is filed in bad faith, the intervening company can 
choose to side with the defendant in order to avoid frivolous or strike suits.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 KAISHA-HO [Companies Act] art. 849 (Japan); Korea Commercial Act, art. 404. The English version 
of Korea Commercial Act, available at http://www.moleg.go.kr/english/korLawEng (last visited Oct. 25, 
2014). 
131 MINSHI SUSONG FA [Code of Civil Procedure] art. 60 (Taiwan). 
132 See TSENG & WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 225.  
133 See id.  
134 See id.; MINSHI SUSONG FA [Code of Civil Procedure] art. 62 (Taiwan). 
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 If the company was not notified of the suit and a final judgment was made that 
adversely affected the company’s interests, Taiwan Civil Procedure offers an 
extraordinary mechanism to revoke the judgment in order to protect a third party that did 
not intervene in the action.135 On the other hand, when the company intervened in the 
action and a final judgment was made, it may initiate a rehearing action to request a 
review of the final judgment, yet only in very exceptional situations, as provided under 
the Article 496 of Taiwan Civil Procedure.136 As for how a conspiratorial derivative 
action has resulted in a prejudicial judgment against the company, in Japan or South 
Korea, the company can directly initiate an action for retrial against the final and 
conclusive judgment.137  
 Finally, although some procedural issues exist, with a limited number of cases 
filed in courts, it is regrettable that such issues have not been carefully reviewed and 
deliberated by Taiwanese judges and scholars.  
B. The Plaintiff’s Right to Withdraw or Settle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 MINSHI SUSONG FA [Code of Civil Procedure] art. 507-1 (Taiwan). 
136 MINSHI SUSONG FA [Code of Civil Procedure] art. 496 (Taiwan). 
137 KAISHA-HO [Companies Act] art. 853 (Japan); Korea Commercial Act, art. 406. 
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 In the U.S., derivative actions, also referred as “representative actions,” allow 
shareholders to present the company to file a lawsuit.138 According to the definition of a 
representative suit, shareholders can, through their actions, assess the company’s rights 
and protect its interests of the company. However, such a decision-making authority is 
limited under Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that 
plaintiffs cannot exercise the right of settlement, dismissal, and compromise without the 
court’s approval.139 In other words, to avoid the possibility of shareholders abusing their 
rights so as to harm the company’s interests, the exercises of the rights should be under 
court’s supervision.  
 The derivative suits in Taiwan are also called as “representative litigations.”140 In 
Taiwan Civil Procedure, a plaintiff in the representative suit normally has the right to 
conduct all acts for the party represented by him or her. However, Taiwanese 
commentators agree that although derivative actions should be representative suits in 
mature, the litigation rights of the plaintiff must be limited mainly because he or she is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Susanna M. Kim, Conflicting Ideologies of Group Litigation: Who May Challenge Settlements in Class 
Actions and Derivative Suits?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 81, 82-83(1998). 
139 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c). 
140 See Ching-Ping Shao, supra note 124, at 71.  
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going to dispose of the company’s cause of action.141 Hence, the cause of action belongs 
to the company, and the plaintiff in the action is merely “the steward.”142 As such, 
Taiwanese commentators suggest that the Taiwan’s law be revised and the court be the 
“gatekeeper” in the derivative action.143 In other words, the plaintiff should obtain the 
court’s approval when it exerts the rights of the company (i.e. settlement, dismiss and 
compromise).  
 As will be discussed in Chapter Four, in Taiwan the Protection Act was enacted in 
2002, and through the authorization of the Protection Act, the Protection Center, which 
can be the plaintiff in the derivative action, was created in 2003. Under the Protection Act, 
the Center can be the plaintiff in the derivative action.144 It is easier for the Center, which 
has many advantages that individual shareholders lack (e.g., no minimum ownership 
requirement), it would be easier for the Center to institute a derivative suit. Besides, as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 See TSENG & WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 227. 
142 See id.   
143 See id.   
144 ZHENGQUAN TOUZI REN JI QIHUO JIAOYI REN BAOHU FA [Securities Investors and Futures 
Traders Protection Act] art. 10-1 (Taiwan). ZHENGQUAN TOUZI REN JI QIHUO JIAOYI REN 
BAOHU FA [Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act] (TOUZI REN BAOHU FA, Taiwan). 
An English version of the Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act, available at 
http://eng.selaw.com.tw/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL007109 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). Please note the 
official copy of this Act is in Chinese, available at 
http://www.selaw.com.tw/Scripts/newsdetail.asp?no=G0100101 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). Text in the 
English version is for English speakers’ reference. 
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non-profit organization established for the protection of securities investors’ benefits, the 
Center may issue even without any incentive mechanism provided in the Taiwan 
derivative suits system.  
 However, after the Protection Center brings suit, it may have a strong incentive to 
settle a case. That is partly because it would have more uncertain financial burdens when 
the suit proceeds. Moreover, because the Protection Center operates under the 
supervision of the competent authority, it has an incentive to settle cases. However, the 
Protection Center may provide lower benefits than expected (in terms of public goods), 
just like other administrative braches in the government. Thus, the Center may pursue 
some statistical goals (such as cases instituted or cases finalized?), rather than 
maximizing benefits to investors.  
 In summary, without provisions providing for the chance to settle or withdraw, 
there is a chance that the plaintiff will harm the company. This dissertation suggests that 
any settlements and withdrawals should be approved by the courts, and if necessary, the 
courts should notify the company and take its views into consideration in determining 
whether the settlements or withdrawals should be approved. 
C. The Business Judgment Rule  
  88 
During a U.S. derivative suit, the company, in some circumstances, has the ability 
to prevent or take over a shareholder’s suit, because it has the cause of action. For 
instance, if a shareholder makes a demand, the company can refuse that demand. 
Although the shareholder can institute a suit later, the court would apply the business 
judgment rule and accept the refusal by not second-guessing it. Unless the plaintiff can 
demonstrate that the directors are “personally involved or interested in the alleged 
wrongdoing” so that “their exercise of business judgment” is thus impaired, or their 
refusal to sue is made in bad faith,145 the suit should be dismissed because the decision 
not to sue falls under the protection of the business judgment rule. Even in a demand 
excuse case (which will be discussed in chapter 5), the Delaware court also applies an 
approach called the Aronson test to determine if the board of directors is not in a good 
position to make a decision about the company best interests. .  
Specifically, the Aronson court adopts the so-call two-pronged test. According to 
the plaintiff’s allegation, the question is: Is there “a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) 
the directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the challenged transaction was 
otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment”?146 Thus, in a demand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 644 (1986) [hereinafter CLARK, CORPORATE LAW]. 
146 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.  
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excused case, the authority of whether to sue still could be reserved for the board of 
directors in most situations. Even if the plaintiff’s suit survives at the pretrial proceeding, 
the company also can constitute a special litigation committee to review whether the 
company should sue. After investigations and deliberations, the committee would make a 
decision, which would earn a certain degree of deference from the courts. Hence, the 
courts would dismiss the suit by deferring to the decisions made by the special litigation 
committee. (This dissertation will further discuss U.S. derivative suits system in Chapter 
Five.) 
From the above, it is clear that there is a mechanism to determine whether suing is 
in the best interests of the company. If the board of directors is disinterested and 
independent, its authority should be maintained. However, in Taiwan, there are no 
statutes like the business judgment rule that provide protection for the board’s business 
decision. Courts differ as to whether the business judgment rule can be applied in 
reviewing the legality of an alleged director’s behavior. More importantly, at the pre-trial 
proceeding, the plaintiff’s suit can be allowed and entered into the trial proceeding if the 
suit meets the pre-suit requirements provided of the TCA, unless the court deems that the 
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lawsuit appears legally groundless.147 In addition, the company has no legal standing to 
motion the court to dismiss after the lawsuit is instituted. In other words, form holds 
considerable sway over substance in Taiwan’s derivative suits system. The key here is 
whether the plaintiff’s suit meets all of the requirements of a derivative suit; however, 
whether the lawsuit is in the best interests of the company does not seem to matter that 
much.  
In the U.S., few lawsuits can survive proceeding trial because the plaintiff faces 
certain challenges, such as meeting the proof of burden requested by the Aronson test or a 
recommendation to dismiss the suit from the special litigation committee. Through these 
mechanisms, many suits can be screened out. In contrast, Taiwan has no such 
mechanisms; so many suits may come up if the law loosens the requirements. That may 
be one reason why Taiwan remains committed to a more lenient policy of derivative suits. 
Thus, this dissertation argues that a U.S.-styled business judgment rule should be seen an 
indispensable to Taiwan’s derivative suits system when Taiwan considers future reform.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 MINSHI SUSONG FA [Code of Civil Procedure] art. 249 (Taiwan). 
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Chapter Four: Securities Investors and Futures Trader Protection Act and the 
Investors Protection Center 
This chapter will focus on analyses of the special legislation in Taiwan called 
Securities Investors and Futures Trader Protection Act (the “Protection Act”), which was 
enacted to provide reinforced protection for securities holders (most shareholders of 
publicly-traded companies).148 Some new and important enforcement mechanisms were 
introduced in the Protection Act to deal with problems when securities holders seek 
recovery through traditional methods (e.g., traditional civil procedure).149 They include a 
special mediation for disputes arising from securities trading and, more important, class 
actions. Further, when a company (rather than its shareholders) becomes a victim 
suffering from wrongdoings by the directors, the Protection Act makes it easier to bring a 
derivative suit being with lifted pre-suit requirements provided by the TCA. Such 
institutions shall be carried out by a government-sanctioned nonprofit organization called 
the Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center (the “Protection Center”). This 
chapter will have a comprehensive introduction to the Protection Center since its 
establishment, including its structure, functions, and performances. Of course, analyses of 
enforcement mechanisms, such as class actions and derivative suits will comprise the 
main part in this chapter.150 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 ZHENGQUAN TOUZI REN JI QIHUO JIAOYI REN BAOHU FA [Securities Investor and Futures 
Trader Protection Act] (Taiwan).  
149 See LIU, The Politics of Corporate Governance in Taiwan, supra note 16, at 273.   
150 See TSENG & WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 240 (stating that any discussion 
with respect to derivative actions would not be complete without a discussion of the Protection Center). 
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I. Introduction 
The majority of securities investors in Taiwan are individuals, rather than institutional 
investors.151 Compared with institutional investors, individual ones, who usually have 
less expertise and information, are more likely to suffer from false/misleading financial 
reports or documents, or any other types of fraudulent transactions.152 Although victims 
of securities fraud have direct causes of action against wrongdoers or those who commit 
fraud, individual investors rarely seek recovery through litigation or any other dispute 
alternatives. With limited capital, the amount of damage they suffer tends to be relatively 
small, so that they may prefer bearing is the loss rather than actively seeking remedy, 
especially when the cost of seeking a remedy more than the loss suffered. Thus, as most 
victims lack incentives to seek remedy or even take any legal action, wrongdoers or 
defrauders can escape civil liabilities; however, this situation appears unreasonable. 
In 1984, the Securities & Futures Institute (“SFI”), a government-sanctioned non-
profit organization, was established and to provide certain types of services for enhanced 
protection of securities investors. In 1998, the SFI established Investors Service and 
Protection Center to analyze serious securities frauds, and more importantly, to assist 
victims of securities frauds to institute lawsuits for recovery. 153 If necessary, the SFI 
would issue a public notice announcing that victims could authorize their rights of action, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 See supra Chapter Two III. c. Table 1: Investors Structure in Terms of Trading Value on TWSE Market.                                                                                                                              
152 Yu-Hsin Lin, Modeling Securities Class Actions Outside the United States: The Role of Nonprofits in 
the Case of Taiwan, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 143, 166 (2007). 
153 Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & Chen Jian-Lin, Reforming China’s Securities Civil Actions: Lessons From 
PSLRA Reform in the U.S. and Government-Sanctioned Non-Profit Enforcement in Taiwan, 21 COLUM. J. 
ASIAN L. 115, 143 (2008) [hereinafter Wang & Lin, Lessons From PSLRA Reform in the U.S. and 
Government-Sanctioned Non-Profit Enforcement in Taiwan] (stating that Taiwan utilizes the government-
sanctioned non-profit organization to supplement private and public enforcement efforts). 
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and later the SFI, after securing victims authorizations, would bring lawsuits against 
those committing fraud on behalf of these victims. Thus, with authorizations from those 
committing fraud victims, the SFI could exercise their causes of action collectively, 
which resolves the lack of incentives problem for them. Meanwhile, the SFI has full 
discretion to decide whether to serve as a representative for victims’ interests.  
However, there are no special procedural rules in the Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure 
for convenience of SFI’s lawsuits. The best way for SFI is the “Appointment of 
Litigation Representatives.” 154 Thus, the SFI and victims together can bring a single 
lawsuit, with both as plaintiffs. In that case, all plaintiffs would appoint the SFI as their 
litigation representative to handle all proceedings on behalf of parties. After appointing 
representatives, all parties are still plaintiffs in the lawsuit and should be bound by any 
result, even one they dislike.155 In other words, the SFI functions as a public-interest law 
firm in shareholder litigations.156 
Through bringing a lawsuit collectively and appointing the SFI as the representative, 
the SFI still would confront other problems.157 For example, litigating is very costly. 
Hiring attorneys and court fees would become a financial burden for the SFI.158 To 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 MINSHI SUSONG FA [Code of Civil Procedure] arts. 41- 44 (Taiwan). 
155 MINSHI SUSONG FA [Code of Civil Procedure] arts. 401 (Taiwan). 
156 Curtis J. Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic Theory and Evidence 
from East Asia, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 169, 177 (2004). 
157 See Yu-Hsin Lin, supra note 152, at 167-68. The author argued that “[t]he SFI not only overcame 
collective-action problems in coordinating investors to bring securities lawsuits but also, when necessary, 
budgeted the payment of court fees and lawyer fees.” Id. 
158 See Yu-Hsin Lin, supra note 152, at 168. The author agreed that “[t]he Investor Services Center of the 
SFI functions similarly to a public-interest law firm”). 
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mitigate the potential cost, the SFI could choose to bring a civil suit piggyback on a 
criminal lawsuit.159 Specifically, those committing securities fraud would be subject to 
both civil and criminal liabilities. In addition to traditional civil procedure as mentioned 
above, the criminal procedure has another system, called Ancillary Civil Action, in which 
victims can seek recovery in the same criminal proceeding if their cause of action arises 
from the prosecuted crime.160 In general, for victims, criminal procedure is preferable to 
civil procedure. In the former, the prosecutor has wide authority to search and seize for 
evidence preservation and as a plaintiff, he or she will be responsible for all activities in 
all proceedings, including attending court hearing and producing evidence. Also, there is 
no court fee in a criminal procedure. However, using Ancillary Civil Action also involves 
a risk. After an investigation, the prosecutor may think no prosecution is needed because 
of the possibility that the defendant committing a crime may be not that high. As a result, 
a “piggyback” civil suit cannot be sustained and this dispute becomes final. In other 
words, victims using this type of proceeding will have no right to sue again, even via a 
civil procedure. 
In summary, there remain some problems persist for securities investors and the SFI 
when seeking recovery against wrongdoing defendants. As a securities fraud usually 
involves a large number of investors and the amount of damage can be huge, the high 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 See id. at 167-68; see also Liu, Corporate Governance Development in the Greater China, supra note 6, 
at 14-5. The author contends that the public sector is willing to subsidize the cost for civil enforcement. 
This type of piggyback civil actions rule in Taiwan was inspired in German law. 
160 XINGSHI SUSONG FA [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 487 (Taiwan). Under Article 487 of Taiwan 
Criminal Procedure, those who injured by an offence may bring an ancillary civil action along with the 
criminal procedure, to request compensation from the defendant and those who may be liable under the 
Civil Code. The English version available at 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=C0010001(last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
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cost of litigations is the most serious problem.161 Basically, the more victims will have 
the higher the claimed amount, the more the cost of producing evidence, and the higher 
the court fee (calculated based on the claimed amount). 
II. The Protection Act and the Protection Center 
A. Establishment of the Protection Center 
To deal with the problems that the SFI has confronted and to provide more enhanced 
protection for securities investors, and the Protection Act was enacted in 2002 by 
Taiwan’s Congress (known as the Legislative Yuan).162 Later, the Protection Act was 
promulgated by the President on July 17, 2002 and took effect on January 1, 2003.163 One 
of its main purposes of the Protection Act is to create another government-sanctioned 
non-profit organization, the Protection Center, and the Protection Center is expected to 
carry out certain tasks specified and authorized by the Protection Act. Specifically, its 
primary tasks are to provide investors with free consultations to the public, to institute 
class actions and derivative suits, to seek disgorgements from short swing trading, to 
organize mediation committee for dealing with securities-related disputes, and to take any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 See Yu-Hsin Lin, supra note 152, at 168. As of 2002, the “SFI had filed de facto securities class actions 
against 23 companies on behalf of 6,028 investors, seeking NT$ 3.56 billion (approximately US$108 
million) in civil damages” see also id.; see also Lian-Yu Liu & Chun Hung Lin, TOUZIREN TUANTI 
SUSONG XINSHIDAI DE LAILIN [A New Era Coming in Securities Class Actions], 111 TAIWAN L. REV. 
80, 88 (2004). 
162 TOUZI REN BAOHU FA [Securities Investor and Futures Protection Act] (Taiwan). 
163 Protection Center, Introduction, available at http://www.sfipc.org.tw/english/about/02.asp (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2014). 
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necessary actions for protecting investors (e.g., issuing press release condemning 
misconducts).164    
With respect to litigation, unlike the SFI, the Protection Center enjoys several 
preferential privileges granted by the Protection Act. The most important rights are to 
bring class actions for victims in securities frauds and to bring derivative suits on behalf 
of the listed companies. Thus, lack of incentives to sue may not be a problem for 
investors. Additionally, with statutory privileges, the Protection Center can provide more 
effective ways to protect investors (see discussions later). 
The Protection Center’s establishment and operation are financially sponsored by a 
Protection Fund.165 When the Protection Center was established, the amount of this fund 
was 1.031 billion (New Taiwan Dollars) or approximately 343.7 million (USD).166 Initial 
donors included the Taiwan Stock Exchange, Taiwan Futures Exchange, GreTai (OTC) 
Securities Market, and other some securities-related firms and associations.167 Meanwhile, 
to provide continuous financial support, Article 18 of the Protection Act also requires 
securities firms, futures firms, the Taiwan Stock Exchange, the Taiwan Futures Exchange, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 See Liu, Corporate Governance Development in the Greater China, supra note 6, at 15-6; see also Liu, 
The Politics of Corporate Governance in Taiwan, supra note 16, at 274. As indicated by Liu, “[a]s of late 
2006, the SFC has filed 41 civil cases and acted for a total of more than 57,000 plaintiffs, claiming a total 
amount of about US $738 million.” 
165 See Wang & Lin, Lessons From PSLRA Reform in the U.S. and Government-Sanctioned Non-Profit 
Enforcement in Taiwan, supra note 153, at 144. 
166 Protection Center, Introduction, http://www.sfipc.org.tw/english/about/02.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 
2014). 
167 See id.  
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and the GreTai (OTC) Securities Market to make monthly compulsory contributions to 
the Protection Fund, based on a statutory calculated formula.168  
The Protection Fund should be spent for the Protection Center’s basic operation and 
for the execution of certain specified tasks (e.g., court fees).169 In addition, the Fund also 
can be used to compensate investors when a securities or commodities firm is in default 
and insolvent due to financial difficulties.170 How to manage the Protection Fund is also 
regulated. In addition to buying bonds and depositing cash in banks, the Fund can be used 
to purchase real estate, listed securities, or to make other low-risk investments for the 
Protection Center’s use.171   
B. The Structure of the Protection Center  
1. Board of Directors 
The main organs of the Protection Center are its board of directors, supervisors, and 
mediation committee. The board of directors consists of no less than three persons 
appointed by the competent authority (i.e., the Financial Supervisory Commission). The 
director candidates can be recommended by fund contributors or other non-representative 
experts (so-called public-interest directors), though public-interest directors should 
comprise more than two-thirds of the total number of directors.172 A chairman is elected 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 See id.  
169 TOUZI REN BAOHU FA [Securities Investor and Futures Protection Act] art. 20 (Taiwan).  
170 TOUZI REN BAOHU FA [Securities Investor and Futures Protection Act] art. 21 (Taiwan). 
171 TOUZI REN BAOHU FA [Securities Investor and Futures Protection Act] art. 19 (Taiwan). 
172 TOUZI REN BAOHU FA [Securities Investor and Futures Protection Act] art. 11 (Taiwan). 
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by a majority vote at a board of directors’ meeting attended by a quorum of at least than 
two-thirds of directors. The election and appointment of a chairman becomes effective 
upon approval by the Financial Supervisory Commission.173  
The board of directors has several statutory powers, including to amend the articles 
of incorporation, issue relevant rules, utilize the protection fund, and, most important,  
decide whether to initiate or stop any legal proceedings (e.g., a class action under Article 
28 of the Protection Act or a derivative suit under Article 10-1 of the Protection Act).174 
2. Supervisors 
The Protection Center should have from one to three supervisors. Every supervisor 
can at any time excise his or her supervisory power independently and without 
permission from the other supervisors, including investigating the operations or finances 
of the Investors Protection Center, inspecting account books or documents, requiring the 
board of directors to produce a report on the Center’s operations or finances situation, 
and requesting the board of directors to stop its wrongful behaviors.175 
3. Mediation Committee 
The Protection Center shall create a mediation committee of 7 to 15 committee 
members.176 Currently, the mediation committee has 15 members, who are professional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 TOUZI REN BAOHU FA [Securities Investor and Futures Protection Act] art. 12 (Taiwan). 
174 TOUZI REN BAOHU FA [Securities Investor and Futures Protection Act] art. 14 (Taiwan). 
175 TOUZI REN BAOHU FA [Securities Investor and Futures Protection Act] art. 15 (Taiwan). 
176 TOUZI REN BAOHU FA [Securities Investor and Futures Protection Act] art. 22 (Taiwan).  
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in a variety of fields, including securities or futures trading, banking, or executive 
management.177 Mediation is an optional, a statutory alternative dispute resolution, which 
would be engaged in by the Protection Center. When a dispute involves the trading of 
securities or futures, a party may bring a lawsuit or apply to the Protection Center for 
mediation.   
4. Management 
Management in the Protection Center is divided into administrative affairs department 
which is responsible for day-to-day operations and businesses, and a legal affairs 
department, which provides a variety of legal services, such as legal consultation and 
legal proceedings.   
C. Functions of the Protection Center 
Of the Protection Center’s tasks, discussed below I will focus on those that 
contribute to dispute resolution. In this regard, the Protection Center provides two 
primary functions: mediation and litigation (or, arbitration).178 
1. Mediation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 The Protection Center, Mediation (Mediation Committee), http://www.sfipc.org.tw/english/service/02-
3.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
178 TOUZI REN BAOHU FA [Securities Investor and Futures Protection Act] art. 28 (Taiwan). Under 
Article 28 of the Protection Act, the Protection Center can apply for arbitration if securing authorizations 
from 20 or more investors. There is the same condition for bringing a class action. However, most cases 
have been resolved through litigations rather than arbitrations. Thus, arbitrations will not be discussed in 
this dissertation. 
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First, any person in a dispute arising from the trading of securities or futures can 
apply for mediation with the Protection Center. Compared with litigation, mediation 
provides some advantages to parties trying to resolute their disputes through mediations. 
There is no fee for mediation, nor is any incurred when the parties fail to reach agreement. 
Hiring lawyers may be helpful but is not a must. In addition, mediation usually proceeds 
more quickly. Thus, for securities victims having small claims, mediation usually is 
preferable to litigation. Any mediation result should be approved by both parties, so the 
result is acceptable to them. In contrast, litigation result tends to be unpredictable, and 
sometimes, could be unbearable to both parties.  
 In addition to the Protection Center, the parties can apply for mediation with the 
courts or mediation committees established by local governments. However, the Center 
would be more trustful of this process than others, because its mediation committee is 
comprised of professional members with relevant expertise. Thus, a dispute can be 
quickly, reliable resolution..  
If the parties can reach agreement, that agreement has the same effect as a court 
decision after it has been ratified by the court. If the parties fail to reach an agreement, 
the plaintiff may sue afterwards. For mediation procedure in the Protection Center, see 
Chart IV. By the end of 2013, 294 mediation applications have been filed with the 
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Protection Center; 179  of these 68 cases were successfully resolved and settled by 
mediation.180  
 
Chart IV: Mediation Procedure in the Protection Center 
 
Source: The Protection Center’s webpage.181  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 The Protection Center Annual Report 2013, at 19. The annual reports are available at 
http://www.sfipc.org.tw/main.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
180 See id.  
181 The Protection Center, Mediation (Mediation Procedure), http://www.sfipc.org.tw/english/service/02-
2.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
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2. Litigations (Class Action & Derivative Suit)  
Second, the Protection Center has another important mission: to litigate for the 
interests of investors in securities fraud. When the Protection Act was originally enacted 
in 2002, the only type of litigation available for the Protection Center was class action. In 
2009, the Protection Act added Article 10-1, which authorized the Protection Center to 
file derivative suits and suits for director removal if certain requirements are met.  
As mentioned above, in the original version of the Code of Civil Procedure in 
Taiwan, there was no concept of class action, so securities fraud victims had to use 
traditional civil procedure for recovery. However, because of the reasons mentioned 
above, few victims would have an incentive to sue. To deal with this problem, Article 28 
of the Act introduced class-action suits for securities-related recovery. However, the 
Protection Center is the only institution or person eligible to bring class-action suits under 
the Protection Act. As the concept of a class-action suit is relatively new to Taiwan, this 
arrangement can prevent frivolous or meritless class-action suits, like some brought in the 
U.S.182 The Protection Center, a government-sanctioned non-profit, that runs and operates 
under supervision of the Financial Supervisory Commission, is less likely to file such 
frivolous or meritless litigations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its 
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1534 (2006) (indicating that “securities class actions 
disproportionately assert “frivolous” claims and thereby reduce shareholder welfare on average”); see also 
James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class 
Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 978-79 (1996) (Empirical results in this article were shown to “provide 
more evidence for the general hypothesis that many securities-fraud class actions are frivolous”); see also 
Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1477-98 (2004) 
(indicating that securities class actions were normally nonmeritorious prior to the PSLRA period). 
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Under the Protection Act, if investors are interested in filing an action, and their 
claims arise from a single common cause, they may authorize the Protection Center to 
institute a civil lawsuit. In contrast to the appointment of representatives in a 
conventional civil procedure, investors are not plaintiffs in the proceeding. Instead, the 
Protection Center, which is authorized to sue in the interests of authorizing investors, will 
be the only named plaintiff. The basic framework of class-action litigations under the 
Protection Act can be divided into the following parts:  
1. The Protection Center can file a class-action suit when it secures authorization from 
20 or more investors who have causes of action arising from a common cause (i.e., 
they are victims in the same securities fraud). The Center will be the only named 
plaintiff during the lawsuit, so it has power to act whenever it thinks fit (including 
settlement or even withdrawal) unless investors limit the scope of power at the outset. 
The recovery would go to the Protection Center as agents of investors, and then will 
first be distributed to real claimants pro rata, but litigation costs and expenses will be 
deducted.  
2. An authorization of power from securities victims to sue to the Protection Center is 
optional, and there will be no automatic opt-in system.183 Thus, if the Protection 
Center fails to secure authorizations from 20 and more investors, a class-action suit 
cannot be initiated. Investors can choose to authorize the Protection Center to sue or 
bring suits on their own.184 However, after such an authorization, an investor would 
lose standing to sue. An authorization can be withdrawn any time before the oral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 See Yu-Hsin Lin, supra note 152, at 175.  
184 Lian-Yu Liu & Chun Hung Lin, supra note 161, at 88. 
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argument is over at trial court.185 Rather than a collective number of claims, the 
number of investors should be the key to decide whether class action litigation can be 
commenced. How are investors’ authorizations to be collected? Normally, the 
Protection Center would not take legal action until these engage in securities fraud or 
other wrongdoers are indicted by prosecutors. The Center will review the details of 
the indictment and decide whether to bring a suit against the indicted defendants. 
Once the Center decides to sue, a notice is posted at its webpage. The notice includes 
basic information, including the names of defendants alleged, fraudulent behaviors, 
eligible plaintiffs, and the deadline for authorization. The letter of authorization can 
be downloaded at the Protection Center’s webpage and the authorization becomes 
complete after investors mail the letter back with the necessary information. The 
authorization is pretty easy and convenient for investors.  
3. The incentive for investors to authorize a class-action suit is that is cost-free. The 
Protection Center is established for providing pro bono service and the service offered 
by such an organization is free of charge. Investors and other claimants in the class-
action litigation, bear no costs for the lawsuit and related proceedings. But, they have 
the right to receive distribution of the awards (deducting all necessary fees and 
expenses) pro rata on the basis of securities they hold when the Protection Center 
wins the case (or if the case is settled). Some large investors or institutional investors, 
however, may not be motivated as much as individual investors to join such suits. 
First, they usually have an ability to hire lawyers and to pay court fees because the 
losses they suffer would be much higher than the cost of litigation. Second, they may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 TOUZI REN BAOHU FA [Securities Investor and Futures Protection Act] art. 28 (Taiwan).  
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be concerned that the Protection Center will not produce the best results during the 
litigation. Basically, the Center as a plaintiff has an absolute right to decide whether 
and how to sue, and even can settle a case without permission from investors. Thus, 
investors who suffer large losses may be worried that the Protection Center will 
arbitrarily settles the case with an inadequate award. If such investors sue by 
themselves, they will do their utmost to secure as large a recovery as possible.  
4. As mentioned, the operations of the Protection Center are financed by the Protection 
Fund. In addition to its initial fund, more capital from the security exchanges is 
required to be deposited into the Protection Fund. Litigations often are costly. 
Especially for a class-action suit, the number of persons involved and the amount 
claimed can be large. Thus, the relevant costs to initiate litigation could be 
tremendous. To maintain the continuous operation of the Protection Center with 
adequate financing, the Protection Act has some provisions in favor of the Protection 
Center in bringing a class-action suit.186 For example, in considering the Protection 
Center’s motion for provisional injunction or a provisional attachment against the 
defendant, a court may exempt the Center from the requirement of a security deposit, 
which almost is a necessity for a plaintiff who wants to be granted a favorable order 
from court. Additionally, the Center can receive the benefit of a discounted court fee. 
Specifically, when the amount of claimed damages is in excess of 30 million NTD 
(approximately 1 million US dollars), 30 million NTD becomes the cap for 
calculating the court fee. As a result, no matter how much the claimed amount is, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 See Yu-Hsin Lin, supra note 152, at 170-74; see also Tseng & Wang, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, 
supra note 18, at 240-41. 
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according to the above method, the maximum amount of court fee is 276,000 NTD 
(approximately 9,200 US) for a class-action litigation brought by the Protection 
Center.187   
5. Most class-action cases involve major types of securities frauds, including making 
false financial statements, producing false prospectuses, manipulating stock prices 
and insider trading. Normally, the Protection Center brings class-action litigation after 
prosecutors’ indictments.  
On August 1, 2009, to strengthen corporate governance and protect securities 
investors, Article 10-1 of the Protection Act was added; it provides that the Protection 
Center may actively file shareholder derivative suits or request a court to discharge 
directors/supervisors who seriously breach their fiduciary duties, regardless of the 
minimum ownership percentage requirement in the Company Act.188 In short, Article 10-
1 of the Protection Act is a special law which preempts the pre-suit requirement as 
provided in the Company Act.189  
However, there are some preconditions to applying Article 10-1 of the Protection 
Act. First, this Article is applicable only when the dispute is associated with listed and 
OTC companies. Otherwise, a derivative suit for a non-listed or non-OTC company 
should be brought in compliance with the Company Law. Due to its limited fund, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Court fees for the appellate courts and Supreme Court will be calculated on a higher basis than that used 
for the trial court fees (averagely, 1% of the claimed amount); however, the 30 million NTD is still a cap 
for calculating the fees. In a case in which the amount of claimed damages is in excess of 30 million NTD, 
the court fee will be 414,000 NTD (approximately 13,800 US dollars).  
188 Please note this dissertation will focus on derivative suits. 
189 See TSENG & WANG, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 241. 
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Protection Act does not require the Protection Center to bring a derivative suit whenever 
it detects a director’s breach of duty. In contrast, Article 10-1 applies when a director’s 
behavior seriously violates the law and the company’s articles of incorporation, or when 
it causes material damage to the company. According to a regulation promulgated by the 
Protection Center, the Protection Center may not bring a derivative suit when:190  
1. The statute of limitations for the cause of action has run; 
2. The amount of the company’s damage is less than 5 million NTD;  
3. The amount of the company’s damage is less than 1% of net revenue in 
preceding the fiscal year;  
4. The amount of the company’s damage is less than 5% of the company’s paid-in 
capital;  
5. Bringing a suit would be contrary to the public interest.  
 However, if the amount of damages is over and above the criteria, this does not 
necessarily mean that a suit should be brought. In fact, the Protection Center has full 
discretion to decide whether filing a suit is appropriate after taking relevant factors into 
consideration. These factors shall include (but are not limited to) the amount of damage, 
the probability of winning the suit, and the possibility of recovery. For example, in cases 
when the defendants abscond with all the property, no asset for recovery, bringing a suit 
turns out to be in vain even if both the amount of damages and the probability of winning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 TOUZI REN BAOHU FA [Securities Investor and Futures Protection Act] art. 10-1 (Taiwan). 
According to the Protection Act, such a regulation was enacted for handling matters associated with the 
Article 10-1.  
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are high.  
III. Derivative Suits under Article 10-1 
As mentioned, Article 10-1 preempts the minimum ownership requirement as of the 
TCA, but the Protection Center as a derivative suit plaintiff must comply with other 
requirements, such as demand and wait requirement. Thus, before bringing a suit, the 
Center must demand in writing and submit it to the company’s supervisors. If the 
company’s supervisors fail to file within 30 days after the demand submission, the 
Protection Center then can commence an action on behalf of the company according to 
Article 10-1.  
A. Introduction of Article 10-1 of the Protection Act  
Under Article 10-1, the Protection Center also can enjoy procedural privileges, such 
as waiver of security for a provisional seizure, injunction, or execution and discounted 
court fee. However, it is a question whether a court can order the Center to post a 
litigation security, as provided in the TCA, because no language of Article 10-1 implies 
such a requirement should be excluded when a derivative suit is brought by the Center. 
Compared with provisions class-action suits under Article 28, granting the Protection 
Center procedural privileges such as a waiver of security for provisional seizure, or 
injunction and discounted court fee, it seems reasonable to waive the Protection Center’s 
responsibility to deposit litigation security.191 One reason is that exemption from such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 See Tseng & Wang, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 241 (authors argues that “[b]y 
exempting the SFIPC from Taiwan’s deposit requirements, a significant barrier to pursuing such 
actions[derivative actions] has been removed”). 
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deposit of litigation security serves has the same (or at least similar) functions as 
procedural privilege. An exemption from a deposit of litigation should lower the costs of 
litigation and thus provide the Protection Center with more incentives to sue. Besides, the 
litigation security is used as a mechanism to prevent frivolous suits. As the Protection 
Center is a government-sanctioned organization that is well supervised by the Financial 
Supervisory Commission, the problem of frivolous suits may not exist. Therefore, even 
though there is no literal exemption, the court should carefully review all factors, and if 
there is no concern about frivolous suits, litigation security should not be required.192  
The Protection Center lessens the problem of informational asymmetry that a normal 
shareholder would face if he or she intends to bring suit against a company’s director. 
Shareholders, as outsiders, may not be aware of directors’ wrongdoing if relevant 
information is not disclosed by the company. When the wrongdoing is revealed, 
shareholders usually do not have enough information and sufficient evidence to sustain a 
lawsuit. Thus, in addition to lack of incentives, informational asymmetry can be a huge 
barrier for shareholders who wish to sue. According to Article 17 of the Protection Act, 
the Protection Center is authorized to request needed information and documents 
necessary from securities firm, stock exchanges, and issuers.193 Thus, the Center may 
have access to more information as a basis to decide whether to commence a legal action. 
Shareholders, however, have no such power to request information prior to filing a suit, 
which may make the suit’s outcome uncertain and unpredictable. As the plaintiff must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 See id. 
193 TOUZI REN BAOHU FA [Securities Investor and Futures Protection Act] art. 17 (Taiwan). 
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bear court fee if she loses, no one will file an action unless she secures persuasive 
evidence so that she appears highly to win a lawsuit. 
Generally, Article 10-1 helps the Protection Center bring a derivative suit with more 
advantages than a regular derivative suit under the TCA. First, the Article suspends the 
minimum ownership requirement (3% of the company’s outstanding shares) in the TCA, 
which is thought the most difficult barrier for plaintiffs to overcome. Second, this Article 
can deal with a possible lack of incentives for shareholders to sue, because the Protection 
Center, as a government-sanctioned non-profit organization, will sue wrongdoing 
directors for the interests of the company and its shareholders, without undertaking a 
cost-benefit analysis, such as an economically rational shareholder might do. Third, the 
Protection Center is vested with the right to request internal documents or necessary 
information from the company (issuer), which helps to alleviate the informational 
asymmetry. 
 Based on above reasons, while the Protection Center may function better than an 
individual shareholder in terms of the usages of derivative suits, the Center, however, 
cannot completely be a substitute for individual shareholders. First, under the current 
provisions, the Protection Center cannot bring a derivative suit against directors (or 
supervisors) of non-listed companies. Second, the Protection Center, as a government-
sanctioned non-profit organization that is designed to execute certain public goals 
supplemental to protect interests of securities holders, has full discretion to determine 
whether to institute a derivative suit. However, there may be great discrepancies between 
the Protection Center and shareholders in terms of their incentives to bring suits. Subject 
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to a limited budget, the Center may choose to bring cases that can be in its best interests, 
rather than in best interests of a given company. For example, the Center may have more 
of an incentive to bring cases that draw more attention from the public and to spend 
resources on them, because success in these cases would soon raise its reputation and 
show its effectiveness. On the other hand, the Center may not treat an unpopular case in 
the same manner.  This would possibly occur as the Center is greatly influenced by the 
government, which means that it would take politics into considerations when making 
decisions.194 This problem becomes more serious because the Center does not publish the 
basis of its decisions, including whether to bring an action, and how it has reached a 
settlement.195  
Third, in the context of corporate governance, shareholders may be better monitors 
of a company’s management than the Center, which is an outsider that has no close 
interests in how the company performs. The Center should not become a primary person 
to execute corporate mechanisms. It can offer a supplemental function when shareholders 
suits appear impractical. Thus, shareholders still should be key persons to bring suits 
against wrongdoing directors on behalf of the company. Like the Protection Center, the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is a law enforcement agency that 
brings civil actions against wrongdoers and companies that violate the securities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 See Shao, supra note 124, at 87-88. 
195 Wang & Lin, Lessons From PSLRA Reform in the U.S. and Government-Sanctioned Non-Profit 
Enforcement in Taiwan, supra note 153, at 150-51. 
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regulations.196 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 expanded the SEC’s ability to distribute 
disgorgement and civil fines (collected as a “fair fund”) to defrauded investors.197 
However, a problem is raised if the overlapping functions between the SEC enforcement 
and private suits would waste the SEC’s resources. Professors Cox and Thomas found 
this problem to be minor.198  Moreover, Professor Velikonja indicated that “[m]ore than 
half the time, the SEC compensates investors for losses where a private lawsuit is either 
unavailable or impractical.”199 In many cases, the SEC’s fair fund even becomes the only 
source of compensation distributed to defrauded investors.200 In addition, even if eligible 
victims do not participate in this distribution, they still have the right to institute suits.201 
Thus, when the private lawsuits are workable, shareholders often seek recovery by 
themselves. That may imply that both SEC’s enforcement and shareholders’ private suits 
can function in a complementary manner.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, 
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#.VGw45L78i3s.  
197 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
7246) (July 30, 2002). 
198 James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 
737, 745 (2003). 
199 Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund 
Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. _____(forthcoming) (2014).  
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
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In summary, although the Protection Center has many advantages in terms of 
instituting derivative suits, its role should be complementary to that of filers of derivative 
suits under TCA. 
Table 3: A Comparison between Derivative Suits under the Taiwan Company Act 
and Derivative Suits under the Protection Act 
 
 Derivative suits filed under the 
Taiwan Company Act 
Derivative suits filed 
under the Protection Act  
Article  Article 214 Article 10-1 
Plaintiff Any shareholder(s) holding at 
least 3% of the company’s 
outstanding shares 
The Protection Center (a 
government-sanctioned 
nonprofit)  
Minimum 
Ownership 
Requirement  
3% of the company’s outstanding 
shares 
N/A (but the Protection 
Center has at least one 
trading unit)202 
Holding Period 
Requirement 
One year N/A 
Litigation 
Security 
Court may order upon a 
defendant’s petition 
Court may order upon a 
defendant’s petition (but it 
should not be so ordered if 
there is no concern about 
frivolous suits) 
Demand and Wait 
Requirement  
Written demand submitted to 
supervisor(s) and wait 30 days 
(Demand and wait is un-
excusable in all situations)  
Written demand submitted 
to supervisor(s) and wait 
30 days (Demand and 
wait is un-excusable in all 
situations) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 See Liu, Corporate Governance Development in the Greater China, supra note 6, at 15. The Protection 
Center owns at least one trading unit in each listed company, so it can assert claims against directors and 
management as a shareholder. See id.  
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Procedural 
Privileges  
N/A 1. Waivers of security for 
provisional seizure, 
injunction, or 
execution 
2. Discounted court fee 
Access to 
information of the 
company 
1. The company makes public 
disclosure pursuant to laws 
and regulations. 
2. A plaintiff, as a shareholder, 
may review and copy articles 
of incorporation, minutes of 
shareholder’s meetings, 
financial documents, and 
shareholders list.  
1. The Protection Center 
also is a shareholder 
of the company.  
2. Request documents or 
information from the 
company and the stock 
exchange, etc. 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
B. Comparison Class Action and Derivative Suit under the Protection Act 
Class action and derivative suits can be brought by the Protection Center in Taiwan, 
which has full discretion to decide whether a lawsuit should be brought, after considering 
all relevant factors. Both can facilitate private enforcement for claimants’ interests and 
get recovery out of wrongdoers’ pockets. Thus, both can be used as a deterrent that 
disincentivizes potential wrongdoers from violating the law. 
However, both are different mechanisms and have several distinctive characteristics. First, 
in a class-action suit, the claimants are securities victims (e.g., securities holders) in a 
securities fraud. In a derivative suit, the claim usually belongs to the company. Second, a 
defendant in a class-action litigation can be anyone who commits securities frauds, and 
they usually securities issuers, directors, officers, accountants, large shareholders (those 
holding 10% or more of the company’s outstanding shares), and securities underwriters. 
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However, in a derivative suit, which is narrowly-defined in the TCA, only directors (and 
supervisors) qualify as defendants. While officers, large shareholders and others who 
should be liable cannot be defendants in derivative suits. Third, a class action and 
derivative suits have different pre-suit requirements. Prior to a class-action suit, plaintiffs 
must secure authorizations from 20 or more claimants whose claims arise in a common 
securities fraud. They do not need to secure permission from the involving company (i.e., 
securities issuer). As the cause of action against director(s) belongs to the company, in 
order to avoid unduly interfering with the company’s autonomy, the Protection Center 
must follow the demand and wait requirement before it can represent the company 
without its permission. Fourth, the Protection Center is the only institution that can bring 
a securities class action. However, despite having some procedural privileges, the Center 
is not the only institution or person that can bring a derivative suit, any eligible 
shareholder(s) can bring such a lawsuit if all pre-suit requirements are satisfied. Fifth, the 
Protection Center only represents listed companies on the Taiwanese stock exchange or 
OTC market. In Taiwan, a company that makes a public offering of securities is a public 
company. But, such a company will not be a listed company unless it applies for a listing 
of securities on the stock exchange or OTC market and its application is admitted. The 
involving company in a class-action suit is usually, but not necessarily, a listed company. 
Sixth, recovery in a class-action suit will go to those who have authorized rights of claim 
to the Protection Center, after deducting all necessary costs and expenses for such a suit.  
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Table 4: A Comparison between Class Action and Derivative Suit under the 
Protection Act 
 Class Action Derivative suit 
Claimants  Victims in a securities fraud The company 
Plaintiff 
(Nominal) 
The Protection Center The Protection Center  
Defendant  Any individuals engaging in 
securities fraud 
Director(s)/Supervisor(s) 
Pre-suit 
requirement 
Authorizations from 20 and 
more securities victims  
Demand and wait requirement 
The Protection 
Center’s 
discretion to sue 
Full discretion Full discretion 
Procedural 
privileges  
Yes Yes, but may be ordered to 
deposit litigation security 
Involving 
Companies 
Usually public or listed 
companies 
Listed companies only 
Recovery to be 
distributed 
Deducting costs and expenses No deduction of costs and 
expenses 
Recovery 
receivers 
Distributed to investors pro 
rata on a basis of values of 
their claims 
The company  
  Source: Compiled by author. 
 
IV. Performance of the Protection Center 
A. Number of Class Actions  
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In 2003 when the Protection Center was established, 28 class-action litigations had 
been filed, and they representing 1,050 investors. By the end of 2013, the total number of 
suits filed had increased to 175, with 108,000 investors have been involved. The amount 
of recovery through litigations was about 42.9 billion (NTD) (approximately 1.43 billion 
USD). See Table 5 for more details.  
Table 5: Class-action Litigations Brought by the Protection Center (2003-2013)  
Note: Above numbers are calculated cumulatively. 
Year Number of Class-
action Litigations 
Investors involved 
(Thousand) 
Amount of Award 
(Billion NTD) 
2003 28 1.05 0.467 
2004 37 4.209 1.405 
2005 36 48.934 18.432 
2006 42 56 21.647 
2007 48 60.9 22.814 
2008 57 60.3 23.821 
2009 71 73 30.014 
2010 89 86 34.392 
2011 150 97 41.6 
2012 161 103 41.8 
2013 175 108 42.9 
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Source: Protection Center Annual Reports (2003-2013) and compiled by author.203 
 
As of the end of 2013, 83 class-action cases were pending in court.204 According to 
the Protection Center’s Annual Report 2013, it has won 42 cases and been granted 
awards of 14.5 billion NTD (approximately 47 million USD);205 23 of these winning 
cases were final and non-appealable.206 Meanwhile, many cases were settled and the total 
amount of settlement awards rose to 2.2 billion NTD (approximately 73 million USD).207  
Of 42 winning cases, 9 cases stemmed from insider trading, 19 from false or 
misleading financial reports, 4 from misrepresentations in a prospectus, 14 from stock 
price manipulation, and 1 from fraud in stock acquisition.208  
B. Number of Derivative Suits 
Under Article 10-1, the Protection Center since 2009 has filed 18 derivative suits (6 
suits in 2010, 9 in 2011, 3 in 2012, and 4 in 2013).209 By the end of 2013, the Center 
accumulatively had filed 22 derivative suits.210 It appears that there is an increase on the 
number of derivative suits. Under the derivative suit system specified in the TCA, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 The Protection Center Annual Reports 2003-2013, supra note 179.  
204 The Protection Center Annual Report 2013, supra note 179, at 20. 
205 See id. at 4. 
206 Id.  
207 Id.  
208 Id. at 20-22. Please note a case may arise from one or more types of securities frauds. 
209 The numbers are from Protection Center Annual Reports (2010-2013). The Protection Center Annual 
Reports (2003-2013), supra note 179.  
210 The Protection Center Annual Report 2013, supra note 179, at 22-23. 
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however, about six cases have been brought by shareholders since its introduction in 
1966.211 The original provision required a plaintiff to hold at least 10% of the company’s 
shares. In 1983, the minimum ownership requirement was amended down to 5%. 
However, this requirement remained too high; consider that only one case was brought 
before 2001.212 In 2001, the ownership requirement was lowered further to 3%. Since 
then, five cases have been brought.  
Table 6: Numbers of Derivative Suits Brought by Shareholders in Different Phases 
Phase Number of suits 
Phase I (1966-1983): 10% minimum ownership 
requirement  
0 
Phase II (1983-2001): 5% minimum ownership 
requirement 
1 
Phrase III (2001-2014): 3% minimum ownership 
requirement 
5 
Source: The database is from the Taiwan Judicial Yuan and was complied by author. 
 
The period covered in this chart is about almost five decades long. But there were 22 
cases filed by the Center in just four years. This seems to imply that the institution of 
derivative suits can be a useful corporate governance mechanism, but under the current 
set-up of the TCA, only a very few shareholders have the ability to, or willingness to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 See supra Chapter Three IV. Table 2: The Derivative Action Judgments Have Been Delivered to Taiwan 
Courts. 
212 After researching on electronic database established and maintained by Taiwan Judicial Yuan (i.e., the 
highest judicial branch), this dissertation finds two cases between 1983 and 2001. But, only one case was 
brought by shareholders, and the other was brought by the supervisor of the company, see also supra 
Chapter Three IV. Table 2: The Derivative Action Judgments Have Been Delivered to Taiwan Courts. 
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bring a suit. Even so, Taiwanese policymakers still have concerns about abuse by 
shareholders, and the requirements in the current derivative suit system remain. This is 
also why the Protection Center has exclusive authority to bring suits under the Protection 
Act with certain requirements suspended. In a single suit filed in 2013, the Protection 
Center, the accused wrongdoer and her company reached a three-way settlement of 1.2 
billion NTD.213  
Table 7: Number of Derivative Suits Brought by the Protection Center (2010-2013)  
Year Number of suits 
2010 6 
2011 9 
2012 3 
2013 4 
Total  22 
         Source: The Protection Center Annual Report (2010-2013) 
 
C. Case Study: A Derivative Suit involving the Free Power Energy Co. (“Free 
Power”)214 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 The Protection Center Annual Report 2013, supra note 179, at 22-23. 
214 The case citation is No. 100 Chin-Tzu-De 8 (Taiwan Shilin District Court). Other two cases are No. 102 
Chin-Tzu-De 13 (Taiwan Taipei District Court) and No. 101 Chung-Su Tzu-De 414 (Taiwan Taipei 
District Court). 
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Although 22 derivative suits were filed by the Protection Center, I found, after 
conducting a search in the legal database, that only 3 cases are decided by the courts are 
available to the public. Others might be have been withdrawn by the Protection Center, 
settled by the parties, or still in process. All three of these cases were dismissed by the 
courts. A common reason for dismissal is that Article 10-1 of the Protection Center had 
no retroactive provisions, so that any alleged wrongdoings committed before such Article 
took effect cannot be a basis to substantiate the Protection Center’s suit. The case is 
presented below demonstrates the serious problem in lawsuits brought by the Protection 
Center.  
Defendant A was convicted of embezzlement, which he committed when he served 
as president (chairman of the board of directors) of the Free Power in 2006. In 2011, 
Defendant A served a supervisor of the Free Power. The Protection Center made a 
written demand requesting the board of directors to sue, but the board failed to bring suit 
within 30 days after the demand. Thus, the Protection Center brought a derivative suit 
against Defendant A pursuant to Article 10-1. Although the facts of Defendant A’s 
wrongdoing were likely true, and Defendant A’s breach of duty could be implied, the 
court held that Article 10-1 had no retroactive force and was not applicable when 
Defendant A’s wrongdoing was committed which was before Article 10-1 took effect on 
Aug. 1, 2009. Thus, the Protection Center’s suit was dismissed.   
 As the above case shows, the internal checks and balances system failed to 
function in the Free Power case. Defendant A, as president, was alleged to have 
embezzled the Free Power’s asset in 2006, and later was indicted by prosecutors. Even so, 
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Defendant A was elected as a supervisor in 2010. Based on the facts presented in the 
indictment, the Protection Center submitted a demand requesting the board of directors to 
sue Defendant A, but the board unfortunately ignored or rejected the demand. During the 
30-days waiting period, Defendant A’s embezzlement was not finally confirmed, but at 
least, his behavior was shown to be highly suspicious. Still the board of directors chose 
not to sue. Because the Free Power is a listed company with a dispersed ownership, it is 
likely that the minimum ownership requirement (3% and more) would be an extremely 
difficult barrier for minority shareholders, who wish to make a demand and bring a suit 
on behalf of the Free Power. With the exemption provided in Article 10-1, the Protection 
Center can bypass this requirement by making demand and bringing a suit. If Article 10-1 
did not exist, maybe no suit against Defendant A could be brought. However, the Free 
Power would possibly still have a chance to sue Defendant A after his unlawful behavior 
was confirmed. However, the procedure usually would take a long time to become final 
and Defendant A could hide his assets and avoid civil liability before that. The Protection 
Center could bring a suit in a timely manner. Although the Center failed to obtain 
recovery out of the wrongdoer’s pocket in this case, the suit still had an important value 
in the context of corporate governance. At least since Article 10-1 took effect, deterrents 
can be created by the Protection Center’s activism. 
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Chapter Five: Shareholder Derivative Litigation in the United States 
It is believed that Taiwan’s provisions of the derivative suits system are transplanted 
from Japanese and U.S. systems.215 This chapter will have an analysis focusing on the 
U.S. derivative suits system. The institution of derivative suits in Japan and other East 
Asian jurisdictions will be introduced next chapter. At the beginning of this chapter, there 
will be a theoretical discussion over the institution of derivative suits in the U.S. in some 
aspects, in order to show its controversy. Such an institution can be a tool to deal with 
problems of agency costs, but it also raises serious abuse concern. Furthermore, this 
chapter will introduce the requirements of derivative suits and explore related issues, 
such as contemporaneous ownership requirement, written demand submitted to board of 
directors and security for expenses. Finally, in comparison with Taiwan derivative suits 
system, this chapter will have a summary illustrating distinguished characteristics in the 
U.S. derivative suits system. As U.S. derivative suit can be a model, the comparison 
would be helpful in reaching this dissertation’s suggestions for Taiwan’s future reform. 
I. Basic Theories of Shareholder Derivative Litigations 
A. Good Theory:  A Solution to Problems of Agency Costs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 See Tseng & Wang, Derivative Actions in Taiwan, supra note 18, at 215. 
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In a modern U.S. company, shareholders, substantial owners of the company, usually 
do not manage the company. Instead, the board of directors is vested with the statutory 
power concerning the operations of the company. Therefore, the separation between 
ownership and control could frequently be seen in many modern companies.216 A U.S. 
board of directors can appoint officers to manage the daily affairs of the company, but 
those who in fact run the company may not care too much about how well or bad the 
company runs because they normally have few financial stakes in ownership of the 
company. Under the scenario of separation between ownership and control, agency 
problem arises because agents (i.e., directors and officers) tend to pursue their own 
interests at the expense of owners (i.e., shareholders).217 
Fiduciary duty can function as a restraint on agents who lack incentives to create best 
interest for the company, as they shall be responsible for any damages resulting from 
their breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, being afraid of potential liability, fiduciary duty 
can align interests of agents with these of the principal (the company and its 
shareholders).218 For example, under regulations of fiduciary duty, for an agent, shirking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(1932). 
217 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) [hereinafter Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm].  
218 See Romano, The Shareholder Suit, supra note 24, at 56-58. 
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is not allowed and carrying out jobs with reasonable care is expected. More importantly, 
in a conflict-of-interest situation, agents should not pursue their personal interests at the 
expenses of the principal. Whenever directors or officers breach their duty, the principal 
thus has a cause of action against them.  
How effectively fiduciary duty regulations function may very depend on how these 
regulations are enforced in fact. Directors may not have strong incentives to comply with 
regulations of fiduciary duty if they find that those who breach duty turn out to have no 
punishment for their wrongdoings or negligence. In this circumstance, directors and 
officers may not worry too much about potential legal liability and regulations of 
fiduciary duty would provide deterrent on these agents in a very limited manner.  
As mentioned, a company has cause of action against its agents who breach their duty 
owed to the company. However, how to make the company’s cause of action (and its 
claim) realized would be a key question. Such agents may serve as important positions 
(e.g., directors or senior officers) and it is unlikely that they are willing to pay for 
damages if they face no pressure from the company which takes no legal action against 
them. Even though the company can take legal actions to seek recovery, agents may exert 
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improper influence on the company’s decisions made for their interests but for the 
company’s interests.  
In a U.S. company, whether and how to seek recovery shall be decided within the 
discretion of board of directors. If bringing a lawsuit is needed to realize the company’s 
claim and directors are future defendants, a conflict of interest exists between directors 
and the company (the relationship like debtors and creditors). Even though there is no 
conflict-of-interest concern when majority directors are not defendants, they may not be 
able to evaluate whether a given lawsuit is in best interest of the company in an objective 
and impartial manner, because they may have structural biases in favor of their fellows 
due to certain relationships (such as colleague, friendship or family). 219  In some 
companies in which the management (e.g., CEO) has dominance or great influence in the 
boardroom, the board of directors would be reluctant to bring suits against the 
management and affiliated persons. As a result, the board of directors may not be able to 
objectively and independently exercise their discretion in certain situations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal 
Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985) [hereinafter Cox & Munsinger, 
Bias in the Boardroom]. 
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Due to above-mentioned concerns such as the conflict-of-interest and possible biases 
of directors, shareholders can also be monitors replacing the board of directors if the 
board of directors as a whole is unable to make objective decisions for the company’s 
interest.220 As Professors Thompson and Thomas stated in their article, “derivative suits 
can be a valuable part of public company shareholder monitoring” in some 
circumstances.221 In a derivative suit, the plaintiff is suing for interest of someone else. 
Why they do this? The answer is based on assumption of altruism that the plaintiff wants 
to do the right thing. The assumption may not actually exist.222  Therefore, there is an 
abuse concern by shareholders, so shareholders should be allowed to sue on behalf of the 
company only when the shareholders meet some requirements, which shall be very 
exceptional.223 This chapter will discuss these requirements reflecting the abuse concern 
later.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Scholars contend that the institution of derivative suits is a necessary mechanism and with such a 
mechanism “fiduciary duties might become meaningless obligations lacking enforcement mechanisms.” 
See KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 209. 
221 Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1786 (2004) [hereinafter Thompson & Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of 
Derivative Lawsuits]. 
222 William Kaplan, Q.C. & Bruce Elwood, The Derivative Action: A Shareholder’s “Bleak House”?, 36 
U.B.C. L. REV. 443, 457 (2003). 
223 CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 267 (6th ed. 2010) (indicating that the shareholder derivative suits 
institute only in some exceptional circumstances) [hereinafter O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS 
AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS]. 
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B. Controversial Nature:  Corporate Governance Tool vs. Abuse Concern 
As Professors Shleifer and Vishny described, corporate governance is to deal with 
“the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment.”224 Presumably, the competition in product market is one of 
the most effective corporate governance mechanisms which can incentivize the 
management to minimize costs and maximize returns for shareholders of the company.225 
Specifically, the underperforming management may have worries that they would be 
removed by unsatisfied shareholders, and they will do their best making satisfactory 
performance to keep their positions. However, the product market competition could not 
prevent faithless managers from expropriating the returns of all investors.226  
Thus, there are two common approaches of corporate governance mechanisms.227 The 
first one is legal protection which gives shareholders certain types of legal rights. The 
voting right is the most important legal protection of shareholders, such as elections of 
board of directors, decisions on issuing securities, substantial changes of the company, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 737 (1997). 
225 See id. at 738. 
226 Id. 
227 See id. at 739. 
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and so on. The voting right, however, can be expensive to exercise and to enforce, and 
the board of directors may interfere in the voting process and conceal the important 
information if the result would be unfavorable to them. 228  The second one is to 
concentrate the share holdings in a small number of shareholders.229 Nonetheless, the 
controlling shareholders (concentrated ownership) have been criticized on both sides of 
advantage and disadvantage of corporate governance mechanisms.230 
In the United Stated, courts are usually reluctant to interfere in any business decisions, 
unless in cases of management theft and asset diversion. In this circumstances, 
shareholders have the legal right to sue the management who breach of the duty of 
loyalty by using class actions and derivative actions. Shareholder class actions and 
derivative actions both are tools in order to combat corporate misconduct.231 However, 
they would be triggered and utilized by the plaintiffs in different situations. Securities 
class actions usually enforce securities regulations which mainly consist of several anti-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 See id. at 750-51. 
229 See id. at 753-58. 
230 See e.g. Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm, supra note 217; see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461 (1986). 
231 Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder Litigation, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 75, 77 (2008). 
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fraud provisions.232 As calculated by Professors Thompson & Thomas, a large number of 
class actions filed in Delaware involve acquisitions.233 Securities class actions and 
derivative actions can be the primary mechanism that could enforce the fiduciary duties 
of corporate officers and directors.234  
Class actions and derivative suits are different in nature. Shareholder derivative 
litigation is a type of shareholder suits on behalf of the company and can produce benefits 
for all of shareholders and the company. In contrast, class actions usually are brought by 
representative plaintiff for part of shareholders of the company and only these 
shareholders involved in the action could recover monetary rewards. As Professor 
Romano stated, “shareholder litigation is accorded an important stopgap role in corporate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). The securities fraud class actions are usually arising under the Rule 10b-5 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
233 Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-
Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 181 (2004) (indicating “the tremendous number of 
acquisition-oriented class action lawsuits filed in the Delaware state courts”)[ hereinafter Thompson & 
Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions]. 
234 See Erickson, supra note 231, at 77; see also Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park & Steven Shavell, When 
Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1733 (1994). 
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law.”235 Scholars argue that shareholder derivative litigations are a better mechanism in 
effecting corporate governance of company than class actions.236  
The litigation is thought as a tool to align managers’ incentives and shareholders’ 
interests to mitigate the possibilities that corporate directors and officers would breach of 
their duty of care and loyalty.237 Moreover, shareholder derivative litigation is considered 
as “the chief regulator of corporate management.”238 Although shareholder derivative 
litigation seems to be forgotten in recent years, it does have its contributions and 
evaluations of corporations for corporate governance.239 
Theoretically, in a derivative litigation, the shareholders represent the interest of the 
company. The legal right originally belongs to the company and should be exercised by 
board of directors. Thus, the essence of shareholder derivative litigation exists agency 
conflict between shareholders and management. However, if shareholders bring suits 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 See Romano, The Shareholder Suit, supra note 24, at 55.  
236 Stephen P. Ferris et al., Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Empirical 
Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 143, 144-46 
(2007). 
237 See Romano, The Shareholder Suit, supra note 24, at 55.  
238 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 548; see also John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the 
Derivative Lawsuit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 261-62 
(1981) [hereinafter Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Lawsuit].  
239 Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit, 61 VAND. L. REV. 387, 388 (2008). 
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with malicious intentions and not for the benefits of corporations, the suits could disturb 
the management from exercising their authority efficiently and may possibly harm 
reputation of the company and its management.  
However, a derivative suit, if properly brought, can provide deterrent on agents and 
protect the company’s benefits. As agents owe duty to the company, the company has a 
cause of action against the wrongdoing agents. In lawsuits arising from causes of action 
that belong to the company, the recovery should go to the company. If the shareholder 
plaintiff wins a derivative suit, he/she, also as shareholder(s) of the company, would 
indirectly earn financial gains after the recovery goes to the company (as the net value of 
company’s asset increases). Nowadays, an individual shareholder, however, tends not to 
have too many stakes in one given company. Thus, even though a shareholder plaintiff 
could win a case, the financial benefit that he/she expects to earn would be relatively 
small. The little amount of benefits may provide no incentive strong enough for 
shareholders to bring a derivative suit on behalf of the company. Professor Romano 
contends that “[t]he efficacy of shareholder litigation as a governance mechanism is 
hampered by collective action problems because the cost of bringing a lawsuit, while less 
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than the shareholders’ aggregate gain, is typically greater than a shareholder-plaintiffs pro 
rata benefit.”240 
Bringing a lawsuit is costly to the plaintiff.  If the plaintiff loses, he or she may have 
to bear all the costs incurred. Without any reimbursement mechanism, no shareholder is 
willing to bring a derivative suit on the behalf of the company. Rather than bringing a 
derivative suit, the better strategy for a shareholder is to sell company’s shares or just to 
wait for suits brought by other shareholders.  To encourage shareholders to file derivative 
suits for the company, there should be an incentive or reimbursement mechanism which 
can reimburse the plaintiff fees and costs reasonably associated with the lawsuit. 
However, if such mechanism is not properly designed, many unnecessary suits will likely 
come out because shareholders who have no cost concern may bring a suit without taking 
it seriously. Therefore, when it comes to derivative suit system, it is a requisite to build a 
well-designed incentive mechanism that can encourage meritorious suits and discourage 
unnecessary frivolous suits. 
However, a well-designed mechanism may have its drawbacks which are not 
foreseeable at the time it is created. From the previous experience in the U.S., with an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 See Romano, The Shareholder Suit, supra note 24, at 55. 
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incentive mechanism, the derivative suit could be manipulated as a striking tool against 
the management. The real reason why the plaintiff brings a suit sometimes is for her own 
private benefits or her attorney’s benefits, such as intent to get a settlement award, rather 
than for the interests of all shareholders. Professor Romano in her article assessed the 
effectiveness of shareholder litigation (derivative suit) as an incentive-alignment device 
by examining lawsuits brought against a randomly selected sample of publicly traded 
firms over several decades.241 Romano concluded that shareholder litigation was a weak 
instrument of corporate governance and found that most of such lawsuits settled, and 
there were financial recoveries in only half of settled suits, and per share recoveries were 
small.242 She also indicated that the principal beneficiaries of the litigation were attorneys, 
who won fee awards in 90 percent of settled suits.243 
Other research also shows that most of shareholder derivative litigations are frivolous 
suits and the plaintiff’s purpose is to seek for the settlement awards and the principle 
beneficiaries tend to the lead attorneys rather than all of shareholders of the company.244 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 Id.   
242 See id. at 84.  
243 See id. 
244 Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 351 (2001) 
(indicating that “shareholders seldom profit--suits are filed because their attorneys stand to reap substantial 
fees”) [hereinafter West, Why Shareholders Sue]; see also FRANKLIN S. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT 
REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944) (the asserted that shareholder derivative suits were 
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This is because in fact most of derivative litigations are settled. While reaching a 
settlement, the lead attorneys may consider their own interests more seriously than the 
company’s interest as a whole. Thus, shareholder derivative litigations are very likely to 
be strike suits.245 In Cohen, as the U.S. Supreme Court observed: “[t]he remedy itself 
provided opportunity for abuse…Suits sometimes were brought not to redress real 
wrongs, but to realize upon their nuisance value.”246    
Thus, the controversial issue in a derivative suits system is whether a particular suit is 
instituted in the best interest of the company. Traditionally, the board of directors has full 
discretion on all business affairs and board’s decisions tend to be protected by the 
business judgment rule, a judicial presumption that every board’s business decision is 
made on informed, good-faith basis, and in the best interest of the company. However, as 
mentioned, a board of directors sometimes is not in the best position to determine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
greatly frivolous in the 1930s and early 1940s); see also George D. Hornstein, The Death Knell of 
Stockholders’ Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1944); see also Coffee & Schwartz, 
The Survival of the Derivative Lawsuit, supra note 238, at 261-62; see also Daniel R. Fischel & Michael 
Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit Incorporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 271-73 (1986). 
245 In a classic strike suit, an attorney who finds a derivative claim recruits a shareholder to be the plaintiff 
in the lawsuit, and she expects to reach a settlement with defendants with attorney fees without caring 
about the alleged wrongdoing. The defendants and the company have incentives to settle because they use 
the company’s money and can avoid the litigation. In such a case, the attorney becomes the real winner and 
the case provides no positive effect on the company. See HAMILTON & FREER, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
IN A NUTSHELL 354. 
246 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 548. 
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whether to bring a suit for the company because they may be interested and non-
independent while exercising their discretion.247 Thus, a shareholder who has financial 
stakes in the company may be more qualified as a plaintiff and the plaintiff’s suit could 
be in line with the best interests of the company.  However, how to build a mechanism to 
effectively align the plaintiff’s interest with the company’s interest would be a 
question.248  
II. What A Shareholder Derivative Litigation Means? – Direct Suit vs. Derivative 
Suit 
Shareholders may bring lawsuits against directors and the management, directly or 
derivatively. In a direct suit, the plaintiff has cause of action and any recovery should go 
to the plaintiff (i.e., the shareholder rather than the company). That is to say, a 
shareholder sues to vindicate her own personal claim. In contrast, in a derivative suit, the 
cause of action belongs to the company rather than the shareholders, so the plaintiff sues 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 Thus, the law needs to balance two competing policies: deference to decision-making authority of the 
board of directors and the need to make wrongdoers accountable. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE 
LAW 187 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter, BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW]. Professors Coffee & Schwartz 
argued that the decision not to sue has certain special factors (e.g., may not o so objective because of the 
problem of structural bias) and should be different from the normal decisions, which enjoyed protection 
under the business judgment rule.  See Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Lawsuit, supra 
note 238, at 280-83.  
248 As a result, the theory may be practically different from the reality. Some are opined that it is also an 
open question whether the institution of derivative suit in fact generates the deterrent effect in the corporate 
governance context. See KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
PRINCIPLES 213. 
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on behalf of the company and the recovery should go to the company. A shareholder in a 
derivative suit is suing to vindicate the company’s claim.249  
It is important to distinguish a direct suit from a derivative suit. In addition to whom 
would be eligible to obtain the recovery, the plaintiff in a derivative suit would face more 
barriers than in a direct suit.  The reason is very straightforward. The plaintiff exercises 
her own cause of action in a direct suit, so the shareholder is the real party in interest; 
however, in a derivative suit, the cause of action belongs to the company, so the company 
is the real party in interest.250 There should be a mechanism to decide who can represent 
the company in order to make sure such suit being brought in line with the company’s 
interest. The mechanism consists of several procedural pre-suit requirements which will 
be discussed later.  
In a direct suit, the plaintiff as shareholder of the company is injured by directors’ 
misconduct. The injury usually involves legal rights granted by law such as voting rights 
or the right of inspection of books and records. If a shareholder’s request to exercise 
his/her rights is denied by directors, he/she may sue the directors to protect and enforce 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 As the shareholder derives the right to institute a suit from the company, his/her suit thus is called 
“derivative suit.” See id. at 207.  
250 HAMILTON & FREER, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 349. 
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his or her rights as a shareholder.251 On the other hand, directors owe duties of care and 
loyalty to the corporation and to all of shareholders, if breach of these duties will produce 
a cause of action for the corporation against its directors. The corporation is injured 
directly by its directors, and a shareholder of the company is injured indirectly. However, 
the board of directors and officers can control the right to pursue litigation to the 
corporation. There is obvious conflict problem that who decides the corporation should 
act and on behalf of the corporation.252 Thus, if the corporate is unwilling to sue its 
directors, a shareholder may institute a derivative suit for recovery on behalf of the 
corporation.  
Unfortunately, the distinction between shareholder derivative suit and direct suit is 
not always so precise to distinguish each other,253 because any wrongdoing harming the 
company would hurt the shareholders too. In those cases, the plaintiff tends to argue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 In Tooley case, there are two pronged standard to determine whether a direct or derivative suit, “(1) who 
suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and (2) who would 
receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?” 
Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004). The Delaware court 
redefined a concept of “special injury” to determine whether a suit was direct or derivative. See id. at 1036-
38. However, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that “disapprove[d] [of] the use of the concept of “special 
injury” as a tool,” because the concept “is not helpful to a proper analytical distinction between direct and 
derivative actions.” See id. at 1035.  
252 Franklin A. Gevurtz., Who Represents the Corporation? In Search of A Better Method for Determining 
the Corporate Interest in Derivative Suits, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 265, 266-69 (1985) (discussing 
qualifications of a plaintiff in a derivative suit can be very different from these in a direct suit).  
253 HAMILTON & FREER, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 351. 
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his/her case is direct suit in order to avoid procedural barriers,254 and if the case is 
successful, the plaintiff will have the recovery. In Tooley, a Delaware case, the court 
adopts two-pronged standard to determine whether a shareholder suit is direct or 
derivative.255 The court will ask “who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the 
suing stockholders” and “who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy 
(the corporation or the stockholders?”256  
III. Requirements Of Shareholder Derivative Litigation 
There are some requirements or procedural barriers for shareholders intended to bring 
a derivative suit on behalf of the company, in order to prevent them from abusing. This 
part will have a brief introduction to these requirements.   
A. Standing Requirement  
The first requirement of shareholder derivative litigation is that the plaintiff must be a 
shareholder of the company during the litigation.257 The plaintiff should be a shareholder 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Id. 
255 Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1033.  
256 Id. at 1033.  The Tooley court denied to use the concept of special injury (which has been used in former 
cases) to determine whether a lawsuit is direct or derivative, because the concept “is not helpful to a proper 
analytical distinction between direct and derivative actions.” See id. at 1035.  
257 GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 395.  
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of the company not only at the beginning of the action but throughout the life of the 
action.258  
The second requirement is that the plaintiff should be a shareholder of the company at 
the time when the complained wrongdoing was committed by the defendants.259 This 
requirement is known as the “contemporaneous ownership rule.” There is an exception 
that the plaintiff obtained his or her shares by operation of law.260 The contemporaneous 
ownership rule is based on some rationales. First, the rule would prevent someone 
purchasing shares only for the purpose of bringing the derivative suit after a claim 
becomes apparent. Second, if anyone buys shares after wrongdoing damaged the 
company, the purchaser would get a “windfall” when the company later won the lawsuit 
and obtained the recovery. This rationale assumes that the price of shares drops after the 
alleged wrongdoing to reflect a discount of stock price. Therefore, the plaintiff might get 
the share at a discounted rate and the price or value of his/her shares would go up after 
the recovery goes to the company. That would create an unfair “windfall.”  However, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Id.  
259 See id. at 396.  
260 Id. This rule is now codified and can be found in several statutes. For example, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure §23.1(b) provides that “[t]he complaint must be verified and must: (1) allege that the plaintiff 
was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction complained of, or that the plaintiff’s share or 
membership later devolved on it by operation of law…” Section 7.41 of Model Business Corporation Act 
and Rule 23.1 of Delaware Rules of Civil Procedure have similar standing requirements for the derivative 
suit plaintiff. 
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assumption may not exist in fact. That is to say, if the price of stock does not reflect any 
discount reflecting the damage that the company suffers, no “windfall” would be 
produced by bringing and winning a suit. Thus, Principles of Corporate Governance 
drafted by the American Law Institute (“ALI Principles”) corrects this drawback 
providing that the rule does not apply when the material facts are not public or are known 
by the plaintiffs at the time they bought the stocks.261 However, the ALI Principles has no 
certain standard to whether the rule should be applied and such rule would be applicable 
on a case-by-case basis.  
Besides, a plaintiff should demonstrate that he/she fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of similarly situated shareholders.262 The plaintiff should show he/she has some 
reasons to sue and his/her attorney is not the real party. For example, if courts find the 
fact that the plaintiff is pursuing simply for the settlement and the suit is urged by an 
attorney, courts would dismiss the suit for inadequate representation.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (1994) [hereinafter ALI 
Principles]. ALI Principles 7.02 (a)(1). 
262 For example, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure §23.1(a) provides that “[t]he derivative action may not be 
maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of 
shareholders or members who are similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association.” 
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B. Demand Requirement 
Normally, shareholders shall not commence a derivative suit until a written demand 
has been made upon the company. The purpose of the required demand can make sure 
that an opportunity is given to the company to rectify the alleged wrong before any 
litigations.263 In other words, as the cause of action belongs to the company, the company 
of course should decide how to deal with it by its own. Basically, a derivative suit is only 
permitted by courts in some exceptional circumstances, and the board of directors should 
have power to decide whether instituting a suit is appropriate for the interest of the 
company. Thus, a derivative suit is allowed to maintain only when the plaintiff convinces 
the court that “the managers are unable to impartially and in good faith control a 
particular lawsuit.”264 If a demand was submitted to the board of directors and any 
decision is made, that decision should be final and shareholders have no grounds to bring 
any suit exercising the company’s right. However, in certain circumstances in which 
there is a reasonable doubt that board of directors cannot exercise the right impartially, 
whether to treat these circumstances differently would be an open question. There are two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 809. 
264 O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 
267.  
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primary views in this regard. They are Delaware’s approach (traditional approach) and 
MBCA’s approach (modern approach). 
1. Delaware’s Approach: Demand Futility and Aronson Test 
Under Delaware’s approach, the plaintiff must make a written demand upon the 
directors unless the plaintiff has a good excuse for not making a demand. Thus, the 
plaintiff has to show that demand is made upon the board of directors and then the 
demand has been refused; otherwise, he or she has to show adequate evidence to prove 
that the demand would be futile, so the demand should be excused. For example, the 
demand would be excused for futility when a majority of directors are interested or a 
majority of directors under the control of a person who would be the defendant in a future 
lawsuit. To assert demand futility, the plaintiff should allege with particularity to 
demonstrate the reasons supporting the assertion. 
Almost all plaintiffs allege demand futility in derivative suits. If the plaintiff makes a 
demand and such demand is refused by the board of directors, he or she then should to 
argue that the board’s refusal is erring. As business decisions (e.g., refusal to sue) made 
by the board of directors will be protected by business judgment rule, so the decision not 
to sue will be assumed legal and the court will not second-guess the board’s decision. In 
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fact, almost all demands have been refused. Thus, in a case in which shareholder’s 
demand is refused by the board of directors, the plaintiff’s suit would be dismissed 
because the court would defer to board’s decision that no suit would be in best interest of 
the company. 
Based on above reasons, it is wise to claim the demand futility in practice. But, what 
the plaintiff needs to show? In Aronson v. Lewis, the court held that the plaintiff had to 
allege facts with particularity for not making a demand.265 The Aronson court adopts so-
call two-pronged test. According to the plaintiff’s allegation, is there “a reasonable doubt 
is created that: (1) the directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the challenged 
transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment”?266 
Although the test for demand futility seems relatively strict and difficult for the plaintiff, 
it at least offers some exceptions for the plaintiff intended to bring derivative suits. 
Otherwise, under the business judgment rule, almost no suits would survive at the pretrial 
stage.  The Aronson test makes sense because the board of directors should have make a 
final call for the company, unless there is a reasonable doubt that the board cannot do its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (1984). 
266 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. 
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job in an impartial and objective manner. For procedures of required demand and demand 
futility, please refer to Chart V.  
Chart V: Delaware’s Approach about the Demand and Demand Futility   
 
 
Source: The author. 
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2. MBCA’s Approach: The Universal Demand Rule 
The Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”) (and the ALI Principles) adopts a 
different approach which requires the demand should be made in all situations.267 This is 
called the universal demand rule. Under this rule, the plaintiff should make a written 
demand upon the company, and the demand must be made at least 90 days before a 
shareholder may commence a derivative action. Thus, both a written demand and 90-day 
waiting should be satisfied in all cases. However, the rule still has very few exceptions. If 
the shareholder has been notified of the rejection by the board of directors within 90 days, 
then he/she can sue. In addition, if irreparable injury to the corporation would likely incur 
when the plaintiff complies with the 90-day waiting, the plaintiff can sue.268 For example, 
if the statute of limitation on the company’s claim is going to expire within 90 days, 
insisting 90-day waiting appears unreasonable and not in best interest of the company, so 
the plaintiff can directly sue without making demand and wait 90 days. Please refer to 
Chart VI. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 MBCA, supra note 102, § 7.42 and ALI Principles, supra note 261, 7.03. See John C. Coffee, Jr., New 
Myths and Old Realties: The American Law Institute Faces the Derivative Action, 48 BUS. LAW. 1407, 
1415-17 (1993) (stated that “the ALI’s approach to the derivative action differs fundamentally at the outset 
from that of Delaware by abandoning the traditional distinction between ‘demand required’ and ‘demand 
excused’”). 
268 MBCA, supra note 102, § 7.42.  
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Chart VI: MBCA’s Approach of the Universal Demand   
 
Source: The author.  
There are some rationales supporting the universal demand rule. First, the board of 
directors should be given an opportunity to reexamine the complaint of a potential 
lawsuit and to make corrective action without a lawsuit. Second, the rule could save time 
and cost for court and shareholders without a need to determine whether a case is subject 
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to demand required or demand futility.269 These are trade-offs between preserving the 
board’s power in decision-making and ensuring that such power would not be misused 
for directors’ personal benefits.270   
3. Summary 
The traditional demand rule is to preserve a legal right for the board of directors to 
determine whether the company should bring a lawsuit to vindicate its claim. The 
demand futility is an exception which the board is no longer to be a proper position to 
make the decision for the interest of the company. Compared with universal demand rule, 
the plaintiff may get around the required demand and the subsequent board’s refusal.271 
However, it remains difficult for the plaintiff to assert demand futility, especially when a 
public company is the real party in interest. As Thompson and Thomas indicated that, 
great public companies shall have three board committees composed exclusively by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Official Comment of MBCA, supra note 102, § 7.42; see also HAMILTON & FREER, THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 362. 
270 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 218.  
271 Professor Bainbridge contends that conserving judicial resources might be the only justification for 
universal demand rule. See id. at 219. 
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independent directors, as required by listing standards of the national stock exchange 
(e.g., NYSE).  This will make derivative suit plaintiffs harder to seek demand futility.272  
No matter what, demand is not a good choice for any plaintiff in a derivative suit, 
because they should bear extremely heavy burden of proof to rebut the assumptions of 
business judgment rule. Thus, almost all plaintiffs in practice would allege the demand 
would be futile, or in MBCA’s jurisdiction, there is an emergency that would cause 
irreparable injury to the company. As long as the suit successfully survives at the pre-trail 
proceeding, the plaintiffs have more leverage in negotiating with defendants (the 
company and defendant directors), as the suit would go further. To avoid more litigation 
expenses incurred in future proceedings, parties would have strong incentives to settle. 
For the defendants, they usually want to settle when the company have indemnification 
clause paying their litigation expenses. The company also has strong incentive to settle 
when the proposed settlement award is lower than expected litigation expenses. This is 
why the companies generally settle the demand excused cases.273 In the meantime, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 To encourage public company shareholder derivative suits, the authors argue that the barriers for 
institutional shareholders should be reduced because it is less likely to have too sharp shift to other 
alternative mechanisms (such as class actions). They suggest that when the plaintiff has more than 1% 
shares of a given public company (most of them will be institutional shareholders), the demand requirement 
should be excused, because with substantial financial interests, they are unlikely to act against their own 
self-interests by bringing unnecessary suits that will inflict injuries on the companies they own. See 
Thompson & Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, supra note 221, at 1792. 
273 BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 211.  
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company may have another choice rather than just settlement, and that is to appoint some 
disinterested, independent directors to constitute a special litigation committee which is 
expected to investigate and decide whether the plaintiff’s lawsuit is in best interests of the 
company. The decision of such committee may earn deference from the court to the 
extent which the committee could be sued as a tool to combat frivolous or strike suits.  
IV. Special Litigation Committees 
A. Introduction  
When a majority of directors are interested in a given case, so the board of directors 
may be not in good position to properly exercise whether the plaintiff’s suit is best 
interest of the corporation. In the meantime, the demand may be deemed futile. However, 
the board of directors may be reluctant to give up its power relating to matters of 
shareholder’s lawsuit. Hence, a special type of sub-committees in the board of directors 
referred as a “special litigation committee” is created. Such a committee is expected to 
decide whether the plaintiff shareholder is in best interest of the corporation to bring a 
derivative action on behalf of the corporation.  
  151 
The committee is usually consisting of disinterested directors in the challenged 
transactions and they often are not defendants in the suit.274 In most cases, these directors 
are appointed by the board of directors after transactions in question are challenged by 
shareholders or even derivative suits are filed.275 After investigation and deliberation, 
when the committee can decide that shareholder’s suit is not in the best interest of the 
corporation, then the committee’s decision replaces the plaintiff’s decision with respect to 
whether to bring a suit for the corporation. 
B. Functions of Special Litigation Committees 
Special litigation committees are controversial too. Special litigation committees 
could be a mechanism to avoid strike suits that the malicious minority of shareholders 
would intervene or attack the management of the corporation by instituting derivative 
actions.276 A special litigation committee has frequently been used as a type of defensive 
measures in the derivative suits. The major task of this committee is to evaluate the 
derivative suit’s impact on the corporation's interest. As a matter of fact, almost all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 412. 
275 Id. 
276 Daniel S. Kleinberger, Direct Versus Derivative and the Law of Limited Liability Companies, 58 
BAYLOR L. REV. 63, 81-82 (2006) (indicating special litigation committees may be  “a respectable and 
useful form of alternate dispute resolution, necessary to prevent diabolic agents (i.e., the plaintiffs’ bar) 
from using litigation…”). 
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committees conclude that shareholders’ suits are not in best interests of the 
corporations.277 However, biases could be generated because the board of directors, 
whose members may have affiliation and friendship with the defendant directors, has 
right to appoint whom can serve as the committee member.278 Thus, a question has been 
raised if the court should totally defer to the committee’s decision dismissing the 
plaintiff’s suit.279  
After examining several social-psychological mechanisms that can generate bias in 
the directors’ assessment of the suit, Professors Cox and Munsinger suggest that certain 
psychological mechanisms generate subtle, but powerful, biases that decrease committee 
members’ abilities to reach an objective judgment for the company and their decisions 
tend to insulate their board colleagues from legal sanctions. 280 It is so called a “structural 
bias.” In other words, the board appoints a special litigation committee to determine 
whether the shareholder derivative litigation is in the best interests of the corporation, if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 412. 
278 KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 212.  
279 Id.  
280 Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom, supra note 219, at 85. The authors argue that “court 
decisions… have failed to reflect fully the psychological facts that [board] colleagues are not naturally 
impartial…,” and suggest that “the derivative suit should be reformed so that the directors’ 
recommendation regarding a suit’s impact on the interests of the corporation would be disallowed 
whenever the suit implicates a colleague of the directors, be that colleague a fellow director, control person, 
or a senior executive who associates on a regular basis with the directors.” See also id. at132. 
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not, the board can terminate the derivative litigation and take back control of the 
litigation. Thus, special litigation committees almost have concluded the derivative 
plaintiff's motion without in the best interests of the corporation, even if the committees 
are consisting of disinterested directors.281  
 How the courts treat recommendation of special litigation committee is very vital. 
The committee members exercise the authority that in originally invested with the board 
of directors. They usually are outsiders who disinterested in the alleged wrongdoing. 
Thus, the business decisions they make may enjoy deference from courts. If the 
committee functions well, they can “take over and prosecute the meritorious suits, while 
seeking dismissal of frivolous actions.” 282  However, with respect to how to treat 
recommendation of special litigation committee, there is no consensus. Basically, there 
are two main approaches: New York Approach and Delaware Approach.    
1. New York’s Approach (Auerbach)  
In Auerbach v. Bennett, the court held that it would not review the substantive 
decision of the special litigation committee and would only reexamine the procedure of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 ERIC A. CHIAPPINELLI, CASE AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 618-19 (2d ed. 2010).  
282 BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 212. 
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the recommendation made by a special litigation committee.283 In other words, Auerbach 
court would apply business judgment rule and respect the recommendation of the special 
litigation committee without second-guessing the committee’s decision.  
It should be noted that there is a completely different view of how to apply the 
business judgment rule in reviewing recommendation of the special litigation committee. 
In Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate Inc.,284 the Iowa Supreme Court held that it 
would not dismiss the suit according to the recommendation of the committees when the 
potential structural bias was present when committee was appointed by directors who are 
defendants in the action.285 “[A] corporation may apply to the court for appointment of a 
‘special panel’ to make an investigation and report on the pursuit or dismissal of a 
stockholder derivative action.”286 It might be less likely that the committee has the 
problem of pro-defendant bias.287   
2. Delaware’s Approach (Zapata Two-Step Analysis) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Auerbach, 47 N.Y.2d at 633-34, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928-29. 
284 Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983). 
285 Miller, 336 N.W.2d at 718. 
286 Id.  
287 CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 649.  
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Different from approaches adopted in Auerbach and Miller, Delaware takes a 
moderate method while reviewing the recommendation made by special litigation 
committees. In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, Maldonado, a stockholder of Zapata, brought 
derivative actions in both Delaware state court and federal court, alleging that the board 
of directors and officers of the corporation had breached their fiduciary duty.288 The 
plaintiff did not make demand upon the corporation before instituting derivative actions, 
because he argued that the demand should be futile as all corporation’s directors were 
named as defendants. Then the corporation’s board appointed directors to compose a 
special litigation committee, and the committee made a decision recommending the court 
to dismiss the action. The Zapata court rejected approaches adopted in Auerbach and 
Miller. Instead, the court adopted so-called “two-step analysis” in determining whether a 
special litigation committee’s recommendation should enjoy protection under the 
business judgment rule that prevents courts from second-guessing such 
recommendation.289  
First, the court should “inquire into the independence and good faith of the 
committee and the bases supporting its conclusions.” Meanwhile, the burden of proof 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). 
289 “The Court should apply a two-step test to the motion.” See id. at 788. 
  156 
switches from the plaintiff to the corporation, so the corporation should prove the 
committee’s independence, the recommendation made in good faith and a reasonable 
investigation.290 Then, the second step analysis is that the court will apply its own 
business judgment standard to decide whether to defer the recommendation of the 
committee.291 To sum up, when the court thinks the corporation fail to pass the first-step 
analysis, the motion for dismissal should be denied.  After passing the first-step analysis, 
it does not mean that the court should defer to the committee’s recommendation 
dismissing the plaintiff’s suit. Instead, the court would use its own business judgment 
standard while deciding whether to dismiss the plaintiff’s suit.292 
In In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, another leading Delaware case even 
indicates that members of special litigation committee who have friendship with the 
accused directors may have biases in determining shareholder’s allegation, and the SLC’s 
findings may not be able to preclude shareholder’s suit.293 The main issue in this case is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 Id.  
291 See id. at 789. 
292 However, Zapata is criticized that it provides no real standards for judges to apply their own business 
judgment. See BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 214. No bright-line rule would possibly result in more 
litigations. See Dennis J. Block & H. Adam Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder 
Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 BUS. LAW. 27 (1981). Some argues that the courts are not so 
competent to make decisions on behalf of the company. See Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” 
Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U.L. REV. 913, 
941 (1982). 
293 In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
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whether or not two members in the special litigation committee are independent.294 The 
special litigation committee consists of two outside directors that have no financial stake 
in shareholder’s allegations. The court found that the special litigation committee was not 
independent, and their findings could not preclude a derivative suit. In fact, the court 
found that special litigation committee members were personal friends of the accused 
directors, and two of them worked at a college which received a lot of donations from the 
other directors of the company. The court concluded that the findings made by the special 
litigation committee could not preclude the shareholder’s suit because it failed to 
successfully prove their independence.295   
V. Security for Expenses  
After examining shareholder derivative suits filed in State of New York during 1930s 
and early 1940s, the Wood Report suggested that less than 10% of suits produce recovery 
for the corporation.296 The Report also concluded that most derivative suits filed by 
shareholders who had minor interests in the corporation tended to be frivolous and their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 “Special litigation committees are permitted as a last chance for a corporation to control a derivative 
claim in circumstances when a majority of its directors cannot impartially consider a demand.” In re Oracle 
Corp. Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d at 939-40. 
295 “In order to prevail on its motion to terminate the Delaware Derivative Action, the SLC must persuade 
me that: (1) its members were independent; (2) that they acted in good faith; and (3) that they had 
reasonable bases for their recommendations.” See id. at 928.  
296 GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 421. 
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purposes usually were to extort settlements in which the corporation, rather than the 
defendants, would pay the reward.297 Based on above findings in the Report, New York 
became the first state to enact security for expenses statute, in order to avoid potential 
strike-suit concern.298 In the meantime, New York’s statute exempts the plaintiff from 
posting the security when the plaintiff owns shares which are worth over 50,000 dollars 
or over 5% of a class of shares. Until 2014, nine states have enacted security for expenses 
statute for derivative actions.299  
The purpose of security for expenses statute is intended to prevent strike suits from 
being brought by malicious plaintiffs. In a state which adopts security for expenses 
statute, the defendants and corporation can require the derivative plaintiff to post security 
to cover expenses which are reasonably expected to incur in the litigation.300 That would 
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299 These states include Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North 
Dakota, and Pennsylvania. See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT & DAVID F. CAVERS, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE 
ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:2 (2014-15 ed.). However, there may be some discrepancies between 
statutes of these states. For more discussions, see also id. 
300 GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 421. 
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make a suit more difficult to be brought by the plaintiffs,301 especially when shareholders 
intend to bring frivolous suits, and such suits could be screened out. 
So far, only nine states have enacted the securities for expenses statute, which means 
that a majority states do not require security for expenses for a derivative action.302 More 
importantly, it should be noted that Delaware does not require security for expenses in a 
derivative suit. Notwithstanding early literature indicated that such statutes would be a 
“death knell” for shareholder derivative actions,303 as a matter of fact, the impact of such 
statutes seems relatively minor.304 For example, MBCA provides that if the lawsuit 
“resulted in a substantial benefit to the corporation,” court may order the corporation to 
pay the plaintiff’s expenses and attorney’s fees.305 Finally, courts would let the plaintiff 
to get a shareholders’ list to look for more shareholders who might be interested joining 
in the action, in order to avoid the deposit of security (by securing 5% of the company’s 
stock). However, defendants did not want the plaintiff to access to the shareholders’ list, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301 While the statute is applied, the losing plaintiff would possibly reimburse the corporation litigation 
expenses and should face post up-front costs. These would make a suit less likely to be brought. See id. at 
421-22. 
302 MBCA § 49 (1969) also had securities for expenses statute, but such statute was deleted in 1984 version.  
303 George D. Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders’ Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 
123 (1944). The author contended that shareholders usually would be reluctant to post the security, even if 
they could file unquestionably meritorious suits. See also id. at 124-25. 
304 GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 422. 
305 HAMILTON & FREER, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 354. 
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so they rarely make petition to request the security.306 As a result, the securities of 
litigation expenses statute turns out to have minor effect in practice.307  
VI.  Incentives to sue  
Under the common rule of civil procedure, the losing party will be responsible for 
costs incurred from the lawsuit. The costs include filing fees, discovery costs, and witness 
fees.308 Bringing a lawsuit is costly to the plaintiff.  If the plaintiff loses, he/she may have 
to bear all the costs incurred. Without any reimbursement mechanism, no shareholder is 
willing to bring a derivative suit on the behalf of the company. Rather than bringing a 
derivative suit, the better strategy for a shareholder is to sell company’s shares or just to 
wait for suits brought by other shareholders. A “free rider” problem exists.309 To 
encourage shareholders to file derivative suits for the company, there should be an 
incentive or reimbursement mechanism which can reimburse the plaintiff fees and costs 
reasonably associated with the lawsuit. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 654-55; see also GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 422-23.  
307 CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 654-55; see also GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 422.  
308 HAMILTON & FREER, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 354.  
309 KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 208.  
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Normally, attorney fees are not included. In a derivative suit, however, the prevailing 
plaintiff confers a benefit on the company, so he/she can request the company to 
reimburse the attorney’s fees.310 Thus, this kind of reimbursement may encourage more 
lawsuits beneficial to the company to be brought. To prevent a secret settlement between 
parties (including plaintiff, defendant, and the company), statutes provide that the suit 
“may not be discontinued or settled without the court’s approval.”311 Thus, the court will 
play a significant role reviewing the propose settlement. Some important factors should 
be taken into consideration, such as the reasonableness of the proposed fees that go to the 
plaintiff’s attorney. If the proposed fees are unreasonably high, the court may object the 
proposed settlement.   
 Notwithstanding reimbursement would encourage shareholders to sue, bringing a 
derivative suit is still costly and the plaintiff may bear all the litigation costs (including 
the attorneys’ fees) if he/she loses. A losing party may be responsible for defendant’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 HAMILTON & FREER, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 355.  
311 HAMILTON & FREER, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 368. See, e.g., MBCA, supra note 
102, § 7.45: “A derivative proceeding may not be discontinued or settled without the court’s approval.”  
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litigation costs,312 even the defendant’s attorney’s fees when the lawsuit is instituted 
“without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose.”313 
VII.   Summary: A Comparative Analysis between Taiwan and U.S. Derivative Suits 
Systems 
To sum up, the U.S. derivative suits system has some mechanisms which are 
different from these in Taiwan derivative suits system. These mechanisms are to deal 
with lack of incentives to sue and the abuse concern. However, there remains a strike-suit 
concern. Notwithstanding there are divergences between the plaintiff’s and the 
company’s interests, the strike-suit concern may not be totally prevented.  
Another major procedural difference between Taiwan and the U.S. is the role of the 
company in the action. In the U.S., the company must be a nominal defendant.314 
However, it depends on the company’s discretion to be active or passive in the lawsuit.315 	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AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 208.  
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note102, § 7.42: “the court may: […] (2) order the plaintiff to pay any defendant’s reasonable expenses 
(including counsel fees) incurred in defending the proceeding if it finds that the proceeding was 
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Additionally, the company may support either the plaintiff or the defendant,316 but in 
most cases, they tend to side with the defendants. However, in Taiwan, the company 
cannot be a defendant in the lawsuit, but the company may intervene in the lawsuit siding 
with the plaintiff or the defendant. Please refer to Table 8 for a comparative analysis 
purpose.  
Table 8: Comparisons between Taiwan and U.S. Derivative Suits Systems 
 Taiwan U.S. 
Standing to sue Holding 3% and more of the 
company’s stock continuously for at 
least one year. 
Holding a share throughout 
the life of the lawsuit; the 
contemporaneous 
ownership requirement; 
fairly and adequately 
representation.  
Demand  Universal demand without any 
exception.  
Delaware: Demand is 
required (but may be 
excused if futile). 
MBCA: Universal demand 
but has exception (when 
irreparable injury to the 
company likely result). 
Waiting Must wait 30 days after the demand 
is made upon supervisors (upon the 
board of directors if the defendant is 
an incumbent supervisor). 
MBCA: Must wait 90 days 
(but can sue earlier after 
the demand has been 
refused). 
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Special 
Litigation 
Committee 
No.  Yes (and recommendation 
of Special Litigation 
Committee may enjoy 
deference from the court). 
Security for 
Expenses 
Upon the defendant’s petition, the 
court may order the plaintiff to post 
security.  
Few states (e.g., New York) 
have security for expenses 
statutes. 
Incentives to sue No any reimbursement (the plaintiff 
will bear litigation expenses and 
attorney’s fees); if loses, the plaintiff 
may be responsible for losses of the 
company and the defendant incurred 
from his/her suit.  
Reimbursement (including 
litigation expenses and 
probably the attorneys’ 
fees); the plaintiff may bear 
the defendant’s litigation 
costs.  
Business 
Judgment Rule 
(BJR)  
No. The lawsuit survives at the pre-
trial proceeding if the plaintiff 
stratifies all pre-suit requirements 
and deposit security as ordered by the 
court. The refusal by supervisors (or 
the board of directors) has no 
determining effect on whether the 
suit fairly and adequately represents 
the interests of similarly situated 
shareholders it should be proceed. 
Probably. When the 
plaintiff makes a demand 
and the demand is refused 
by the board of directors. In 
demand excused case, the 
company may form a 
special litigation committee 
and the court may apply 
BJR to review committee’s 
recommendation. 
Strike-suit 
concern 
No statutes with respect to 
reimbursement and indemnification. 
The company has weak incentives to 
settle. In practice, the derivative suits 
are rarely seen, so for now there is no 
such concern. 
Most big companies have 
indemnification clause and 
the court may order the 
company to pay the 
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. 
Thus, parties may have 
strong incentives to settle. 
Attorneys thus may take 
advantage of this, and 
becomes the real party 
interest by instituting a 
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frivolous suit.  
Role of the 
Company 
Not a defendant but can intervene in 
the lawsuit.  
Must be a nominal 
defendant. 
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Chapter Six: Shareholder Derivative Litigation in East Asia 
 This chapter will focus on to the derivative suits systems in several East Asian 
countries, including China, Japan and South Korea. After an overview of each system, 
which features this chapter will provide a comparative analysis, in hopes of seeking 
should be incorporated into Taiwan for future reforms.   
I. The Derivative Suits System in Japan 
A. Introduction 
In the Meiji period (1868-1926), Japan built its legal system by transplanting 
statutes and relating concepts from Germany, which was deemed model country for its 
civil law. 317 The original version of the Japanese Commercial Code did not create the 
institution of derivative suits until 1950.318 That year, legal reformers introduced the 
principles of U.S.-style corporate law into Japan these principles provided corporate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 NW. 
U.L. REV. 1436, 1444-45 (1994) [hereinafter West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions]; see 
also Shiro Kawashima & Susumu Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan: Law, Practice, and 
Suggested Reforms, 33 STAN. J INT’L L. 9, 13-15 (1997) [hereinafter Kawashima & Sakurai, Shareholder 
Derivative Litigation in Japan]; see also MASAFUMI NAKAHIGASHI & DAN W. PUCHNIAK, Land of the 
Rising Derivative Action: Revisiting Irrationality to Understand Japan’s Unreluctant Shareholder Litigant, 
in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA, 132-34 (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter 
NAKAHIGASHI & DAN W. PUCHNIAK, Land of the Rising Derivative Action]. 
318 See West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions, supra note 317, at 1444; see also Kawashima 
& Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan, supra note 317, at 14.  
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governance, shareholder protections and the institution of derivative litigation.319 The 
derivative suit system in Japan was established with the enactment of Articles 267 
through 268-3 of the Commercial Code [SHOHO in Japanese].320 Scholars believe that 
this institution is one of the most important features to protect minority shareholders’ 
right and to balance powers between corporate board of directors and the shareholders.321  
The Japanese derivative suits system provides that any shareholder who holds at 
least one share continuously for six months can submit a written demand, after which the 
corporation must decide whether to bring a lawsuit against the wrongdoing director.322 If 
the corporation fails to make a response within waiting period (60 days), the shareholder 
may institute a lawsuit against the director in the name of the corporation.323 However, he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 See West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions, supra note 317, at 1446; see also Kawashima 
& Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan, supra note 317, at 14-15. 
320 See West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions, supra note 317, at 1446; see also Kawashima 
& Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan, supra note 317, at 15-17. Please note the current 
version of Japan Commercial Code has been amended several times since its enactment, and the latest 
derivative suits system in Japan is regulated by Article 847 of the Japan Companies Act. KAISHA-HO 
[Companies Act] art. 847 (Japan). 
321 See Kawashima & Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan, supra note 317, at 14. 
322  The demand is submitted to the company’s statutory auditor, who in turn submits it to the board. See 
West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions, supra note 317, at 1448.  Japan adopts two-tier board 
system in which includes the board of directors (managing board) and the statutory auditors (monitoring 
board). The demand should be made upon the company’s statutory auditor. The role of Japan statutory 
auditors in the corporate governance system is similar as outside directors in the U.S. See Kawashima & 
Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan, supra note 317, at 24-27.  
323 See Kawashima & Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan, supra note 317, at 16. 
According to Article 267 of the Commercial Code, the period of waiting time was 30 days. Under 
KAISHA-HO [Companies Act] art. 847(3) (Japan), the period is up to 60 days.  
  168 
or she can forgo the waiting period and act immediately in cases in which complying 
with the waiting period could cause an irreparable injury to the corporation.324 The 
current Japanese derivative suits system is based on Article 847 of the Companies Act. 
But the content of the Article only had slight changes, compared with the former 
provisions in the Commercial Code. 
B. The Requirements of A Derivative Suit In Japan 
In general, the Japanese reformers designed the derivative suits system similar to 
the one in the U.S. However, there still are some differences between the two. First, 
instead of adopting to the contemporaneous ownership requirement, a Japanese 
shareholder must hold one share continuously for six months at the time he or she 
institutes a derivative action. Second, the demand requirement is similar to the MBCA’s 
universal demand rule in all cases. Third, the plaintiff must wait for sixty days after he or 
she makes a demand upon the company.325 This waiting period is required in all cases 
unless there is a statutory exception that the company is likely to suffer irreparable harm 
under this waiting period. Thus, the plaintiff could bring a derivative action immediately 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 KAISHA-HO [Companies Act] art. 847(3) (Japan). 
325 Id.  
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in an exceptional situation, but they must notify the corporation “without delay.”326 
Fourth, a third party (not the company and not one of its directors) could be a defendant 
in a derivative action in the U.S. In Japan, however, only the directors and certain persons 
serving in important positions in the company can be defendants in the lawsuit, including 
promoters, auditors, and liquidators.327 Finally, the court may order the plaintiff to 
deposit a security for litigation expenses upon the defendant’s petition, but the petition 
must provide prima facie evidence that the lawsuit has been filed in bad faith.328 
Meanwhile, the main purpose of depositing security is that the defendants can recover 
damages from the plaintiffs more easily when they win the case.329 
C. The Revised Provision of Security for Expenses in the Commercial Code of 
1993 
Like the security requirement for litigation expenses statutes in some states in the 
U.S., the provision of security for expenses in Japan is designed to avoid having the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 KAISHA-HO [Companies Act] art. 847(4) (Japan). 
327 KAISHA-HO [Companies Act] art. 847 (Japan); see also West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative 
Actions, supra note 317, at 1446-47 (indicating that in an exceptional situation a person could be the 
derivative defendant when he or she subscribes for shares at a huge unfair price (fukosei naruhakka kagaku) 
in collusion with directors of the corporation). 
328 KAISHA-HO [Companies Act] art. 847 (7)(8) (Japan). 
329 See Kawashima & Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan, supra note 317, at 41-42. 
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plaintiffs file lawsuits in bad faith. The Japanese court defines “bad faith includes cases 
in which the plaintiffs brought suit with little hope of success or that would likely be 
dismissed by defendants.”330 Whether to deposit security and the amount of security 
would have a determinative effect on the plaintiff’s incentives to sue. There is a material 
change regarding the provision of security for litigation expenses.    
Before 1993, the method for calculating the court fee for a derivative suit was 
based on a sliding scale. For example, if the amount of damage that the plaintiff alleges 
hoped to recover was $10 million dollars and the court fee should be about $25,000.331 
Because the plaintiff had to deposit the court fee up front and cover entire fee if he or she 
lost, the court fee became the biggest obstacle for a plaintiff who intended to file a 
derivative suit.332 Professor West observed that only 15 derivative suits had been brought 
before 1993, and the average court fee was very high.333 Among these 15 cases, only one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330 See West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 244, at 355. 
331 See id.   
332 In addition to the requirement of security for expenses, Japan’s culture would be one of the most 
important reasons for very few derivative suits to be brought. Generally, Japanese shareholders tend to be 
non-litigious and without interest in filing litigations as dispute resolutions. See NAKAHIGASHI & DAN W. 
PUCHNIAK, Land of the Rising Derivative Action, supra note 317, at 134-35; see also West, The Pricing of 
Shareholder Derivative Actions, supra note 317, at 1439-41; see also Dan W. Puchniak & Masafumi 
Nakahigashi, Japan’s Love for Derivative Actions: Irrational Behavior and Non-Economic Motives as 
Rational Explanations for Shareholder Litigation, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 10-11 (2012) [hereinafter 
Puchniak & Nakahigashi, Japan’s Love for Derivative Actions]. 
333 See West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 244, at 355. 
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was settled, and the plaintiffs in the other suits lost.334 Facing possible huge financial 
burden, few plaintiffs would had an incentive to sue.  
In 1993, Japan’s Supreme Court changed the rule to calculate court fees in Nikko 
Securities case, holding that a flat fee should henceforth be applied in a derivative suit. 
Japan’s Congress then passed an amendment to the Commercial Code. From then on, no 
matter how much the recovery the plaintiff was seeking, the court fee was set at 8,200 
(yen) (about U.S. $82). 335  This change had an important impact on the Japanese 
derivative suits system, and later the number of litigations cases increased immediately 
and dramatically.336 In 1993, the total cases of derivative suits pending were 84, and in 
1999, the total number increased to 286.337 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Id. 
335 See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, Japan’s Love for Derivative Actions, supra note 332, at 34. 
336 See Kawashima & Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan, supra note 317, at 11; see also 
West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions, supra note 317, at 356; see also Puchniak & 
Nakahigashi, Japan’s Love for Derivative Actions, supra note 332, at 32-34; see also Brian R. Cheffins & 
Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability Across Countries, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1385, 1458 (2006); see also 
REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 175 (2d ed. 2009) (indicated that the shareholder litigation in United States has high relative 
with shareholder litigation in Japan and Japanese shareholder litigation was increasing recently); see also 
ARAD REISBERG, DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 225-226 (2007) (discussed that 
Japanese shareholders have brought more derivative actions in late 1993 because the litigation fees cheaper 
than before). 
337 See West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 244, at 356; see also id. TABLE 1.  
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Table 9: Japanese Derivative Suits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mark D. West, Why Shareholder Sue: The Evidence from Japan338 
According to research by Professors Puchniak & Nakahigashi, during 1999, the 
number of derivative suits filed rose to 95 and the total number of suits (cumulatively) 
was 222. 339 Once the flat court fee was applied, derivative actions in Japan became more 
common, compared with other countries (excluding the U.S.) in the worlds.340 With 
regard to the rate of legal service, there were about 30 thousand attorneys registered with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 See West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 244, at 356 (Table 1). 
339 See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, Japan’s Love for Derivative Actions, supra note 332, at 32; see also id. at 
67 (Appendix A, Table 1). 
340 See id. at 32. However, in a U.S. scholar’s point of view, the derivative suit remains not so common in 
practice. For instance, Professor Cooney stated that “while somewhat on the rise in Japan, derivative 
actions are still rather infrequent because of low economic awards in the litigated as well as the settled case.” 
Leslie Larkin Cooney, A Modality for Accountability to Shareholders: The American Way?, 28 OKLA. CITY 
U. L. REV. 717, 717-18 (2003). 
Year  
 
Pending, 
District 
Court 
Pending, 
High Court 
Total 
Pending 
New Cases, 
District 
Court 
1993 74 10 84 Unavailable 
1994 133 12 145 Unavailable 
1995 158 16 174 Unavailable 
1996 174 14 188 71 
1997 203 16 219 83 
1998 222 18 240 68 
1999 258 28 286 95 
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the Japan Bar Association in 2011, and any single lawyer could approximately provide 
legal service for 4,119 persons.341 
D. Abuse Concerns after 1993  
As mentioned, the number of derivative suits has been increasing dramatically 
since 1993. Consequently, legal commentators became concerned that strike and 
frivolous suits would be instituted by plaintiffs who intended to interfere with a 
corporations’ management. Therefore, the Japanese courts use “the abuse of rights 
doctrine, and the security for expenses provisions in the Commercial Code” as 
mechanisms for avoiding frivolous suits.342 Under the abuse of rights doctrine, Japanese 
courts could protect corporations from being attacked through frivolous suits.343  The 
provisions of security for expenses also could deter a derivative plaintiff from bringing 
suits in bad faith. Finally, although the business judgment rule is not codified, courts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 Majiroxnews, Too Many lawyers in Japan, says Ministry of Internal Affairs, MAJIROX NEWS (Apr. 23, 
2012), available at http://www.majiroxnews.com/2012/04/23/too-many-lawyers-in-japan-says-ministry-of-
internal-affairs/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2014). “By comparison the American Bar Association claimed over 
1.2 million active attorneys in the United States. That would be roughly one lawyer for every 250 people.” 
342 See Kawashima & Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan, supra note 317, at 12. 
343 See id. at 39-40. 
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would apply the U.S.-styled business judgment rule to protect directors and prevent 
frivolous suits.344        
II. Derivative Suits System in China  
A. Introduction  
The institution of shareholder derivative litigations was formally introduced into 
China’s Company Law in 2005 (“Company Law of 2005”). 345  Many important 
amendments can be found to the Company Law of 2005, 346 because the former law did 
not meet the demands for fast growing economy and changing society in China.347 The 
introduction of the derivative litigation is one important corporate reforms that provided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 See id. 
345 China’s Company Law was enacted in 1993 and the Law had amendments in 1999 and 2004. The 
amendment of 2004 was called Company Law of 2005 and took place in 2006.  
346 The English version of the Company Law of 2005 (China) is available at China’s Leader in Online 
Legal Research, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
347 Baoshu Wang & Hui Huang, China’s New Company Law and Securities Law: An Overview and 
Assessment, 19 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 229, 229-30, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1172982; see also 
Jiong Deng, Building an Investor-Friendly Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit System in China, 46 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 34, 356-58 (2005); see also DONALD C. CLARKE & NICHOLAS C. HOWSON, Pathway to Minority 
Shareholder Protection: Derivative actions in the People’s Republic of China, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION 
IN ASIA 245-49 (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter CLARKE & HOWSON, Derivative Actions in 
the People’s Republic of China] (discussing that the sensitive political policy and economy history has 
effected the development of derivative actions in China in past several decades. “First, the state’s policy of 
maintaining a full or controlling interest in enterprises in various sectors leads to a fundamental dilemma in 
Chinese corporate governance... Second, the prevalence of concentrated ownership in Chinese firms means 
that the main agency problem in Chinese corporate governance is not vertical, between disaggregated 
shareholders and managers, but horizontal, between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders... 
Third, the reform-era corporate capital structures outlined above are an invitation to opportunism, abuse 
and outright fraud by controlling shareholders and insiders – an invitation that has been taken up with gusto 
at CLSs (publicly listed or not) and closely held firms alike...”). 
  175 
more protection for minority shareholders and improved corporate governance in 
China.348  
B. The Requirements of A Derivative Suit In China 
Like Taiwan, the China’s derivative suit system developed under the influence of 
Japan and the U.S., as shown by its pre-suit requirements. Under Article 152 of the 
Chinese Company Law of 2005, when directors, supervisors, or senior managers 
breached their duties that violated laws, administrative regulations, or the bylaws of the 
companies, a shareholder has a right to institute a derivative action. This can be done 
when the shareholders of a limited liability or joint stock limited company, separately or 
aggregately, hold 1% or more of the company’s total shares for more than 180 days 
continuously. 349 First, according to Article 152, there are two classes of potential 
defendants in a derivative action: “insiders” such as directors, supervisors or senior 
managers, and “any other people.”350 The latter class refers to a defendant in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 See Wang & Huang, at 236; also see Hui Huang, Research on the Shareholder Derivative Action, 7 
SHANGSHIFA LUNJI (Commercial Law Review) 332, 437-41(2003) (indicated that the concept of 
shareholder litigation had been unknown in China before the Company Law of 2005) [hereinafter Huang, 
Research on the Shareholder Derivative Action]. 
349 Company Law of 2005, supra note 345, arts.150, 152(1) (China).  
350 See CLARKE & HOWSON, Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China, supra note 347, at 273-
75. 
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derivative action who has harmed the legitimate rights and interests of a company.351 
When it comes to defendants in the derivative suits, Chinese corporate law is 
significantly different from the law in Taiwan and Japan,352 and more akin to that of the 
U.S.  
Second, the standing requirements for plaintiffs in derivative suit are treated 
differently in cases involving a limited liability company (i.e. private company or a 
closed company in the U.S.) or a joint stock limited company (i.e. a public company or 
publicly-held company in the U.S.).353 Any shareholder of a limited liability company has 
the right to bring a derivative action without being constrained by the standing 
requirements of minimum ownership and the minimum holding period. In contrast, 
shareholders in the joint stock limited company must hold 1% or more of the company’s 
stock and hold shares consecutively for 180 days or more, to be eligible to bring a 
lawsuit.354 Unlike the contemporaneous ownership rule in the U.S., Article 152 does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Company Law of 2005, supra note 345, art. 152(3) (China). 
352 GONGSI FA [Company Act] arts. 214, 227 (Taiwan); defendants are limited to directors and 
supervisors in a derivative action. KAISHA-HO [Companies Act] art. 847(1) (Japan); defendants would be 
an incorporator, director at incorporation, Company auditor at incorporation, directors, supervisors, officer, 
or liquidator. 
353 In Taiwan, the derivative suit is only available for shareholders of a joint stock limited company.  
354 See CLARKE & HOWSON, Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China, supra note 347, at 270-
72. 
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request that the plaintiff must be a shareholder when the cause of action arises or that 
plaintiff hold at least one share throughout the life of the action.355  
Third, the demand requirements in China have low procedural obstacles for 
qualified plaintiffs and are practiced close to the U.S. demand requirement.356 To be 
specific, if defendants are directors or officers, the shareholder should submit a written 
demand to the board of supervisors (i.e., a monitoring device)357 or an individual 
supervisor of a limited liability company with no board of supervisors, to file an action.358 
Shareholders can sue in the following situations: (1) their demand is refused by the board 
of supervisors or a supervisor of a limited liability company; (2) the board of supervisors, 
or a supervisor fails to bring a lawsuit within thirty days after receiving a demand; (3) in 
an emergency, i.e. a situation that will cause irreparable damage to the interests of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355 See id. at 270-72, 288. 
356 Hui Huang, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis, 
27 B.F.L.R. 619, 623-24 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2140613 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014) 
[hereinafter Huang, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China].  
357 The idea of the board of supervisors is derived from Germany’s two-tier board system. However, unlike 
Germany’s board of supervisors that has authority to appoint and remove directors, China’s board of 
supervisors as a monitoring device has a parallel position with the board of directors, and their power 
seems weak just as Taiwan’s supervisors. 
358 In contrast, if the defendants would be supervisors, the demand should be made upon the board of 
directors. However, when the third pay (who is not a director, officer, or supervisor) is the defendant, the 
Article 152 does not explicitly describe when the derivative plaintiffs should make a writing demand upon 
the board of directors, board of supervisors or the people’s court. See CLARKE & HOWSON, Derivative 
Actions in the People’s Republic of China, supra note 347, at 272-273, 289. 
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company if no suit is immediately brought.359 China thus has an approach similar to 
MBCA’s universal demand. It should be noted that the business judgment rule is not 
applicable and the result in a case would be significantly different from the cases in 
MBCA’s jurisdictions, as the court may not defer to a refusal by the board of supervisors, 
which could create more opportunities for the shareholders to sue.360   
China’s Company Law of 2005 does not stipulate that plaintiffs must post a 
security for litigation expenses when filing a derivative action with the courts.361 The 
reason is that the derivative action is a new mechanism for improving China’s corporate 
governance it was instituted in 2006, so that legal reformers prefer a policy that can 
encourage the usage of this mechanism.362     
C. Deficiencies in China’s Derivative Suits System 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 Company Law of 2005, supra note 345, art. 152(2) (China). 
360 See CLARKE & HOWSON, Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China, supra note 347, at 272-
73 (indicated that nothing could stop a shareholder in China to file a derivative action, unless the company 
institutes a lawsuit by itself). As they stated, “[u]nlike many other derivative lawsuit mechanisms 
internationally, there is no room for the corporation to argue that a lawsuit would not be in the 
corporation’s interests, or that it has obtained adequate non-litigious remedies for the wrongdoing.” See 
also id. 
361 However, only when the procedures for calling a shareholders’ meeting or shareholders’ assembly, or 
meeting of the board of directors, or the voting form, is in violation of laws, administrative regulations or 
the bylaws, or if a resolution is in violation of the bylaws of the company, the people’s court shall demand 
the shareholder plaintiffs provide corresponding security at the request of the company. Company Law of 
2005, supra note 345, art. 22(2)(3) (China). 
362 Hui Huang, The Statutory Derivative Action in China: Critical Analysis and Recommendations for 
Reform, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 227, 248 (2007). 
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What follow are some findings of an empirical study of China’s derivative actions 
between 2006 and 2010, involving a total of 50 judgments.363 The study shows that the 
number of derivative actions increased steadily during the five years (from the time the 
Company Law of 2005 took effect). The population of China was approximately 1.34 
billion in 2010, and the number of derivative suits was 50.364 Taiwan had approximately 
23 million persons, and the number of derivative suits was 6 until now. As such, the 
number of derivative suits in China would be less than in Taiwan per capita.  
Moreover, the derivative actions usually were brought in economically active 
provinces, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong and Zhejiang. Most cases of derivative 
action involved private companies in real estate industry as well as U.S. 365  The 
allegations of the derivative actions usually involve a breach of the duty of loyalty; of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 See Huang, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China, supra note 356, at 627. 
364 Laurie Burkitt & Jeremy Page, China’s Population is Aging Rapidly, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(Apr. 29, 2011), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704187604576290031070463712 (last visited Nov. 14, 
2014).  
365 See Thompson & Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, supra note 221, at 
1765.  
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total of 50 cases of derivative actions, the shareholder plaintiffs won relief almost 60 
percent of the cases.366  
Although the empirical study implies that the derivative suits system has been 
successfully practiced in China since its introduction in 2006, its current provisions still 
have some drawbacks. First, the Company Law of 2005 should indicate that the 
derivative plaintiff must be qualified as a shareholder of the company when the suit is 
filed.367 Second, the Law does not provide a criterion or concept to justify the board’s 
decision to refuse a shareholder’s demand.368 Third, if the shareholder plaintiff files a 
derivative action against “any other people,” there is no indication or specification of who 
will be the person that the shareholder has to make a demand of.369 Finally, Article 152 
made different causes of action for insiders and “any other people,” but offers no reason 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 See Huang, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China, supra note 356, at 654. 
367 See CLARKE & HOWSON, Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China, supra note 347, at 288. 
368 See CLARKE & HOWSON, Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China, supra note 347, at 288-
89 (“One Supreme People’s Court judge has made just this suggestion: we must stipulate effective 
conditions for any resolution (by the board refusing demand): first, that the resolution is conditioned on 
prior appropriate investigation (of the claim) by the supervisory board or the independent directors; second, 
that the directors who vote on the resolution do not include defendants in the derivative action; and third, 
that the resolution be made in the best interests of the corporation”). 
369 See CLARKE & HOWSON, Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China, supra note 347, at 289. 
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for these two categories.370 These deficiencies of the statutes seem to indicate directions 
for the future reform in Taiwan derivative suit.   
III. The Derivative Suits System in South Korea 
A. Introduction  
The institution of shareholder derivative suits was introduced in the Korean 
Commercial Act (“KCA”) in 1962.371 Although Korean corporate law was based largely 
on German, as well as Japanese law, the concept of the derivative actions follow the 
institution developed in U.S. corporate law.372 At the outset, the South Korea government 
focused on avoiding frivolous suits and other abuses; the result was that the derivative 
actions were rarely brought in practice.373 Recently, to improve corporate governance and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 See id. at 289. 
371 HYEOK-JOON RHO & KON-SIK KIM, Invigorating Shareholder Derivative Actions in South Korea, in 
THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA 187 (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012)[hereinafter RHO & KIM, 
Invigorating Shareholder Derivative Actions in South Korea].  
372 See id. at 187; see also OK-RIAL SONG, Improving Corporate Governance through Litigation -
Derivative Suits and Class Actions in Korea, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 
94 (Hideki Kanda et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter OK-RIAL SONG, Improving Corporate Governance through 
Litigation].  
373 See id. at 94. 
  182 
monitoring mechanisms in corporate law, the policy has been to make it easier for 
shareholders to file derivative actions.374  
Thus, the KCA provision on derivative actions was amended after the economic 
crisis in Korea.375 In particular, the 1998 amendment to the KCA significantly lowered 
the minimum ownership requirement from 5 percent to 1 percent and 0.01 percent for 
different type of companies.376 Before the 1998 amendment of the KCA, with its strict 
standing requirement, almost no derivative action was instituted. 377  Although the 
minimum ownership requirement was significantly lowered, the total number of 
derivative actions was only around fifty-five cases until 2010.378 The moderate total 
number of derivative actions might indicate that the lower standing requirement was not 
necessarily the result of an increase of frivolous suits or abuse concerns in Korean 
derivative actions.379    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 See RHO & KIM, Invigorating Shareholder Derivative Actions in South Korea, supra note 371, at 189-
192. 
375 See OK-RIAL SONG, Improving Corporate Governance through Litigation, supra note 372, at 95. Korea 
Commercial Act, art. 403 amended on December 28, 1998.  
376 Korea Commercial Act, arts. 403, 542-6(6). 
377 See RHO & KIM, Invigorating Shareholder Derivative Actions in South Korea, supra note 371, at 196.  
378 See id. at 193; see also id. at 214 Appendix, Table 4A.1. Between 1997 and 2010, the number of 
derivative actions in South Korea was less than 10 every year. 
379 See RHO & KIM, Invigorating Shareholder Derivative Actions in South Korea, supra note 371, at 213. 
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B. The Requirements of A Derivative Suit in Korea 
Under Article 403 of the KCA, a shareholder who holds at least 1 percent of the 
company’s outstanding shares is authorized to bring a derivative action against 
wrongdoing directors.380 “Company” is narrowly defined as being unlisted corporation. 
For a listed company’s shareholder, however, the ownership requirement is lowered to 
0.01 percent of the company’s outstanding shares; at the same time, the statute also 
prescribes the minimum holding period for six months continuously before bringing a 
lawsuit.381  
After the 1998 amendment, the minimum shareholding was no longer required 
throughout the life of the action. Thus, if the plaintiff sells his or her shares and the 
holding is below the statutory requirement (i.e., 1% of the company’s stock) after filing a 
derivative suit, the lowered holding cannot be a reason for the court to dismiss the suit.382 
However, the plaintiff is required to hold at least one share throughout the life of the 
action. Furthermore, unlike the U.S.-styled contemporaneous ownership rule, that fact 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Korea Commercial Act, art. 403. 
381 Korea Commercial Act, art. 542-6(6). “Any person who has continued to hold stocks equivalent to no 
less than 1/10,000 of the total number of issued and outstanding shares of a listed company for more than 
six months may exercise shareholder’s rights under Article 403.”  
382 Korea Commercial Act, art. 403(5). 
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that the shareholder purchased shares of the company after the causes of action accrued 
(‘‘at the time the alleged wrongdoing was committed’’) does not disqualify the 
shareholder as a plaintiff instituting a derivative action.383   
In Korea, the demand is universal, so shareholders must make a written demand 
to the board of the company and wait for thirty days before filing a derivative action.384 
Only in an exceptional situation, in which an irreparable damage to the company may 
result, can shareholders immediately institute a lawsuit without the demand and the 
waiting period.385 From this, Korea also adopts an approach similar to that of the MBCA. 
However, Korea has a more lenient policy towards derivative suits in a listed company by 
lowering the minimum ownership requirement, while MBCA does not treat listed and 
unlisted companies (or, even closed and public companies) differently.  
The dichotomy between listed and unlisted companies may have a good rationale, 
reflecting the fact that the ownership requirement tends to make the derivative suits 
extremely difficult (albeit not impossible). Particularly for shareholders in public or listed 
companies, high ownership requirements become an insurmountable barrier. A loosen 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 See RHO & KIM, Invigorating Shareholder Derivative Actions in South Korea, supra note 371, at 196-
197; see also OK-RIAL SONG, Improving Corporate Governance through Litigation, supra note 372, at 95.  
384 Korea Commercial Act, arts. 403(2)(3). 
385 Korea Commercial Act, art. 403(4). 
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requirement would encourage the bringing of more suits. As mentioned above, before the 
1998 amendment to the KCA, requirement, almost no derivative suit was instituted. After 
the amendment, the number of suits increase. That may provide persuasive evidence for 
Taiwan, which has long wanted to make its derivative suits system more active. However, 
Taiwan apparently is much more conservative than Korea.  
In addition, Korean courts may order the plaintiffs to post a security for litigation 
expenses when the defendants demonstrate that the derivative action was brought in bad 
faith.386  
C. Litigation Fees  
As mentioned, how to calculate the litigation, or court, fee has significant impact 
on the plaintiff’s willingness to sue. The Korean courts currently adopt a fixed-fee 
method and the litigation fee for a lawsuit is about $240 (230,000 Korean won).387 The 
KCA also provides a mechanism for the plaintiff to request that the reimbursement of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 See OK-RIAL SONG, Improving Corporate Governance through Litigation, supra note 372, at 97-98. 
387 In Korea, a nominal filing fee has been about $50 (50,000 won) since early 1990s, but now is up to 
about $240 (230,000 won). However, the filing fees have never been a critical issue for Korean litigants, so 
the increase of the fees never becomes a block for lawsuits, and such increase just reflects a general effect 
of inflation. See id. at 94. 
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court fees and attorney’s fees from the company.388 However, the plaintiff could demand 
reimbursement only when he or she wins the case and reimbursement would be limited to 
“in relation to the action and a reasonable amount of other expenses.”389 This provision 
probably exists because Korea is concerned with U.S.-typed strike suits that may come 
up with looser pre-suit requirements and a generous reimbursement provision.  
D. Other Issues In Korea’s Derivative Suits System  
Although Korean legal reformers reduced the minimum standing requirement to 
encourage the mechanism of derivative actions, the number of suits was still limited in 
South Korea. Compared to the number of derivative actions in Japan and in the U.S., the 
mechanism of derivative actions may not be attacked by frivolous suits or abuse 
concerns.390 As mentioned, minority shareholders have to bear financial risks, litigation 
fees, and uncertain reimbursement from the company. Thus, they need more incentives to 
bring derivative actions. In fact, most of the derivative actions have been brought by 
NGOs, such as the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (“PSPD”), rather 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388 Korea Commercial Act, art. 405. “The plaintiff shareholder who has filed an action pursuant to Sec. 3 
and 4 of Art. 403 and won in the action shall be entitled to reimbursement for a reasonable amount of 
litigation expenses and other expenses that were paid in connection with the action. In such case, the 
corporation which has paid its reimbursement obligation is entitled to reimbursement from the defendant 
director(s) or auditor(s).” 
389 Korea Commercial Act, art. 405. 
390 See RHO & KIM, Invigorating Shareholder Derivative Actions in South Korea, supra note 371, at 213. 
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than by minority shareholders or entrepreneurial attorneys.391 The PSPD filed two 
marked derivative actions against Korea First Bank and Samsung Electronics in 1997 and 
2001 respectively.392 Although the PSPD has many legal resources, it still lost the 
derivative lawsuits. 393  Therefore, some literature provided practical suggestions for 
improving the monitoring mechanism of derivative litigations. First, the courts could 
loosen the interpretation of the reimbursement and contingency fees arrangements.394 
Second, legal reformers may consider the introduction of an American style “discovery 
process,” because the causes of action of derivative actions usually involve by-product of 
criminal or bankruptcy proceeding.395 Third, the demand requirement should not be 
strictly enforced. Fourth, considering the double derivative actions, because of the 
structure of economic system in South Korea.396 Finally, introducing into the U.S. style 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391 See RHO & KIM, Invigorating Shareholder Derivative Actions in South Korea, supra note 371, at 213. 
The introduction of PSPD is available at http://www.peoplepower21.org/English (last visited Oct. 25, 
2014). See Boong-Kyu Lee, Don Quixote or Robin Hood?: Minority Shareholder Rights and Corporate 
Governance in Korea, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 345, 355-56 (2002). 
392 See OK-RIAL SONG, Improving Corporate Governance through Litigation, supra note 372, at 104. 
393 See id. 
394 See id. at 213. 
395 See id. 
396 See id. 
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of “professional lawyers” that may increase the incentives of bring the derivative 
actions.397   
IV.  Summary 
Table 10: Comparisons among Derivative Suits Systems in the U.S., Japan, China, 
South Korea and Taiwan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397 See RHO & KIM, Invigorating Shareholder Derivative Actions in South Korea, supra note 371, at 213; 
see also OK-RIAL SONG, Improving Corporate Governance through Litigation, supra note 372, at 105-06. 
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United 
States 
Japan China South 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Ownership 
Requirement  
1 share 1 share Any 
shareholder 
of the 
limited 
company 
0.01% of 
the 
company’s 
stock in a 
listed 
company 
3% of the 
company’s 
stock (only 
applicable 
in joint 
stock 
limited 
company) 1% of the 
joint stock 
limited 
company’s 
stock 
1% so the 
company’s 
stock in an 
unlisted 
company 
Share Holding  
Requirement 
No 6 months 180 days 6 months 1 year 
Contemporan
eous 
Ownership 
Rule 
Yes No No No No 
Demand 
Requirement 
Delaware: 
Demand 
Futility Test 
Universal 
Demand 
Universal 
Demand 
Universal 
Demand 
Universal 
Demand 
MBCA: 
Universal 
Demand 
Demand Upon The 
Company 
(The board 
of directors) 
The 
Company 
(The 
statutory 
The 
company 
(The 
supervisors 
The 
company 
(Director 
or 
supervisor
The 
Company 
(Superviso
rs) 
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auditors) or the 
board of 
supervisors
) 
) 
Waiting 
Period 
Delaware: 
No 
60 days 30 days 30 days 30 days 
MBCA: 90 
days 
The Company 
Refuses 
(In 
emergency) 
Can file suit Can file suit Can file 
suit 
Can file 
suit 
Cannot file 
suit 
Special 
Litigation 
Committee 
Yes No No No No 
Defendants in 
the Lawsuit 
Directors, 
officers and 
other 
persons 
(who have 
caused harm 
to the 
company or 
have 
profited 
from 
company) 
Incorporator
, director at 
incorporatio
n, company 
auditor at 
incorporatio
n, officer, 
liquidator 
Director, 
supervisor, 
senior 
manager, 
and “any 
other 
people” 
Directors, 
supervisor
s, 
promoters, 
and 
liquidators 
Directors 
and 
supervisors 
Company 
Status in the 
Lawsuit 
Two Roles: 
An nominal 
defendant & 
a real 
The 
company 
may 
intervene in 
a suit (either 
Third Party 
(In most 
derivative 
actions) 
The 
company 
may 
intervene 
The 
company 
may 
intervene 
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plaintiff as a coparty 
or for 
assisting 
either of the 
parties) 
in a suit in a suit 
Security for 
Expenses 
Statute 
Yes (but 
allowed in 
few states) 
Yes (but 
only in bad 
faith) 
No Yes (but 
only in 
bad faith) 
Yes (if 
courts 
think fit) 
Delaware: 
No 
Incentive 
Mechanism 
 
(Reimbursem
ent Statute) 
for Plaintiffs 
Yes Yes No Yes No 
Incentive 
Mechanism 
 
(Reimbursem
ent Statute) 
for Attorneys 
Yes Yes No No No 
Contingency 
Fees 
Yes No No No No 
Business 
Judgment 
Rule Applied  
Yes Yes No No No 
Concern of 
Frivolous 
Yes Yes  
(After 1993) 
No No No 
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Suits  
Court Fees Fixed Fee Fixed Fee 
(8,200 
Japanese 
yen) or 
about U.S. 
$82) 
The sliding 
scale 
(depending 
on the 
amount of 
the claim) 
Fixed Fee 
(230,000 
won; 
about U.S. 
$240) 
The sliding 
scale 
(depending 
on the 
amount of 
the claim) 
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Chapter Seven: Suggestions and Conclusion 
 Based on the analyses in the preceding chapters, this chapter will begin with a 
summary of Taiwan’s derivative suit system focusing on certain of its drawbacks. Some 
suggestions for future legal reform follow, along with detailed reasons. In the meantime, 
to alleviate the concerns of abusing by shareholders, there will be some for them, 
corresponding solutions. Explanations will be presented to demonstrate that abuse by 
shareholders may not be so serious, even if Taiwan adopts a lenient policy, in the future 
as suggested in this dissertation. Finally, conclusion of this dissertation will be following.  
I. Summary of Drawbacks in Taiwan’s Derivative Suit System 
In order to avoid trivial, frivolous, and even strike suits, Taiwan prefers a very 
conservative policy to regulate derivative suits. The current TCA provides an impractical 
institution of derivative suits for shareholders. Certain pre-suit requirements in fact 
prevent all of derivative suit from being brought, regardless of whether they have merit or 
they are in line with the company’s best interests.398  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 These requirements chill not only frivolous suits but also meritorious suits. This result also can be seen 
in the U.S. See KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 
209. 
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First, the minimum ownership requirement (3% and more) excludes many 
shareholders from having the right to sue on behalf of the company. Especially for 
shareholders of a listed company with a diversified ownership, this requirement actually 
creates an extremely high barrier. Second, the minimum holding period requirement (a 
year or longer) arbitrarily discriminates against newer shareholders by disqualifying them 
from being eligible plaintiffs. Third, the demand and wait requirement might let the 
company have an opportunity to correct internal problems before they are litigated in 
courts. However, this requirement fails to function when supervisors are interested and/or 
non-independent parties. Upon receiving a demand from shareholders, interested and/or 
non-independent supervisors are likely only to sue. What’s worse, they may secretly 
notify defendant directors of such demands and the defendant directors may have time to 
hide their assets to avoid future executions. The demand and wait requirement is 
inexcusable. Even when there is a doubt that all supervisors are interested and/or non-
independent parties and thus the demand will be futile, this requirement cannot be 
excused. Further, there are some emergencies in which the company would bear 
irreparable damage if the wait period were complied with; however, this requirement still 
cannot be excused. 
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 Even if a suit meets all the pre-suit requirements and survives at the pretrial 
proceeding, the plaintiff faces other troubles. Upon a petition by the defendant, the court 
has wide discretion in determining whether to require the plaintiff to deposit a litigation 
security, which may become a huge financial burden for him or her. In case the plaintiff 
loses the suit, the company and defendant directors who suffer damages arising from the 
suit can sue the plaintiff for recovery.   
 The lack of an incentive to sue can be one of the most serious problems for 
shareholders, even if they are eligible to sue for the company’s sake. In a derivative suit, 
the real claimant is the company and any recovery should go to it not the plaintiff. 
Because of this, incentive mechanisms to sue are needed. However, there is no laws or 
regulations in this regard, so the plaintiff in a derivative suit would definitely be a loser, 
even if he or she wins the suit. Thus, shareholders may prefer waiting for others to sue (as 
free-riders) rather than aggressively taking any legal actions. Without adequate incentives, 
no lawsuit will be brought by shareholders, even if a lawsuit could benefit the company 
and its shareholders.  
As outsiders, shareholders, especially minority ones, may not have access to 
information they need to determine that a lawsuit can be brought. During the lawsuit, the 
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plaintiffs may not be able to produce evidence if they are not equipped with the right to 
check and copy company documents. In these circumstances, it is hardly to be expected 
that a suit will be brought by shareholders.  
 Another problem is the narrow definition of a derivative suit in Taiwan. Only 
incumbent directors and supervisors can be one sued in derivative suits. Therefore, if the 
company has a claim on its former director, officer, or others, the board of directors 
should have the right to determine how to seek recovery. If the board refutes to bring a 
suit, shareholders cannot step into the company’s shoes to take any legal action. Thus, 
there could be a loophole for majority shareholders, who could control the board. They 
would not be sued by the company if they are not directors and supervisors, no matter 
how much they may be liable to the company.  
Article 27 of TCA also exacerbates this problem. First, this article allows that a 
government or juristic person (e.g., a company), when holding shares issued by a given 
company, can be elected as a director (or supervisor) of that company, but a government 
or juristic person shall appoint one representative who exercises its directorial power. In 
this circumstance, a government and juristic person, rather than its representative, should 
be the director. In fact, the representative acts in the capacity of director, but he or she 
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cannot be a defendant in a derivative suit even if his or her behavior damages the 
company. Second, a government or juristic person as shareholder may appoint one or 
more its representative to be elected as directors of the invested company. Differently 
from the first approach, the representative should be a director. This article also 
authorizes the government and juristic person to have the ability to change its 
representative(s) at any time without cause; thus, a director could be changed at any time, 
which creates uncertainty for a derivative suit to sustain, because the defendant, if he or 
she is a representative of a government or juristic person, may lose directorship at any 
time.  
In summary, the problems mentioned above are detailed in Table 11. 
Table 11: Current Provisions and Problems in Taiwan Derivative Suit System 
 Current Provisions Problems  
Narrow 
Definition 
Defendants only can be 
incumbent 
directors/supervisors. 
1. Majority shareholders or others 
intended to avoid liabilities resulted 
from their wrongdoings can choose not 
to be a director; however, they still act 
in the capacity of a director.  
2. Article of 27 in TCA makes this 
problem worse, because a director is a 
representative of a government or 
juristic person can be changed at any 
time, which creates uncertainty for a 
derivative suit.  
Ownership Holding 3% and more of 1. Very difficult to satisfy, especially for 
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Requirement  all company’s 
outstanding shares. 
shareholders of a publicly-held 
company. 
2. May exclude all lawsuits, but some of 
these may have merit for the company 
and its shareholders’ benefit. 
Period 
Requirement  
Continuously holding 
required amount of 
shares for a year or 
longer.  
Unfair for newer shareholders who 
purchase shares within the preceding year.  
Demand and 
Waiting 
Requirement  
Must make demand to 
supervisors and wait 30 
days after supervisors 
receive demand before 
bring a lawsuit. 
Loopholes exist when all supervisors are 
dismissed or retire, or in emergency 
situations.  
Litigation 
Security  
Court has full discretion 
to order plaintiff to 
deposit security.  
Uncertain financial burden offers 
disincentives for shareholders to bring 
suits. 
No incentive 
mechanism  
No reimbursement 
clauses for plaintiffs who 
wins; plaintiffs should be 
liable if they lose. 
No incentives to encourage beneficial 
suits.  
Information 
Asymmetry  
No special right to check 
and copy company 
documents. 
No adequate information to determine 
whether to sue; inability to produce 
evidence. 
 
II. Suggestions for Future Reforms 
The above-mentioned requirements and problems have contributed to the dearth of 
derivative suits in Taiwan. Thus, the current derivative suit system should be promptly 
amended because the system has not provided deterrence of corporate governance as 
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expected since its introduction. This dissertation argues that some existing requirements 
for derivative suits should be eliminated or amended and some new provisions should be 
added, for the purpose of enhancing the functions of the derivative suit system in Taiwan. 
Specific suggestions are found in below and Table 12.  
1. Limited of Derivative Defendants  
 Because of the very narrow definition of a derivative suit, a majority or large 
shareholders, who have influence on the company’s operation, could easily avoid possible 
lawsuits brought by disgruntled shareholders, which is unreasonable simply because they do 
not serve as directors (or supervisors). Thus, eligible defendants in a derivative suit should be 
expanded into anyone who is liable to the company. In other words, the qualified defendants 
would be directors and anyone else liable. Thus, the initiating of a derivative suit would 
occur more often, especially when it is applicable to persons serving important positions in 
the company, such as promoters, managerial officers, liquidators, and inspectors.399 The 
derivative suits may be more beneficial to the company when defendants are directors or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 These persons (including directors and supervisors) are collectively called “responsible persons” 
according to Article 8 of the Company Act. They are required to have same fiduciary duties to the company. 
See GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 23 § 1 (Taiwan). However, Articles 214 and 227 specifically makes 
directors and supervisors as possible defendants in a derivative suit. As such, law should not have 
reasonable grounds to treat them differently from directors and supervisors. Unfortunately, as Taiwan is a 
civil law jurisdiction, no other provisions could support otherwise. Moreover, in 2012, with an amendment 
of Article 8(3) of the Company Act, the concepts of de facto and shadow directors were introduced. If 
persons in a public company act like directors (“de facto directors”) or can control over the management of 
the personnel, financial or business operation of the company (“shadow directors”), they shall be subject to 
regulations governing the “responsible persons.” Thus, these persons (who are not legally directors or 
supervisors) might be defendants in derivative suits. Such amendment may more or less help expands 
functions of derivative suits in Taiwan. See GONGSI FA [Company Act] art. 8 § 3 (Taiwan). 
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other senior officers, which would create a deterrent on those fiduciaries in the context of 
corporate governance. 
2. Unreasonable Prerequisite Requirement  
 The minimum ownership requirement should be eliminated, because this requirement 
has actually made almost no derivative suits be brought in Taiwan. In these circumstances, a 
derivative suit appears not to be a good option for shareholders who intend to sue on behalf 
of a publicly-held company. This requirement in fact not only can prevent strike and 
frivolous suits but also meritorious ones; therefore, this requirement is not be a good measure 
for avoiding abuses by shareholders. The minimum holding period requirement should be 
eliminated. The holding period cannot function as a mechanism that can effectively prevent 
abuses in part because the statutory period of one year is arbitrary and discriminates against 
new shareholders without any rational basis.  
 The demand futility should be introduced into Taiwan. Demands submitted to 
supervisors would be futile when all supervisory positions are vacant or supervisors retire. In 
addition, if there is a reasonable doubt that all supervisors are disinterested and independent 
parties, a demand becomes unnecessary or even incapable. Thus, Taiwan should consider 
introducing the rules of demand futility adopted in Aronson. Besides, the requirement of 
waiting 30 days is applicable even if supervisors explicitly deny the demand. As supervisors 
have made a decision with regard to shareholders’ demands, there is no strong reason why 
shareholders should not be able to sue until 30 days elapse. 
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 Further, if there is an emergency in which the company might suffer irreparable 
injury, requiring shareholders to absolutely comply with the waiting period makes no sense, 
because one of the main reasons for derivative suits is to preserve the company’s claims. 
Thus, the waiting period should be waived in an emergency situation. However, the plaintiff 
should need to show the evidence at the pre-trial proceeding, in order to prove that there are 
situations in which the demand is excused or an emergency is present.  
3. Exceptions for Litigation Security 
 The current provision of litigation securities should be amended, because the court 
has wide discretion in ordering the plaintiff to deposit a security, even if her lawsuit has merit. 
The current provision is expected to become a concern for shareholders without reasonable 
grounds. In fact, litigation security is not a good mechanism to determine whether a suit is 
frivolous or not. Although a shareholder is unable to deposit security according to a court’s 
order that does not imply that such a suit is frivolous or only for a striking purpose. To the 
contrary, depositing a security cannot suggest that the plaintiff’s suit is meritorious and not 
for a striking purpose. Despite this, litigation security can be a useful mechanism for 
excluding cases that are groundlessly brought. Specifically, if the court deems that a case has 
no reasonable grounds for being brought, an order to deposit litigation security might 
dissuade the plaintiff from proceeding. However, litigation security should be the exception 
rather than the rule. The plaintiff should be ordered to deposit such a security only when the 
court thinks that the lawsuit probably is groundless. 
4. Adding an Incentive Mechanism  
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 A reimbursement clause should be added to encourage shareholders to bring suits. 
Under the current system, a shareholder in a derivative suit is bound to be a loser. Even if he 
or she wins the case, the recovery goes to the company and he or she, as the plaintiff, has no 
right to request reimbursement from the company. That means that a plaintiff would pay all 
the costs and expenses for bringing a case from his or her own pocket. Thus, it is very likely 
that no one will be willing to bring a derivative suit. Therefore, a reimbursement clause 
should be necessary, even though it may encourage some frivolous suits to be brought for 
this reason, there should be some conditions when the court can order the company to 
reimburse the plaintiff. To be specific, after the court’s review, reimbursement should be 
ordered when the suit is deemed meritorious or beneficial to the company. Meanwhile, the 
amount of reimbursement should be limited to the costs and expenses necessary to 
commence and maintain the suit. 
5. Burden of Court Fees 
 Along with the costs and expenses of litigations, court fees are another financial 
burden for shareholders who intend to sue. If a plaintiff loses the case, he or she should 
pay the court fees from his or her own pocket. The court fees will be calculated based on 
the amount of the claim in the suit. More significant, the greater amount of the plaintiff’s 
claim, the more the financial risk for him or her. This dissertation argues that the plaintiff 
should not bear all the risk, because a derivative suit may create benefits for the company. 
Usually, if shareholders win the case, the recovery goes to the company. Further, the suit 
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also creates a deterrent to the extent to which governance risk in the company could be 
mitigated. Thus, it is unreasonable that the plaintiff pays the court fees simply because he 
or she loses a case. Winning a case depends on a variety of uncertain factors that the 
plaintiff cannot control. For instance, the plaintiff has to present evidence showing that a 
cause of action has accrued. However, some important internal documents (e.g., the 
minutes of board meeting) may be held by third parties like the company. The plaintiff 
may be unaware of critical information beneficial to his or her suit. Thus, it seems fair 
that the company should pay all or part of court fee if a losing shareholder’s suit is 
deemed meritorious. Notwithstanding this, courts still can order the losing plaintiff to pay 
partial court fees for avoiding abuses. 
 As shown from the experiences of Japan and Korea, fixed court fees provide 
incentives for the plaintiffs and effectively encourage more derivative suits. Taiwan likewise 
should establish some fixed fees.  
6. Informational Asymmetry  
 Taiwan should consider authorizing shareholders to check the company’s books and 
records of the company, as so provided in DGCL§220, to redress the informational 
asymmetry between shareholders and defendant directors. To avoid abuse by shareholders, 
the company can denied shareholders’ requests, and the shareholders can petition the courts 
to decide whether the application should be granted. 
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7. The Business Judgment Rule 
 The business judgment rule should be introduced into Taiwan’s company law. In 
Taiwan, no mechanism exists to determine whether suing is in the company’s best interests. 
Theoretically, if the board of directors is deemed disinterested and independent, its authority 
should be maintained. However, the company has no legal standing to motion the court to 
dismiss if the plaintiff’s suit meets all procedural requirements. Whether the plaintiff’s suit 
meets all the requirements is critical; however, whether the lawsuit is in the company’s best 
interests does not matter that much. In the U.S., few lawsuits can survive proceeding to the 
trial because the plaintiff should face certain challenges such as proof of burden requested by 
the Aronson test or a recommendation to dismiss from the special litigation committee. 
Through these mechanisms, many suits can be screened out. However, Taiwan has no such 
mechanisms, so many more suits my come up if the law loosens the requirements. This may 
be one reason why Taiwan remains concerned about a more lenient policy of derivative suits. 
This dissertation thus argues that a U.S.-styled business judgment rule is indispensable to 
Taiwan’s derivative suits system for future reforms. As a result, the application of business 
judgment rule would make frivolous suits or strike suits less likely to be instituted. 
8. Provisions of Settlement and Withdrawal  
 Some procedural provisions should be added, especially those concerning settlements 
and withdrawals. To avoid a secret, arbitrary settlement or withdrawal and protection of the 
company’s interests, any settlement or withdrawal should be approved by the courts. If 
necessary, the court may notify the company and take its reviews into consideration when 
determining whether the settlement or withdrawal should be approved. 
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Table 12: Suggestions for Taiwan’s Future Reforms  
 
Items Suggestion 
Defendants of A Derivative 
Suit 
Defendants can be any debtors who owe the company 
(claimant). 
Minimum Ownership 
Requirement  
This requirement should be deleted. However, the plaintiff 
must be a shareholder during the entire lawsuit.  
Minimum Holding Period 
Requirement  
This requirement should be deleted. However, the plaintiff 
must be a shareholder during the entire lawsuit. 
Demand and Wait 
Requirement  
1. Demand should be excused when it is futile; it becomes 
futile if the positions of all incumbent supervisors are 
vacant, or if they retire, uninterested, or non-
independent.  
2. A suit can be brought immediately when supervisors 
have explicitly denied the demand or emergencies exist. 
Litigation Security  Litigation security is required only when there is a doubt that 
the plaintiff’s suit has no grounds. 
Incentive Mechanism  The TCA should add a reimbursement clause, which awards 
a plaintiff reasonable fees and expenses for his or her 
lawsuit, when the suit is deemed meritorious or beneficial to 
the company after being reviewed by court. 
Court Fee The TCA or Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure should add a 
clause that the court can order the company to pay a court 
fee, when the suit is deemed meritorious or beneficial to the 
company after being reviewed by court. 
Information Asymmetry  The court should authorize shareholders to check the 
company’s books and records, but should apply for the 
court’s approval. 
Business Judgment Rule Should be applicable at pretrial and trial proceeding. 
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Provisions of Settlement 
and Withdrawal 
Either the plaintiff’s settlement with the company or 
withdrawal of the suit should be approved by the courts. 
 
III.  The Problem of the Abuse of Derivative Suits 
The institution of derivative suits is controversial in nature, and as a governance 
mechanism its effectiveness could be doubtful. However, such a mechanism has been in 
effect since 1966 in Taiwan and it has been amended three times. The introduction and 
amendments can suggest that such an institution is expected to function as a governance 
mechanism in Taiwanese policymakers’ view; however, in fact, it fails to work as 
expected, because the current provisions of the TCA in effect prevents all derivative suits. 
This dissertation argues that the institution of derivative suits can be a useful corporate 
governance mechanism, and thus more derivative suits should be encouraged. Thus, this 
dissertation suggests that Taiwan eliminates and/or amend some unreasonably strict pre-
suit requirements. However, if this were done, there would still be a danger that 
shareholders would abuse intentionally or unintentionally the institution of derivative 
suits. 
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Basically, due to the controversial nature of derivative suits, any reforms of this 
mechanism is legitimate on condition that the abuse concern is fully taken into account. 
As the American experience suggests, the abuse concern would be raised in all likelihood. 
The reasons include:      
(1) No Contingent Fee Incentive in Taiwan 
 No contingent fee is allowed in Taiwan. “Contingent fee” would be defined as “[a] 
fee charged for a lawyer’s services only if the lawsuit is successful or is favorably settled 
out of court,”400 and such fees are usually “calculated as a percentage of the client’s net 
recovery.”401 Many believe that the contingent fee would encourage lawyers who institute 
frivolous or strike derivative suits just to benefit their law firms. Unlike American 
derivative plaintiffs (or attorneys), Taiwanese shareholders have no strong incentives to 
file an action without merit, because they have to pay all the costs and expenses fees 
(including attorney fees) from their own pockets. Even after a reform that lifts some pre-
suit requirements and adds a reimbursement clause, shareholders still will have no 
incentives to bring frivolous or groundless suits because they cannot sue without taking 
risks.  
(2) No Settlement Incentive 
 There is no settlement between the company and the plaintiff in Taiwan because 
no provision exists regarding exculpation and indemnification. Furthermore, there is no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 Black’s Law Dictionary 315 (7th ed. 1999).  
401 Id. 
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concept of discovery in Taiwan’s judicial proceedings similar to that in the U.S., which 
costs parties much time and attorney fees. Discovery occurs when a derivative suit 
survives a motion to dismiss it at the pre-trial proceeding. Facing the time-consuming and 
high cost of discovery, the defendant has a strong incentive to settle with the plaintiff, 
with settlement awards going to plaintiffs and their attorney. This consequence creates a 
lucrative business for attorneys. With an attempt to get a settlement, an attorney may urge 
shareholders to file a trivial suit without merit. However, the U.S.-type strike suits are 
less likely to happen in Taiwan. Even the introduction of settlement, as suggested in this 
dissertation, will not create a strike suit concern if the amount is well estimated. 
(3) Introduction of the U.S. Business Judgment Rule 
 As discussed above, the business judgment rule, as a judicial assumption, should 
be introduced into the Taiwan corporate governance system and be applied at pretrial 
proceedings in shareholder suits. The rule is essentially designed to immunize directors 
and officers from liability with respect to the management of corporate affairs. In light of 
this rule, the courts do not second-guess business decisions, and shareholders have the 
burden of proof to rebut this judicial assumption. As such, the rule will be an efficient 
means to root out frivolous and strike suits in Taiwan.  
(4) “Asian Values” in Taiwan’s Culture 
 Taiwan’s social culture is risk-averse and conforms to “Asian values.” These 
attitudes are normal and prevalent among all Taiwanese. In particular, when minority 
shareholders face certain disputes, they prefer to look for other solutions rather than 
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directly seeking legal remedies (including filing derivative suits). Thus, although the 
strict requirements for undertaking derivative actions may be revised in the future, abuse 
concerns would not be so serious in Taiwan as in the U.S., China, and South Korea. 
These countries have more flexible requirements for derivative actions than does Taiwan, 
but, under similar culture background, their number of derivative actions would still be 
relatively modest. 
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CONCLUSION 
To avoid strike suits or trivial suits, Taiwan has adopted a conservative policy for 
regulating derivative suits. The current regulations of the TCA, however, provide an 
impracticable regimen for derivative suits for shareholders. Pre-suit requirements, such as 
the ownership requirement and inexcusable demand, in fact prevent all types of 
derivative suits from being brought, regardless of whether they might have merit or are in 
the company’s best interests. The TCA also fails to offer shareholders adequate 
incentives to encourage the initiation of beneficial lawsuits.                
As analyzed above, the current derivative suit system should be amended because 
the very few suits that are brought prove that this system has not played the deterrence of 
corporate governance function as expected since its introduction. In Taiwan, the 
ownership requirement should be eliminated, because it actually makes derivative suits 
nearly impossible. A derivative suit appears not to be an option for shareholders in a 
publicly-held company. The ownership requirement in fact can prevent not only strike 
but also beneficial suits, so this requirement seems not a good means for abuse control. 
The holding period requirement also should be eliminated. The holding period cannot be 
an abuse control mechanism because the statutory period of one year is arbitrarily 
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designed, and this requirement discriminates against newer shareholders without any 
rational basis. 
The concept of demand futility should be introduced into Taiwan. A demand to 
supervisors is futile when all supervisory positions are vacant or there is a reasonable doubt 
that all supervisors are disinterested and independent. If there is an emergency in which a 
company would suffer irreparable injury, compliance with the waiting period can be waived. 
In situations in which demand is excused or an emergency is present, the plaintiff needs to 
provide evidence for this at the pre-trial proceeding. 
The current provision of litigation securities should be amended because the court has 
full discretion to order the plaintiff to deposit security even if her lawsuit has merit. The 
current provision involves a disincentive for shareholders without any rational reason for 
doing so. In fact, security is not a good tool to distinguish beneficial suits from strike suits. 
An amended provision should provide that a plaintiff should be asked to deposit a security 
only when the court finds that the lawsuit can be deemed a striking suit. 
A reimbursement provision could encourage shareholders to bring more merit suits to 
the company. However, such reimbursement should be allowed only if the court finds that 
shareholders suits are beneficial.     
I believe that some requirements should be eliminated or amended and some new 
provisions should be enacted, as detailed in Table 13.  
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Table 13: Current Provisions, Problems, and Suggestions   
 Current 
Provisions 
Hurdles for 
Shareholders  
Suggestions 
Ownership 
Requirement  
Holding at least 
3% of company’s 
shares. 
Very difficult to meet 
for shareholders of a 
publicly-held company.  
Eliminating this 
requirement; but a 
derivative plaintiff must 
be a shareholder during 
the entire lawsuit.  
Period 
Requirement  
Continuously 
holding required 
amount of shares 
for at least one 
year.  
Unfair for newer 
shareholders who 
purchase shares within 
the previous year.  
Eliminating this 
requirement.  
Demand and 
Waiting 
Requirement  
Must make 
demand to 
supervisors and 
wait 30 days after 
supervisors receive 
demand.  
Loopholes exist when 
all supervisors are 
dismissed or retire, or in 
emergency situations.  
A demand should be 
waived when futile; 
shareholders don’t have 
to wait in emergency.  
  
Litigation 
Security  
Court has full 
discretion to order 
plaintiff to deposit 
security.  
Uncertain financial 
burden offers 
disincentives for 
shareholders to bring 
suits. 
Security is required 
only when the court 
reasonably believes that 
the suit has no merit.     
No Incentive 
for 
Derivative 
Plaintiffs 
No any 
reimbursement for 
plaintiffs. 
No incentive to 
encourage beneficial 
suits.  
Should add 
reimbursement 
provision that awards 
plaintiffs reasonable 
fees when their suits are 
deemed beneficial.  
Business 
Judgment 
Rule (BJR) 
N/A N/A Can be introduced as a 
tool to maintain the 
authority to decide 
whether to sue and to 
avoid frivolous suits. 
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APPENDIX: SELECTED ARTICLES 
GONGSI FA [Company Act] (Taiwan) 
Article 8 
I. The term “responsible persons” of a company as used in this Act denotes shareholders 
conducting the business or representing the company in case of an unlimited company or 
unlimited company with limited liability shareholders; directors of the company in case 
of a limited company or a company limited by shares. 
II. The managerial officer or liquidator of a company, the promoter, supervisor, inspector, 
reorganizer or reorganization supervisor of a company limited by shares acting within the 
scope of their duties, are also responsible persons of a company. 
III. For a company whose shares have been issued in public, a non-director who de facto 
conducts business of a director or de facto controls over the management of the personnel, 
financial or business operation of the company and de facto instructs a director to conduct 
business shall be liable for the civil, criminal and administrative liabilities as a director in 
this Act, provided, however, that such liabilities shall not apply to an instruction of the 
government to the director appointed by the government for the purposes of economic 
development, promotion of social stability, or other circumstances which can promote 
public interests. 
Article 23 § I 
I. The responsible person of a company shall have the loyalty and shall exercise the due 
care of a good administrator in conducting the business operation of the company; and if 
he/she has acted contrary to this provision, shall be liable for the damages to be sustained 
by the company there-from. 
II. If the responsible person of a company has, in the course of conducting the business 
operations, violated any provision of the applicable laws and/or regulations and thus 
caused damage to any other person, he/she shall be liable, jointly and severally, for the 
damage to such other person. 
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III. In case the responsible person of a company does anything for himself/herself or on 
behalf of another person in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 1, the meeting of 
shareholders may, by a resolution, consider the earnings in such an act as earnings of the 
company unless one year has lapsed since the realization of such earnings. 
Article 27 
I. Where a government agency or a juristic person acts as a shareholder of a company, it 
may be elected as a director or supervisor of the company provided that it shall designate 
a natural person as its proxy to exercise, in its behalf, the duties of a shareholder. 
II. Where a government agency or a juristic person acts as a shareholder of a company, its 
authorized representative may also be elected as a director or supervisor of the company. 
If there is a plural number of such authorized representatives, each of them may be so 
elected, but such authorized representatives may not concurrently be selected or serve as 
the director or supervisor of the company. 
III. Any of the authorized representatives of a company referred to in Paragraphs I and II 
of this Article may, owing to the change of his/her functional duties, be replaced by a 
person to be authorized by the company so as to fulfill the unexposed term of office of 
the predecessor. 
IV. Any restriction placed upon the power or authority of the authorized representatives 
set forth in Paragraph I and Paragraph II of this Article shall not be set up as a defense 
against any bona fide third party. 
Article 171 
A shareholders meeting shall, unless otherwise provided for in this Act, be convened by 
the Board of Directors. 
Article 172 § V 
Matters pertaining to election or discharge of directors and supervisors, alteration of the 
Articles of Incorporation, and dissolution, merger, spin-off, or any matters as set forth in 
Paragraph I, Article 185 hereof shall be itemized in the causes or subjects to be described 
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in the notice to convene a meeting of shareholders, and shall not be brought up as 
extemporary motions. 
Article 172-1 § I  
Shareholder(s) holding one percent (1%) or more of the total number of outstanding 
shares of a company may propose to the company a proposal for discussion at a regular 
shareholders’ meeting, provided that only one matter shall be allowed in each single 
proposal, and in case a proposal contains more than one matter, such proposal shall not 
be included in the agenda. 
Article 173 § I 
Any or a plural number of shareholder(s) of a company who has (have) continuously held 
3% or more of the total number of outstanding shares for a period of one year or a longer 
time may, by filing a written proposal setting forth therein the subjects for discussion and 
the reasons, request the board of directors to call a special meeting of shareholders. 
Article 185 § I 
A company shall not do any of the following acts without a resolution adopted by a 
majority of the shareholders present who represent two-thirds or more of the total number 
of its outstanding shares: 
1.Enter into, amend, or terminate any contract for lease of the company’s business in 
whole, or for entrusted business, or for regular joint operation with others; 
2.Transfer the whole or any essential part of its business or assets; or 
3.Accept the transfer of another's whole business or assets, which has great bearing on 
the business operation of the company. 
Article 192 § I 
The board of directors of a company shall have at least three directors who shall be 
elected by the shareholders’ meeting from among the persons with disposing capacity. 
For a company whose shares are issued to the public, if the percentage of shareholdings 
of all the directors selected in accordance with the preceding Paragraph is subject to the 
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provisions separately prescribed by the competent authority in charge of securities affairs, 
such provisions shall prevail. 
Article 194 
In case the board of directors decide, by resolution, to commit any act in violation of any 
law, ordinance or the company’s Articles of Incorporation, any shareholder who has 
continuously held the shares of the company for a period of one year or longer may 
request the board of directors to discontinue such act. 
Article 196 § I 
The remuneration of directors, if not prescribed in the Articles of Incorporation, shall be 
determined by a meeting of shareholders and cannot be ratified by a meeting of 
shareholders. 
Article 199 § I 
A director may be discharged at any time by a resolution adopted at a shareholders’ 
meeting provided, however, that if a director is discharged during the term of his/her 
office as a director without good cause shown, the said director may make a claim against 
the company for any and all damages sustained by him/her as a result of such discharge. 
Article 220 
Subject to the condition that the board of directors does not or is unable to convene a 
meeting of shareholders, the supervisors may, for the benefit of the company, call a 
meeting of shareholders when it is deemed necessary. 
Article 212 
In case the shareholders’ meeting of a company resolves to institute an action against a 
director, the company shall, within 30 days from the date of such resolution, institute the 
action. 
Article 213 
In case of a lawsuit between the company and a director, the supervisor shall act on 
behalf of the company, unless otherwise provided by law; and the meeting of 
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shareholders may also appoint some other person to act on behalf of the company in a 
lawsuit. 
Article 214 
Shareholder(s) who has/have been continuously holding 3% or more of the total number 
of the outstanding shares of the company over one year may request in writing the 
supervisors of the company to institute, for the company, an action against a director of 
the company. 
In case the supervisors fails to institute an action within 30 days after having received the 
request made under the preceding Paragraph, then the shareholders filing such request 
under the preceding Paragraph may institute the action for the company; and under such 
circumstance, the court may, at the petition of the defendant, order the suing shareholders 
to furnish an appropriate security. In case the suing shareholders become the loser in that 
lawsuit and thus causing any damage to the company, the suing shareholders shall be 
liable for indemnifying the company for such damage. 
Article 215 
Where a lawsuit instituted under paragraph 2 of the preceding article is found by a final 
judgment to be based on facts apparently untrue, the shareholders who instituted the 
action shall be liable to compensate the defendant director for loss or damage resulting 
from such an action. 
Where a lawsuit instituted under paragraph 2 of the preceding article is found by a final 
judgment to be based on facts apparently true, the defendant director shall be liable to 
compensate the shareholders who instituted the action for loss or damage resulting from 
such an action. 
Article 216 § I & II 
I. Supervisors of a company shall be elected by the meeting of shareholders, among them 
at least one supervisor shall have a domicile within the territory of the Republic of China.  
II. For a company whose shares are issued to the public, there must be two or more 
supervisors to be elected in accordance with the provision of the preceding Paragraph, 
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and the total shareholdings of all supervisors shall meet the requirement as separately 
specified by the authority in charge of securities affairs, if any.  
Article 218 § I 
Supervisors shall supervise the execution of business operations of the company, and 
may at any time or from time to time investigate the business and financial conditions of 
the company, examine the accounting books and documents, and request the board of 
directors or managerial personnel to make reports thereon. 
Article 218-2  
Supervisors of a company may attend the meeting of the board of directors to their 
opinions.  
In case the board of directors or any director commits any act, in carrying out the 
business operations of the company, in a manner in violation of the laws, regulations, the 
Articles of Incorporation or the resolutions of the shareholders’ meeting, the supervisors 
shall forthwith advise, by a notice, to the board of directors or the director, as the case 
may be, to cease such act. 
Article 220 
Subject to the condition that the board of directors does not or is unable to convene a 
meeting of shareholders, the supervisors may, for the benefit of the company, call a 
meeting of shareholders when it is deemed necessary. 
Article 221 
Supervisor may each exercise the supervision power individually. 
Article 222 
A supervisor shall not be concurrently a director, a managerial officer or other 
staff/employee of the company. 
Article 227 
The provisions set out in Article 196 to 200, Article 208-1, Article 214 and Article 215 
hereof shall apply mutatis mutandis, to the supervisors provided, however, that the 
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request to be submitted to supervisors under Article 214 hereof shall be submitted to the 
board of director. 
ZHENGQUAN JIAOYI FA [Securities and Exchange Act] (Taiwan)  
Article 14-2 
A company that has issued stock in accordance with this Act may appoint independent 
directors in accordance with its articles of incorporation. The Competent Authority, 
however, shall as necessary in view of the company’s scale, shareholder structure, type of 
operations, and other essential factors, require it to appoint independent directors, not less 
than two in number and not less than one-fifth of the total number of directors. 
Independent directors shall possess professional knowledge and there shall be restrictions 
on their shareholdings and the positions they may concurrently hold. They shall maintain 
independence within the scope of their directorial duties, and may not have any direct or 
indirect interest in the company. Regulations governing the professional qualifications, 
restrictions on shareholdings and concurrent positions held, assessment of independence, 
method of nomination, and other matters for compliance with respect to independent 
directors shall be prescribed by the Competent Authority. 
Given any of the following circumstances, a person may not act as an independent 
director, or if already acting in such capacity, shall be dismissed: 
1.Any circumstance set out in a subparagraph of Article 30 of the Company Act.  
2.The director is a government agency, juristic person, or representative thereof, and was 
elected in accordance with Article 27 of the Company Act.  
3.The person fails to meet the qualifications for independent director set forth in the 
preceding paragraph.  
Transfer of an independent director’s shareholdings is not subject to the provisions of the 
latter part of paragraph 1 or of paragraph 3, Article 197, of the Company Act. 
When an independent director is dismissed for any reason, resulting in a number of 
directors lower than that required under paragraph 1 or the company’s articles of 
incorporation, a by-election for independent director shall be held at the next following 
shareholders meeting. When all independent directors have been dismissed, the company 
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shall convene a special shareholders meeting to hold a by-election within 60 days from 
the date on which the situation arose. 
Article 14-3 
When a company has selected independent directors as set forth in paragraph 1 of the 
preceding article, then the following matters shall be submitted to the board of directors 
for approval by resolution unless approval has been obtained from the Competent 
Authority; when an independent director has a dissenting opinion or qualified opinion, it 
shall be noted in the minutes of the directors meeting: 
1. Adoption or amendment of an internal control system pursuant to Article 14-1.  
2. Adoption or amendment, pursuant to Article 36-1, of handling procedures for financial 
or operational actions of material significance, such as acquisition or disposal of assets, 
derivatives trading, extension of monetary loans to others, or endorsements or guarantees 
for others.  
3. A matter bearing on the personal interest of a director.  
4. A material asset or derivatives transaction.  
5. A material monetary loan, endorsement, or provision of guarantee.  
6. The offering, issuance, or private placement of any equity-type securities.  
7. The hiring or dismissal of an attesting CPA, or the compensation given thereto.  
8. The appointment or discharge of a financial, accounting, or internal auditing officer.  
9. Any other material matter so required by the Competent Authority. 
Article 20-1 
When the essential content of the financial reports or relevant financial or business 
documents referred to in paragraph 2 of the preceding article, or financial reports filed or 
publicly disclosed pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1 contain misrepresentations or 
nondisclosures, the persons under the following subparagraphs shall bear liability for 
damages suffered by the bona fide purchasers, sellers, or holders of securities issued by 
the issuer: 
1.The issuer and its responsible person.  
2.Employees of the issuer who placed their signatures or seals on the financial report or 
the financial or business document in question.  
  221 
With the exception of the issuer and the issuer’s chairman and general manager, a person 
under any paragraph of the preceding subparagraph shall not be liable for damages when 
he or she can demonstrate that they exercised all due diligence and had legitimate cause 
to believe that the reports or documents contained no misrepresentations or 
nondisclosures. 
A CPA who performs attestation of the financial reports or financial and business 
documents referred to in paragraph 1 shall be liable for the occurrence of any damages as 
set forth in paragraph 1 that arise out of misconduct, violation or negligence in 
connection with the performance of his or her duties as CPA. 
In respect of the liability of a CPA under the preceding paragraph, a good-faith buyer, 
seller, or holder of securities may petition a court to requisition the CPA’s working 
papers, and further, to review or make copies of the same. The CPA and the accounting 
firm may not refuse such action. 
With the exception of the issuer and the issuer’s chairman and general manager, when the 
negligence of a person under any subparagraph of paragraph 1 or under paragraph 3 
results in the occurrence of the damages set forth in paragraph 1, each such person shall 
bear liability for damages in proportion to their degree of responsibility. 
The provisions of paragraph 4 of the preceding Article shall apply mutatis mutandis to 
paragraph 1. 
Article 26-3 
The board of directors of a company that has issued stock in accordance with the Act may 
not number less than five persons. 
ZHENGQUAN TOUZI REN JI QIHUO JIAOYI REN BAOHU FA [Securities 
Investors and Futures Traders Protection Act] (Taiwan) 
Article 10-1 
When the protection institution carries out matters under paragraph 1 of the preceding 
article and discovers conduct by a director or supervisor of an exchange-listed or OTC-
listed company in the course of performing his or her duties that is materially injurious to 
the company or is in violation of laws, regulations, and/or provisions of the company’s 
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articles of incorporation, it may handle the matter in accordance with the following 
provisions: 
1. The protection institution may request the supervisors of the company to institute an 
action against the director on behalf of the company, or may request the board of 
directors of the company to institute an action against the supervisor on behalf of the 
company. If the supervisors or the board of directors fail to institute an action within 30 
days after receiving the request made by the protection institution, then the protection 
institution may institute the action on behalf of the company without regard to the 
restrictions of Article 214 of the Company Act or Article 227 of the Company Act as 
applied mutatis mutandis through Article 214. The protection institution’s request shall 
be made through a written instrument. 
2. The protection institution may institute a lawsuit in court for an order dismissing the 
given director or supervisor, without regard to the restrictions of Article 200 of the 
Company Act or of Article 227 of the Company Act applied mutatis mutandis through 
Article 200. 
 If the company has duly established an audit committee, the term “supervisor” as used in 
the preceding paragraph shall be taken to mean the audit committee or its member 
independent directors. 
The provisions of Articles 34 through 36 apply mutatis mutandis when the protection 
institution, pursuant to paragraph 1, institutes an action or an appeal, or petitions for an 
injunctive or executory proceeding. 
When the company’s exchange listing or OTC listing is terminated for any reason, the 
protection institution may still apply the provisions of the preceding three paragraphs 
with respect to any circumstance of paragraph 1 that occurred during the company’s 
period of listing. 
Article 11 
The protection institution shall have a board of directors comprised of no less than three 
persons. 
Directors shall be selected (or appointed) in the following manner: 
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1. Selection by the competent authority from among representatives recommended by a 
contributor. 
2. Appointment by the competent authority of academics, experts, and impartial members 
of the public who are not representatives of a contributor, and whose number shall 
comprise not less than two-thirds of the total number of directors. 
The term of a director shall be three years; successive terms may be served pursuant to 
continued selection or appointment. 
Article 12 
A chairman of the board of directors, who shall not be a contributor’s representative, 
shall be selected by a majority vote at a meeting of the board of directors attended by a 
quorum of no less than two-thirds. Selection of a chairman will become effective upon 
approval by the competent authority. 
Article 14 
The following matters shall be subject to resolutions of the board of directors: 
1. Amendments to the protection institution’s articles of incorporation.  
2. Adoption and amendment of the operating rules of the protection institution. 
3. Utilization of the protection fund.  
4. Amendments regarding the manner of custody and utilization of the protection fund. 
5. Borrowing and lending of capital. 
6. Matters requiring resolutions of the board of directors pursuant to the articles of 
incorporation. 
7. Other matters requiring resolutions of the board of directors pursuant to regulations of 
the competent authority. 
Resolutions of the board of directors shall be passed by a majority of directors at 
meetings where the required quorum shall be a majority of the directors. Resolutions on 
matters set forth in subparagraphs 1 through 5 of the preceding paragraph shall be passed 
by a majority of directors at meetings with a quorum of two-thirds of the directors. 
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Article 15  
The protection institution shall have from one to three supervisors. 
 A supervisor may at any time investigate the operations or finances of the protection 
institution, inspect account books or documents, or require its board of directors to 
produce a report. 
Supervisors may each exercise their supervisory powers independently. Upon discovering 
that the board of directors is acting in violation of an act or regulation or the articles of 
incorporation or operating rules of the protection institution, a supervisor shall 
immediately notify the board to cease the conduct. 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 11 shall apply mutatis mutandis to supervisors. 
Article 17 
The protection institution may request issuers, securities firms, securities service 
industries, futures enterprises, or relevant bodies in securities and futures markets to 
assist with the following matters or to provide relevant documents or materials: 
1. Mediations carried out in accordance with this Act. 
2. Payments made to securities investors or futures traders for unrepaid creditor’s rights 
pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1. 
3. Initiation of litigation or arbitration pursuant to Article 28. 
4. Matters undertaken on behalf of the competent authority. 
5. Other matters beneficial to the operation of the protection institution in its protective 
capacity. 
Where the protection institution discovers violations of an act or regulation through 
documents or materials obtained pursuant to the preceding paragraph, or where necessary 
for protection of the public interest, it shall report and request the handling of such 
matters by the competent authority; the same shall apply to any failure to provide 
assistance or the documents or materials requested pursuant to the preceding paragraph. 
Article 19 
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The protection fund shall be custodized by means of government bond purchases or 
deposit with financial institutions. Subject to approval by the competent authority, 
amounts totaling no more than 30 percent of the net value of the fund may be utilized for 
the following. 
1. Purchase of real property for use by the protection institution. 
2. Investment in exchange-listed or OTC-listed securities. 
3. Other investments beneficial to the fund’s capital maintenance. 
The total amount utilized pursuant to subparagraph 1 of the preceding paragraph may not 
exceed 10 percent of the total assets contributed at the time of the fund’s establishment. 
The amount of original investment in the stock of any exchange-listed or OTC-listed 
company pursuant to paragraph 1, subparagraph 2 may not exceed 1,000 shares. 
Article 20 
Use of the protection fund shall be limited to the following: 
1. Payments to securities investors or futures traders in accordance with Article 21. 
2. Expenditures by the protection institution for operation in accordance with this Act and 
other necessary expenses. 
3. Payment of fees for initiation of litigation or arbitration procedures in accordance with 
this Act. 
4. Other uses as approved by the competent authority. 
Budgeting for expenditures referred to under subparagraph 2 of the preceding paragraph 
shall be limited to the interest earned on fund assets in the given year, provided that the 
competent authority may make appropriate adjustments in view of financial and 
operating conditions. 
Article 21 
Under any of the following circumstances with respect to a securities investor or a futures 
trader, the protection institution may use the protection fund for payment: 
  226 
1. When an investor’s consigned securities firm breaches contract due to financial 
difficulties leaving it unable to make payment, where the investor, after completing 
settlement obligations for a trade of securities on the stock market, or after having 
requested exercise of warrant rights with the issuer of call (put) warrants through the 
securities firm, while having already made the necessary payment or delivery of 
securities, is unable to obtain the securities or payment of funds due.  
2. When a futures trader’s consigned futures commission merchant breaches contract due 
to financial difficulties leaving it unable to make payment, where the futures trader has 
engaged in futures trading on the futures market but is unable to obtain the margin or 
option premium due and to realize capital gains after completion of clearing procedures 
at the futures clearing house. 
Limits on payments to each securities investor or futures trader from the protection fund 
pursuant to the preceding paragraph, and limits on the total amount of such payments to 
all securities investors or futures traders at any given securities firm or futures 
commission merchant, as well as the regulations and procedures governing such 
payments, shall be prescribed by the competent authority. 
After making a payment pursuant to paragraph 1, the protection institution assumes the 
rights of the securities investor or futures trader against the securities firm or futures 
commission merchant in breach of contract within the amount of the payment made. 
The provisions of Articles 34 through 36 apply mutatis mutandis when the protection 
institution, pursuant to the preceding paragraph, institutes an action or an appeal or 
petitions for an injunctive or executory proceeding against the securities firm or futures 
commission merchant in breach of contract. 
Article 22 
When a civil dispute occurs between a securities investor or a futures trader and an issuer, 
a securities firm, a securities service enterprise, a futures commission merchant, the Stock 
Exchange, the GreTai Securities Market, a clearing institution or another interested party, 
where the dispute arises out of offerings, issuance, trading, futures transactions, or other 
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securities-related matters, the securities investor or futures trader may apply to the 
protection institution for mediation. 
The protection institution may establish a mediation committee comprising 7 to 15 
committee members to perform mediation. Regulations governing organization of the 
committee and mediation procedures shall be prescribed by the competent authority. 
Article 28 
For protection of the public interest, within the scope of this Act and its articles of 
incorporation, the protection institution may submit a matter to arbitration or institute an 
action in its own name with respect to a securities or futures matter arising from a single 
cause that is injurious to multiple securities investors or futures traders, after having been 
so empowered by not less than 20 securities investors or futures traders. The securities 
investors or futures traders may withdraw the empowerment to submit a matter to 
arbitration or institute an action prior to the conclusion of oral arguments or examination 
of witnesses and shall provide notice to the arbitral tribunal or court. 
After the protection institution has submitted a matter to arbitration or instituted an action 
in accordance with the preceding paragraph, and other securities investors or futures 
traders suffering damages due to a securities or futures matter arising from the same 
cause empower it to submit a matter to arbitration or institute an action, it may expand 
the claims asserted for arbitration or judgment prior to the conclusion of oral arguments 
or examination of witnesses in the court of first instance. 
The empowerment to submit a matter to arbitration or to institute an action under the 
preceding two paragraphs includes compulsory execution, provisional attachment, 
provisional injunction, participation in reorganization or bankruptcy proceedings, and 
other powers necessary to the protection institution’s exercise of rights in a securities or 
futures matter arising from a single cause. 
The empowerment to submit a matter to arbitration or institute an action under 
paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be effected through a written instrument. 
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Article 4 of the Arbitration Act and Article 167 of the Securities and Exchange Act shall 
not apply when a protection institution institutes an action or expands the claims asserted 
for judgment pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2. 
MIN FA [Civil Code] (Taiwan) 
Article 103 
An expression of intent which an agent makes in the name of the principal within the 
scope of his delegated power takes effect directly to the principal. 
If an expression of intent which is required to be made to the principal is made to his 
agent, the provision of the preceding paragraph shall be mutatis mutandis applied. 
Article 172 
A person, who manages an affair of another person without a mandate or obligation, shall 
manage the affair in conformity with the principal’s expressed or presumptive wishes and 
in the manner beneficial to the principal. 
Article 176 
If the management of the affair is beneficial to the principal and is not against his 
expressed or presumptive wishes, and where the manager has, for the principal, made 
necessary or beneficial expenses, or assumed debt, or suffered injury, he is entitled to 
claim against the principal for the reimbursement of such expenses plus interest 
commencing from the date of outlay, or the payment of such debt, or compensation for 
the injury sustained. 
In the cases provided by the second paragraph of Article 174, the manager may still have 
the claim in the preceding paragraph, even if the undertaking of the management of the 
affair is against the principal’s wishes. 
MINSHI SUSONG FA [Code of Civil Procedure] (Taiwan) 
Article 41 
Multiple parties, who have common interests and may not qualify to be an 
unincorporated association provided in the third paragraph of the preceding Article, may 
appoint one or more persons from themselves to sue or to be sued on behalf of the 
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appointing parties and the appointed parties. 
After the appointment has been made in a pending action in accordance with the 
provision of the preceding paragraph, all parties who are not appointed shall withdraw 
from the proceeding. 
The appointed parties provided in the two preceding paragraphs may be substituted, 
increased in number, or cancelled. Such substitution, increase in number, or cancellation 
shall not take effect until after a notice of such action is served upon the opposing party. 
Article 60 
Except where a party had conducted oral argument without objecting to the intervention, 
any party may move the court to deny a third-party motion for intervention, 
An interlocutory appeal may be taken from the ruling on the motion provided in the 
preceding paragraph. 
An intervener may conduct acts of litigation before the ruling denying the motion for 
intervention becomes final and binding. 
Article 62 
Article 56 shall apply mutatis mutandis to all cases where the claims of an action must be 
adjudicated jointly with regard to the intervener and the party supported. 
Article 65 
While an action is pending, a party may notify a third party whose legal interests will be 
adversely affected if such party is defeated. 
The notified third person may make further notification to another person. 
Article 67-1 
The court may, at an appropriate time prior to the conclusion of oral-argument in the first 
or second instance, serve a written notice of the action and the phase reached to a third 
party who is legally interested in the outcome of such action. 
The third party notified in accordance with the provision of the preceding paragraph may 
file, within five days of service of the notice, the motion provided in the first paragraph of 
Article 242. 
Wherever the third party notified in accordance with the provision of the first paragraph 
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is qualified to intervene in accordance with the provision of Article 58, the provision of 
the preceding Article shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
Article 77-13 
In matters arising from proprietary rights, the court cost shall be 1,000 New Taiwan 
Dollars [“NTD”] on the first NTD100,000 of the price or claim’s value, and an additional 
amount shall be taxed for each NTD10,000 thereafter in accordance with the following 
rates: NTD100 on the portion between NTD100,001 and NTD1,000,000 inclusive; 
NTD90 on the portion between NTD1,000,001 and NTD10,000,000 inclusive; NTD80 on 
the portion between NTD10,000,001 and NTD100,000,000 inclusive; NTD70 on the 
portion between NTD100,000,001 and NTD1,000,000,000 inclusive; and NTD60 on the 
portion over NTD1,000,000,000. A fraction of NTD10,000 shall be rounded up to 
NTD10,000 for purposes of taxing court costs. 
Article 249 
In case of any of the following, the court shall dismiss the plaintiff’s action by a ruling, 
but where the defect is rectifiable, the presiding judge shall order rectification within a 
designated period of time: 
1. Where the civil court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the action; 
2. Where the court in which the action is pending does not have territorial jurisdiction 
over the action and cannot issue a ruling provided in Article 28; 
3. Where the plaintiff or defendant lacks the capacity to be a party; 
4. Where the plaintiff or defendant lacks the capacity to litigate and is not legally 
represented by his/her statutory agent; 
5. Where an advocate initiates the action and the advocate lacks authority; 
6. Where the action is not initiated in accordance with the prescribed formality, or lacks 
other requirements; 
7. Where the action is initiated in violation of either the provisions of Article 253 or the 
second paragraph of Article 263, or its claim has been adjudicated by a final judgment 
with binding effect. 
Article 401 
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In addition to all parties, a final and binding judgment is binding on a person who 
becomes a party’s successor after the initiation of the action and on a person who 
possesses the claimed object for the parties or their successors. 
A final and binding judgment to which a party has acted as the plaintiff or the defendant 
for another person is also binding on such other person. 
The provisions of the two preceding paragraphs shall apply mutatis mutandis to the 
declaration of provisional execution. 
Article 496 
Except where the party has filed an appeal to assert the ground for a review or has failed 
to assert such ground known to him/her, a rehearing action may be initiated to request a 
review of a final judgment with binding effect in any of the following situations: 
1. Where the application of law is manifestly erroneous; 
2. Where the reason for the judgment manifestly contradicts the main text; 
3. Where the court which entered the judgment is not legally organized; 
4. Where a judge who should have disqualified himself/herself from the case by operation 
of law or by decision has participated in deciding the case; 
5. Where the parties are not legally represented in the action; 
6. Where a party has misrepresented that he/she did not know the opposing party’s 
domicile/residence when initiating the action, except where such opposing party has 
ratified the relevant litigation proceeding; 
7. Where a judge participating in deciding the case committed a criminal offense or 
received disciplinary sanction as a result of breaching his/her duties concerning the action 
which may affect the result of the original judgment; 
8. Where a party’s agent, or the opposing party, or the opposing party’s agent engaged in 
criminally punishable acts of any kind concerning the case which may affect the result of 
the original judgment; 
9. Where the tangible evidence based on which the judgment was entered was fabricated 
or altered; 
10. Where the witness, expert witness, interpreter, or statutory agent, after signing a 
written oath, gave false representation with regard to his/her testimony, expert testimony, 
interpretation, or statement, based on which the judgment was entered; 
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11. Where the referenced civil, criminal, administrative judgment, or any other decision 
or administrative disposition, based on which the judgment was entered, was amended by 
a subsequent final decision or administrative disposition with binding effect; 
12. Where a party discovers that the same claim has been disposed of by a prior final and 
binding judgment or a settlement or mediation, or that the applicability of such judgment 
or settlement or mediation is available; 
13. Where a party discovers tangible evidence which has not been considered or which 
becomes available, on condition that taking into consideration such tangible evidence will 
result in a more favorable decision to such party. 
Article 507-1 
In cases where a third party who is legally interested in an action was prevented from 
intervening in that action due to reasons not imputable to himself/herself, and thus was 
unable to present means of attack or defense which may have affected the result of the 
judgment, such third party may, by naming the parties to that action as co-defendants, 
initiate an opposition action against that final and binding judgment to seek the 
revocation of the portion of such judgment prejudicial to him/her, except where such 
party should seek remedies through other legal proceedings. 
XINGSHI SUSONG FA [Code of Criminal Procedure] (Taiwan) 
Article 487 
Those who injured by an offence may bring an ancillary civil action along with the 
criminal procedure, to request compensation from the defendant and those who may be 
liable under the Civil Code. 
KAISHA-HO [Companies Act] (Japan) 
Article 847  
(1) A shareholder (excluding a Holder of Shares Less than One Unit who is unable to 
exercise rights pursuant to the provisions of the articles of incorporation) having the 
shares consecutively for the preceding six months or more (or, in cases where a shorter 
period is prescribed in the articles of incorporation, such period or more) may demand the 
Stock Company, in writing or by any other method prescribed by the applicable 
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Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice, to file an action for pursuing the liability of an 
incorporator, Director at Incorporation, Company Auditor at Incorporation, Officer, etc. 
(meaning the Officer, etc. prescribed in Article 423(1); hereinafter the same shall apply in 
this Article) or liquidator, an action seeking the return of the benefits set forth in Article 
120(3) or an action seeking payment under the provisions of Article 212(1) or Article 
285(1) (hereinafter referred to as an ‘Action for Pursuing Liability, etc.’ in this Section); 
provided, however, that this shall not apply in cases where the purpose of the Action for 
Pursuing Liability, etc. is to seek unlawful gains of such shareholder or a third party or to 
inflict damages on such Stock Company. 
(2) With regard to application of the provisions of the preceding paragraph to a Stock 
Company that is not a Public Company, the phrase ‘A shareholder (excluding a Holder of 
Shares Less than One Unit who is unable to exercise rights pursuant to the provisions of 
the articles of incorporation)’ in that paragraph shall be deemed to be replaced with ‘A 
shareholder.’ 
(3) When the Stock Company does not file an Action for Pursuing Liability, etc. within 
sixty days from the day of the demand under the provisions of paragraph (1), the 
shareholder who has made such demand may file an Action for Pursuing Liability, etc. on 
behalf of the Stock Company.  
(4) In cases where the Stock Company does not file an Action for Pursuing Liability, etc. 
within sixty days from the day of the demand under the provisions of paragraph (1), if 
there is a request by the shareholder who made such demand or the incorporator, Director 
at Incorporation, Company Auditor at Incorporation, Officer, etc. or liquidator set forth in 
that paragraph, it shall, without delay, notify the person who made such a request of the 
reason for not filing an Action for Pursuing Liability, etc. in writing or by any other 
method prescribed by the applicable Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice.  
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (3), in cases where the Stock 
Company is likely to suffer irreparable harm through the elapse of the period set forth in 
those paragraphs, the shareholder set forth in paragraph (1) may immediately file an 
Action for Pursuing Liability, etc. on behalf of the Stock Company; provided, however, 
that this shall not apply in the cases prescribed in the proviso to that paragraph.  
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(6) The Action for Pursuing Liability, etc. set forth in paragraph (3) or the preceding 
paragraph shall be deemed to be an action relating to a claim which is not a claim based 
on a property right in calculating the value of the subject-matter of the suit.  
(7) When a shareholder files an Action for Pursuing Liability, etc., the court may, in 
response to a petition by the defendant, order such shareholder to provide reasonable 
security.  
(8) When the defendant intends to file the petition set forth in the preceding paragraph, 
the defendant shall make a prima facie showing that the Action for Pursuing Liability, etc. 
has been filed in bad faith. 
Article 849 
(1) A shareholder or a Stock Company may intervene in a suit relating to an Action for 
Pursuing Liability, etc. either as a coparty or for assisting either of the parties; provided, 
however, that this shall not apply when it will unduly delay the court proceedings or 
impose an excessive administrative burden on the court. 
(2) In order for a Stock Company to intervene in a suit relating to an Action for Pursuing 
Liability, etc. to assist a director (excluding an Audit Committee Member), executive 
officer, liquidator or a person who was formerly in such a position, it shall obtain the 
consent of the persons specified in the following items for the categories listed 
respectively in those items: 
 (i) Company with Company Auditors: the company auditor (in cases where there are two 
or more company auditors, each of such company auditors); or  
 (ii) Company with Committees: each Audit Committee Member. 
(3) When a shareholder files an Action for Pursuing Liability, etc., the shareholder shall 
give notice of suit to the Stock Company without delay. 
(4) When a Stock Company files an Action for Pursuing Liability, etc. or receives the 
notice of suit set forth in the preceding paragraph, it shall give public notice to that effect 
or give notice thereof to its shareholders without delay. 
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(5) With regard to application of the provisions of the preceding paragraph to a Stock 
Company that is not a Public Company, the phrase “give public notice to that effect or 
give notice thereof to its shareholders” in that paragraph shall be deemed to be replaced 
with “give notice to that effect to its shareholders.” 
ZHONGHUA RENMING GONGHEGUO GONGSIFA [Company Law of the 
People’s Republic of China]  
Article 152  
Where a director or senior manager is under the circumstance as mentioned in Article 150 
of this Law, the shareholder(s) of the limited liability company or joint stock limited 
company separately or aggregately holding 1% or more of the total shares of the 
company for 180 consecutive days or more may request in writing the board of 
supervisors or the supervisor of the limited liability company with no board of 
supervisors to initiate a lawsuit in the people’s court. If the supervisor is under the 
circumstance as mentioned in Article 150 of this Law, the aforesaid shareholder(s) may 
request in writing the board of directors or the acting director of the limited liability 
company with no board of directors to lodge an action in the people’s court.  
If the board of supervisors, or supervisor of a limited liability company with no board of 
supervisors, or board of directors or acting director refuses to lodge a lawsuit after 
receiving a written request as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, or if they fail to 
initiate a lawsuit within 30 days after receiving the request, or if, in an emergency, the 
failure to lodge an action immediately will cause unrecoverable damages to the interests 
of the company, the shareholder(s) as listed in the preceding paragraph may, on their own 
behalf, directly lodge a lawsuit in the people’s court.  
If the legitimate rights and interests of a company are impaired and any losses are caused 
to the company, the shareholders as mentioned in the preceding paragraph may initiate a 
lawsuit in the people’s court according to the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs. 
Korean Commercial Act (South Korea) 
Article 403  
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(1) Any shareholder who holds not less than 1/100 of the outstanding shares may demand 
the corporation to file a lawsuit against director(s) seeking his/her liability.  
(2) The demand under Sec. 1 shall be made in writing, stating the reasons thereof.  
(3) If the corporation has failed to file such action within 30 days from the date on which 
the demand under Sec. 2 was received, the shareholder mentioned in Sec. 1 may 
immediately file such action on behalf of the corporation.  
(4) If the corporation may suffer irreparable damages with the lapse of the period set 
forth in Sec. 3, the shareholder mentioned in Sec. 1 may immediately file such action, 
notwithstanding Sec. 3.  
(5) The action shall not be rejected even where the number of shares held by a 
shareholder who has filed an action under Sec. 3 and 4 comes to be under 1/100 of the 
outstanding shares after the filing (with the exception that s/he no longer holds any share).  
(6) In the action fi led under Sec. 3 and 4, the parties, without permission from a court, 
cannot withdraw, renounce, or approve the claim nor compromise.  
(7) The provisions of Sec. 3 and 4 of Art. 176 and Art. 186 shall apply mutatis mutandis 
to the action under this Article. 
Article 404  
(1) The company may intervene in an action under Article 403 (3) and (4).  
(2) A shareholder who has filed an action under Article 403 (3) and (4) shall immediately 
give notice of the action to the company.  
Article 405 (Rights and Obligations of Shareholders Filing Actions)  
(1) If a shareholder who has filed an action pursuant to Article 403 (3) and (4) wins the 
case, he/she may demand reimbursement by the company for the cost incurred in relation 
to the action and a reasonable amount of other expenses disbursed for the action. In such 
cases, the company which has paid the expenses for action shall have a right to indemnity 
against the directors or auditors.  
Article 406  
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(1) In cases where the plaintiff and defendant in an action under Article 403 have 
procured a judgment to be rendered by their collusion for the purpose of fraudulently 
injuring the rights of the company, which is the subject matter of the case, the company 
or shareholders may institute an action for retrial against the final and conclusive 
judgment.  
(2) The provisions of Article 405 shall apply mutatis mutandis to actions under paragraph 
(1).  
Article 546-6 
(6) Any person who has continued to hold stocks equivalent to no less than 1/10,000 of 
the total number of issued and outstanding shares of a listed company for more than six 
months may exercise shareholder's rights under Article 403 (including cases where 
applied mutatis mutandis in Articles 324, 408-9, 415, 424-2, 467-2, and 542).  
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